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PREFACE 
Urban hiato17 has attracted the interests ot JD8D7 contemporary American 
historians. The majority- ot research haa been concentrated on the urbaniza-
tion process ot the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but a tew scholars 
have tumed their attention to the more tormative periods ot town or cit7 
developnent. Richard c. Wade's The Urban Frontier (Chicagoz 1959) provided 
a new tramework in which to view both wstward expansion and cit7 developnent. 
According to Wade, the towns were often the tirst outposts ot civilization on 
the trontier around which agricultural. cCID1l1Ullities -were later established. 
Wade's theme of the urban trontier is a controlling idea in the tollowing 
study. 
In 18151 the wstern ah ore of Lake Michigan was a frontier area. In 
previous decades, the region had been under control ot the British governaent. 
But the War ot 1812 marked a signif'icant stage in wstward expansion, tor now 
the American government prepared to secure milit&1'7 and political control ot 
the Old Northweat. In the period f'ran J.815 to 183.3, Green Bq and Chicago 
-were the two major settlements along Lake Michigan's western shore. At areas 
known todq as Kewaunee, Manitowoc, Milwaukee, and Racine, tur traders and 
Indians occasionally met to exchange turs, but perm.anent settlements never 
developed. In this period, the tur traders, the American govemment, and the 
American Fur C(D.J>any were the principal participants of trontier life. In 
describing the operation of the tur trade, particular attention is devoted to 
the nature ot the tur trade society- and its relationships to the later growth 
of' tollln8. 
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Beginning in 183.3, frontier society changed radically. F.migrant~ from 
the East moved into the territory from Green Ba;y to Chicago as townsites 
developed where fomerly there were only simple fur trade villages. Leading 
the march westward were eastem financiers anxious to speculate in towns along 
Lake Michigan's westem shore. In the next decade, these eastem capitalists 
in partnership with westem entrepreneurs established to'Wfls, constructed 
buildings, and initiated intemal :improvement projects. Chicago and Milwaukee 
soon became the pre-Elllinent camnercial centers, but secondary townsites at 
Green Ba\v', Racine, and Kenosha also underwent rapid developn.ent. By 184.3, 
the westem shore ot Lake Michigan was no longer a frontier region as the 
agricultural interior w~ brought under cultivation and townsites from 
Green Ba;y to Chicago emerged as thriving cammerci&l centers. 
This study relates the developnent or these towns trcm their origins as 
fur trade villages. In an effort to refine the techniques ot investigating 
the history or towns, I have stressed the :importance ot entrepreneurial leader-
ship and the significant involvement ot eastem capital in establishing the 
westem towns. 
For assistance in the preparation of this study, I wish to thank 
Mr. Archibald Motley ot the Chicago Historical Society, Miss Josephine Harper 
of the State Historical Soc1et7 ot Wisconsin, and Dr. Robert McCluggage who 
directed the research and writing ot the dissertation. A speci&l thanks is 
due to the Illinois State Historical Societ7 and the Illinois State Sesquicen-
tennial. Camnission tor a grant which enabled the author to devote his tul.1-
time to the writing or this sti.¥iy. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Struggle tor Frontier Daninanee: The National. 
Government and the American Fur Canpany, 1815-1822 
The War or 1812 was owr. Along the westem shore ot Lake Michigan, the 
frontier inhabitants, with some trepidation, prepared to retum to their 
normal pattem of lite. For years, the area had been a wildemess in which 
the only occupation was the .fur trade. Green Bq with approxima.tely 250 
people was the most populous area including such refinements of civilization 
as two trading stores, three blacksmiths, and a carpenter.1 Green Bq was 
hardly an American settlement, for its population consisted ot families or 
English and French extraction still loyal to the British gowmment. The most 
important residents were tur traders, such as Jacques Porlier, a native ot 
Montreal who settled at the Ba.y in 1791. John Lawe, the recognized leader of 
the mnall canmunity, was a native Englishman, who had first traded in Mackinac 
and then moved to Green Bq in 1797.2 
Their society and the conduct of the fur trade was simply organized. 
Before the War of 1812, the traders received manufactured products .from the 
North West Company- in Canada to exchange for the animal pelts collected by 
the Indians. Jacob Franks 1 an tmcle of John Lawe 1 served as the middleman 
betwen the Canadian canpany and the Green Bq traders. Both the white 
traders and the Indians thrived on the fur trade and the two societies co-
~xisted in relatiw hamony. Numerous traders married into the neighboring 
Indian tribes. 
l 
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In 18151 Green Bay was the oncy penna.nent settlement on the we stem shore 
of Lake Michigan. Milwaukee had no established residents. Occasionally a fur 
trader located there for a season to trade with the Indians.3 The same was 
true of numerous points between Qreen Bq and Chicago. ·where rivers nowed 
into the Lake such as at present-day Kewaunee, Manitowoc, Sheboygan, Kenosha,, 
and Racine,, an occasional trader would establish a post at the confluence of 
the waterways,, but pennanent settlements never developed. Lake Michigan's 
westem shore was virtually unaffected by American influence and the tide of 
westward expansion. 
Chicago differed little .f'ran the other points on Lake Michigan. Before 
the War of 1812,, Chicago's population consisted of a few traders,, chief' of' 
whan was John Kinzie, and a small contingent of American military personnel. 
While the presence of Fort Dearborn meant that the Chicago area was exposed 
to American influence, this pressure had little real effect. The fur traders 
were supplied by British finns and the Indians consistently remained loyal to 
their British contacts. During the War of 1812,, the Indians under the in-
fluence of their British al.lies massacred the military personnel at Fort 
Dearborn indicating that American presence had little influence on the 
lliinois country. With the War's conclusion, the few inhabitants of Chicago 
drifted back hoping to re-establish the fur trade. John Kinzie, the most 
notable of these traders, retumed in 1815.4 
The scene was the same all along the westem shore of Lake Michigan. The 
traders retumed to their small settlements hoping that the War of 1812 had 
not changed the familiar pattem of frontier life. Yet the frontier was to 
change, and to change radically. Decisions affecting the destiny of the 
westem shore of Lake Michigan were now made in places far away from Green Bay 
or Chicaro. at Washiru?:ton in Congress and at New York in the office of John J. 
Astor and Canpa.ny. 
In Washington, statesmen and government officials reelized that the 
Northwest frontier was anything but secure for settlement or free from 
British influence. The responsible parties were accurate in this judgment. 
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During the \';ar of 1812, the predaninantly French-Canadian population of 
Green Ba;r had actively aided the British forces. Robert Dickson, a Canadian 
fur trade agent for Green Ba.y before the War, successfully recruited numerous 
Green Ba.y traders and used the Bay as a depot for British supplies and troopa. 5 
The Fort Dearborn Hassacre at Chicago contributed further evidence of .American 
insecurity on the frontier. The War itself had accomplished very little for 
the United States in the areas bordering Lake Michigan, for the government was 
still confronted with the tasks of securing the area from British influence 
and pacifying the Indians. 
To these problems Lewis Cass, Governor of the Hichigan Territory and 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, :immediately turned his attention. In 
September, lSJ.4, Cass commissioned the Chicago trader, John Kinzie, to act in 
behalf of the United States and visit the Indian tribes of the Illinois and 
Indiana country to urge their allegiance to the American government.6 Early 
in 1815, Kinzie completed his tour and reported to Governor Cass a series of 
proposals designed to secure American control of the frontier. Kinzie en-
visioned a system of military posts and Indian agencies to control the British 
influence. He also suggested a strict supervision of the Indian trade with 
only licensed traders allowed in the Indian territory. The first step, 
according to Kinzie, was the establishment of military posts at Green B~ and 
Chicago. Speaking from experience, Kinzie informed Governor Cass that the 
British deliberately created animosity between the Indians and the American 
govemment.7 
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Utilizing the counsel of many westeni citizens, Gass formulated his own 
plan for frontier security. Writing to the Secretary of War in June, 1815, 
Cass claimed that the government's primary task was to exclude British par-
ticipation in the Indian trade. The most feasible solution to this problen., 
Cass suggested, was to block the main camnunication arteries through which 
British goods reached American territory. Cass therefore recamnended the 
establishment of a fort at Green Bay blocking the Fox-Wisconsin waterway and 
at Chicago cutting off the transshipment of goods fra:n Lake Hichigan to the 
Illinois River.8 
Other govenunent officials did not approach the problem with the same 
clear perspective. General Jacob Brow, Commander of the Northeni Division 
of Military Departments in the United States, recommended a wholesale exclu-
sion of British traders from the Northwest Territory. 9 Govemor Ninian 
Edwards of the Illinois Territory suggested that all the residents of Green 
Bay should be driven !ran the colll'l.try and their places filled with American 
citizens.10 
Washington officials did not accept the advice of General Brown or 
Governor !::dwards but followed the recommendations of men like Lewis Cass. 
The govenunent now moved to secure American control of the frontier. This 
movement signaled the end of the simple economic and social frontier life. 
The government was as large a business and regulatory organization as existed 
and it, not the individual trapper or farmer, made the first steps towards 
American expansion. Unfortunately, government policy alienated a generation 
or frontier inhabitants. 
Governnent action in the Old Northwest consisted of three different 
policies. The first step was to establish military posts at Green Bay and 
5 
Chicago. In 1816, Captain Hezekiah Bradley arrived in Chicago to beg;i.n the 
construction of the new Fort Dearborn while Colonel John Miller commanded the 
troops sent to Green Bey to erect Fort Howard.11 Realizing that frontier 
security demanded more than military control, the government established 
Indian agencies at both Green Bey and Chica.go. In 1816, Charles Jouett headed 
the Chicago Indian Agency while Colonel John Bowyer assumed the same duties 
a.t Green B8\f • In general, the Indian agent was to prepare the way for the 
purchase of Indian lands before the tide of white settlement and when possible 
advance the civilization of our primitive red brothers. Host importantly, 
however, the Indian agent was to undermine British influence among the Indian 
tribes. He was therefore charged with the responsibility of regulating the 
Indian trade through the issuing of licenses to selected traders.12 To the 
fur traders at Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green Bey, who, for over a hU11dred 
years, had conducted their trade with the Indians unfettered by the intru-
sions of supervisory personnel, the Indian agents could only represent a 
threat to their nom.al patterns of conducting the Indian trade. Indeed, many 
t~aders realized that the era of the individualistic exploitation of the fur 
trade was at an end. 
If the presence of military posts and Indian agencies to control the 
areas west of Lake Michigan seemed to represent an econoodc threat to the 
fur trader, :imagine their reaction to the establishment of government fac-
tories at both Green BS3' and Chicago in 1816. The government factory was not 
a new institution on the frontier. The system was originally devised in 1795 
to regulate the Indian trade. Its most distinguished aim was admittedly 
humanitarian, for the factory hoped to eliminate the impoverishment which the 
Indian suffered in dealing with the supposedly unscrupulous fur traders. 
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Stocked with money and supplies to exchange for the Indian's furs, the factory, 
in reality, was a government business intending to undennine independent con-
trol of the Indian trade.13 Needless to s~, the trader v:iewE.'Cl the .factory 
with some trepidation, for it was in direct competition with his only source 
of economic livelihood. ~Jhile the military posts and Indian agencies were 
regulatory institutions, the government .factories were large-scale business 
enterprises. At Chica.Go, Jacob Varnum assumed the duties of government factor 
while Matthew Irwin was appointed to head the Green Bay factory. The outside 
influences which were to change the character and path of settlement along the 
lake shore were now firmly entrenched at the two most critical junctures of 
trade and commerce. 
The initial policies of the government in establishing militacy posts, 
Indian agencies, and factories were :i.r.~~ediatc :measures for military security 
and Indian pacification. Yet the &overnment was never certain about the 
future use of the lands borderinc Lake r:ichigan until late in the 1820 1 s. 
Illinois and the region of Chicago was seemingly destined for white settlement 
since by 11330 the t:;over.nment had purchased ;":ost of the Indian lands in that 
area.14 In '.Jisconsin, however, the ;:~overnment was not im;ilediately corn.':l.itted 
to clearing title to the land for white settlement. In 1825, Secretary of 
\'iar, John Calhoun, suggested that the Indians of northern Illinois, Indiana, 
Ohio, and New York be r..1oved to areas north of the Illinois state line and 
west of Lake l.lichi;an.15 Calhoun's suggestion was never completely followed 
even though a group of New York Indians was removed to an area south of 
Green B~ in 1825.16 The pressure of white settlement in the early 1830 1 s 
finally brou3ht an end to any ideas of 1/isconsin as a permanent Indian 
reservation. 
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If the residents on the western shore of Lake Hichigan only had .to 
confront the confused and often contradictory policy of the national govern-
oent, perhaps their role in frontier expansion would have been greater. The 
story, however, now switched from government departments in ·11ashington to the 
business district of New York and the of :~ice of John J. Astor and Company. 
For some years previous to the ·;~'ar of 1812, John Astor had dreamed of convert-
ing the American fur trade into a major capitalistic investment. Astor knew 
of the rich harvest of furs garnered in the Lake Eichigan area. Before 1Hl21 
this trade was controlled by several Canadian firms with only a limited capital 
investment. Astor envisioned a centrally organized fur trade company with 
access to a large supply of goods, employing thousands of traders, and 
utilizing the market techniques of a large corporation. In 18ll, he took the 
first step by entering into partnership with several. Canadian firms which were 
trading in the Green BC\Y and Chicago areas. Astor thought, or at least sus-
pected, that someday these areas would be under American control and that 
British interests would be curtailed leaving Astor the bulk of the fur trade 
in the Old Northwest. Astor's plan worked exceedingly well, for after the 
War of 1812 British interests in the Old Northwest were excluded. Astor 
therefore turned to the organization of a large corporation to exploit this 
trading territory. He first set up the American Fur Company and appointed 
two dynamic businessoen, Ha'Tisey Crooks and Robert Stuart, to establish western 
headquarters at Uackinac. From Mackinac, Crooks and Stuart gradually incor-
porated the independent fur traders into one of the first major business 
enterprise on Lake Hichigan's western shore.17 
Fran 1815 to 1817, Astor, Crooks, and Stuart were involved in arranging 
the administrative details of the American Fur Company and its presence was 
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not :ir..1li1ediately felt in the interior. The government acted more promptly. 
In addition to establishing military posts and Indian agencies, the government 
also enacted legislation to regulate the trade. After deliberations by a 
Congressional cor:i.~ittee, Congress passed the following law designed to curtail 
British influence in the trade. The trade law of 1816 stated that: 
Licenses to trade with the Indians within the territorial bounda-
ries of tho United ~>tates shall not be granted to any but citizens 
of the United States, unless by the express dir~ction of the 
President of the United States, and upon such terms and conditions 
as the public interest in his opinion require • • • • 
The law also prescribed penalties of forfeiture, fine, and .imprisonment for 
any foreigner introducing merchandise into the Indian country or entering 
the Indian t~rritory without a passport.18 The law of 1816 was designed to 
eliminate British influence in the interior and to encourage the exploitation 
of the fur trade by American citizens. 
Through the influence of John Astor, the government was made aware of 
the fact that iunerica.n business interests were not sufficiently developed nor 
suitably trained to conduct the fur trade without the aid of selected British 
personnei.19 Astor succeeded in convincing national and local officials that 
the law of 1816 should be interpreted liberally. William H. Crawford, the 
Secretary of War, indicated the general attitude of the government in the 
following comraunication to Governor Cass: 
It is therefore wholly improbable that the enterprise of .American 
citizens will futnish an adequate supply to those remote tribes. 
The want of capital in the hands of men accustaned to the trade, 
and who have enterpr:i.se to bear the fatigues, and brave the dan-
gers incident to its prosecution will it is believed, render it 
necessary for the present to pennit foreigners to carry on this 
trade, under such regulations as shall subject them to a strict 20 
observance of the laws of the United States on this subject .••• 
Governor Gass COim!lunicated this infonnation to the Indian agents at the 
local posts. He mentioned the efforts of Hamsey Crooks, the American Fur 
Company agent, to establish a canpany for the exploitation of the trade and 
advised extreme liberality in licensing British traders for the American Fur 
2J. Canpany. 
While Cass and other national officials acknowledged Astor's requests 
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for a liberal licensing policy, 22 the Indian agents at certain key points, 
Mackinac and Green Bay, enforced the law more stringently. Major Willjam H. 
Puthuf'f, the Indian agent at Mackinac, who issued licenses to traders joumey-
ing from Mackinac to the interior, considered the employment of British 
23 traders a threat to American control. Puthuf'f was against the licensing of 
the Green Bay traders because of their close cormections with the British 
before the War of 1812.24 He al.so claimed that Astor's American Fur Ca.npany 
was primarily staffed by British personnel and was therefore a threat to 
American interests. 25 Acting on these judgments, Puthuff consistently re-
fused to grant licenses to the Green Bay traders and encouraged Colonel Bowyer, 
the Green Bay Indian agent, to follow the same policy. In one case, Puthuff' 
seized Jacques Porlier•s winter collection of furs claiming that Porlier had 
never received a trading license. 26 
Local government of ticials were extremely inconsistent in their interpre-
tations of the 1816 trade law. While Y.lilliam. Puthuff followed a strict policy 
at Mackinac, Colonel Bowyer at Green Bay vacillated. At one point, Bowyer 
issued licenses to any trader who applied, leading one Green Bay resident to 
speculate that 11I believe there will be as many traders as houses. 112:"/ At 
other times, Bowyer followed a stricter policy. In October, 1817, he expelled 
a long-time Green Bq trader from the territory. 28 The vacillations of local 
Indian agents left the traders in a state of constant confusion about their 
ability to trade in the coming season. Gradually they began to resent the 
regulations of this new govemment. 29 
Inconsistency was not alone the province of local officials, for the 
national government also shifted its interpretation of the 1816 law. In 
January, 1818, Governor Cass informed the local Indian agents of a major 
policy change which called for the canplete and total exclusion of all but 
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American citizens fran the fur trade. Exceptions were no longer to be granted, 
not even to the American Fur Company.JO The Green B~ traders were astounded 
by the law and questioned the advisability of even rema:injng residents of 
Green Ba.v.31 A far more powerful interest, the American Fur Company, also 
found the new directive objectionable. Without the aid of trained British 
personnel, Astor could not hope to quickly and effectively establish a trade 
monopoly. By prohibiting all British interests from the trade, the government 
was virtually excluding the majority of traders then in the Northwest 
Territory. Since before the War of 1812, the area had been a fur trade ter-
ritory exploited only by traders joumeying south from Canada or living at 
Green Ba.v. After the War, thsse traders were, in the eyes of the American 
government, still British citizens and thus not legally allowed to partici-
pate in the trade. Faced with the possible ruin of their Canpany 1 Astor, 
Crooks 1 and Stuart exerted tremendous pressure on the national level and 
succeeded in obtaining an almost instant repeal of the new directive.32 Under 
new instructions £ran Governor caS's, the Indian agents were now allowed to 
license British traders but only to serve as employees of trading outfits 
headed by American citizens.33 
The changing character or government policy indicated two salient points 
about these initial years of American involvement on the frontier west of Lake 
Michigan. First, the American Fur Canpany seemed to wield enormous power 
both upon national official.a and upon the lesser territorial. agents. Recalci-
trant Indian ents such as l or Puthuf.t' and Colonel Bo er who refused to 
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license traders desired by the American Fur Company were removed from.their 
posts a short t:hne later.34 Secondly, the government increased the hostility 
between its officials and frontier residents. By 18181 Jacques Porlier ex-
pressed the general sentiments of the traders when he remarked that 11 I begin 
to perceive the word libertz in the language of politics or of the Governments 
does not mean the same thing as we comoonly suppose. ,i35 
Porlier was not the only Green Bay trader to feel the effects of the 
government's presence. John Lawe continually complained that he was rapidly 
losing money because he could not obtain a license. "This is three years 
nearly, 11 Lawe explained, as:tnce peace has been made and I have been in hell 
ever since. 1136 Frustrated by their inability to pursue the fur trade free 
ran regulations, several. of the Green Btzy traders seriously considered moving 
to lands recently purchased by a Canadian friend., Lord Selkirk, in the Red 
ver district. Before his plans were completed, Lord Selkirk died, forcing 
he traders 1 such as John Lawe and the Grignons, to accept their plight at 
1reen Bay.37 In late 1819, the traders at Green Bay finally applied for 
erican citizenship realizing that such action was their only hope of 
ceiving permanent licenses for the Indian trade.38 
The entire license controversy indicated a great deal of government 
consistency, but the dispute al.so revealed the tactics and power of Astor's 
erican Fur Company. The company utilized the confusion surrounding the law 
r 1816 to increase their control over the fur trade. 
While Astor spent the years .fran 1815 to 1817 organizing the arlm1njatra-
ive aspects of the company, a Detroit merchant, David Stone, obtained a large 
upply of goods and sent traders into the interior. Stone employed Jacob 
•ranks, the uncle of John Lawe, who employed many of the Green Bay traders 
39 or Stone's com 
• traders 
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experienced great difficulty in ob~~ing trading licenses.4u By 18186 
however, Ham.say Crooks and Robert Stuart were prepared to actively oppose 
David Stone in the territory west of Lake Michjgan. Because of the American 
Fur Company's power over local officials, Stuart and Crooks made the law of 
1816 work to their advantage. Posing as friends of the Green Ba.y traders, 
Crooks and Stuart assured them that they would consult with the proper 
Washington officials a.bout obtaining licenses.41 Robert Stuart personally 
wrote to Govemor Cass explaining that the innocent residents of Green Bay 
had suffered terrible hardships because the local Indian agent had failed to 
grant licenses. Stuart further counselled Cass that u ••• such oppression 
and inconsistency will I am convinced be speedily remedied by you Sir. i/+2 
By 18211 the Green Bay traders received annual trading licenses because 
of the /unerican Fur Company's influence. 'l'hus the Green Bay traders naturally 
tenninated their business relations with David Stone in favor of the more 
powerful American Fur Company. The independent fur traders, confused and 
victimized by the govennnent 1s regulations, willing!y attached them.selves to 
the American Fur Company which slowly increased its control of the fur trade. 
In time, traders frcm Green Ba.y to Chicago would find themselves helpless 
employees of a frontier monopoly. 
The .factory system was the final phase of the govennnent's frontier 
policy. :~stablished at both Chicago and Green Bay in 1816 to regulate the 
Indian trade of the Illinois and Wisconsin areas, those factories provided 
the context for the most bitter and sustained conflicts of the period. Their 
existence, of course, threat~fied the economic livelihood of the regular fur 
trader in addition to providing canpetition for Astor's American Fur Company. 
From 1816 to 1S22, the American Fur Campany waged their o'Wl'l private war on . 
the factories and the scene on the frontier was a picture of one business 
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enterprise vying for trade hegemony over the other. In the interim, the 
previously independent trader was caught between the .factory and the .American 
Fur Company. By 18221 when the factory system collapsed partial.ly the result 
of the competitive and political practices of the .American Fur Company and 
partially due to the inept and inconsistent fo:nnula.tion of the system, the 
small trader was more than ever convinced that he was at the mercy of forces 
outside his control. The entire story of the factory system was an example 
of the frontier's dependence and connection with eastern capital involved in 
the American Fur Canpany, big government, and the canpetitive economic prac-
tices which existed between them. 
In 1816, Thanas L. McKenney was appointed director of the factory system 
with the title of Superintendent of the Indian Trade.43 Later with the consent 
of the President, McKenney selected his factors for the posts at Chicago and 
Green Bq. Jacob Vamun, a native of Mew England, was appointed to head the 
Chicago factory. Before the War of 18121 he had directed a factory at Sandusky, 
Ohio, and was presumably well-acquainted with the system.44 Similarly Matthew 
Irwin, who was to supervise the Green Bay factory, had previously operated the 
Chicago factory from 1810 to 1Sl2.45 Vamum's salary was $800 per year while 
Irwin received $10oo.46 The difference in salarJ reflected the more difficult 
task which faced Irwin at the Bay. Before the War of 18121 Chica.go was ex-
posed to the factory system and American military personnel, but .American 
institutions had never been established at Green Ba\Y" until the arrival ot 
Mat thew Irwin. 
Jacob Vamum, Matthew Irwin, and Thanas McKenney embarked upon the project 
with great enthusiasm. In its first year of operation, McKenney sent to the 
Green Bq factory approximately $15,500 worth of trade goods.47 By January, 
1817. McKenney seemed very disturbed by Irwin's conduct of the .factory: 
Since you have been at Green I3ay your returns have been very 
much irregular and the business you have been doing very limited. 
The whole amount of your sales appears to be only $538.40 and of 
this sum it would seem about $180 had been sold to the Indians. 
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Disillusioned, McKenney considered closing the factory unless Irwin :immediately 
explained the causes for its poor business.48 
Matthew Irwin soon responded to McKenney•s request in tones of despair 
about the future of factories in that area. The great number of British 
traders in the area, the use of liquor in the Indian trade, and the hostility 
of frontier residents, Irwin explained, were the principal deterrents to a 
successful factory. 49 
Irwin did not immediately succumb to frontier hostility. For the next 
several years, he waged an econanic and political war against the traders and 
the American Fur Canpany. Irwin's efforts to save the Green Bay factory 
illuminated the dl.ltiple causes of the factory's decline and also the tactics 
and practices of the American Fur Canpany. 
Irwin first asked Colonel John Bowyer, the Green Bay Indian agent, for 
aid. Attempting to utilize the law of 1816, which prohibited foreigners from 
participation in the trade, Irwin presented Bowyer a detailed list of traders 
of known British affiliations. The list included the names of many praninent 
Green Bay traders. Irwin requested Bowyer to withhold trade licenses from 
these individuals and mentioned the consequences of failure to act: 
It may be proper to rEm&rk that whilst these and other British 
subjects are suffered to enter and continue in this country as 
traders, it will be useless tor the Government to continue this 
factory here; principally rran the ascendancy which an uninter-
rupted intercourse of many ;rears had enabled thEIIl to acquire 
over the minds of t~0 Indians, supported by extensive family con-
nections with them. 
At different times, however, Colonel Bowyer licensed the Green Bay 
traders. Irwin considered such policies as a deliberate attempt to undercut 
15 
the factory. In truth, the govemment•s Indian policy was burdened by a basic 
contradiction. The Indian agents regulated the tur trade by issuing licenses 
and were compelled to give licenses to American and selected British traders 
of reputable character. Moreover, the Indian agents charged fees for licenses 
providing them with a vested interest in the nl.lllber of traders in the terri-
tory. The Indian agents often sympathized with the private traders and the 
American Fur Company. The government factor, on the other hand, conducted 
his own Indian trade in direct competition with the private tra.ders. 51 The 
government factor could not hope to succeed when the Indian agents continued 
to issue licenses. Matthew Irwin perhaps best characterized the frustration 
of the govenunent factor: 
There appears a palpable incongruity in the manner of conducting 
the Indian trade; the factors are sent to supply the wants of the 
Indians, and the Indian agents can adopt such measures as to defeat 
all their plans to that end. It is very certain that the authority 
vested in then to issue licenses is well calculated to destroy ~ 
the benefits that might be expected tram the Factories • • • • 
Matthew Irwin and Tham.as McKenney realized that the factory's success 
necessitated the total exclusion of private traders where factories existed. 53 
Irwin and McKenney urged such action, but the interests of the private 
traders, the American Fur Canpany, and the bureaucracy of an established 
system precluded any major change. 
Unable to awake Washington to the contradictions of frontier policy, 
Irwin attempted to increase the effectiveness of the Green BB\V' factory. The 
factory was located at Green Bay which was a considerable distance fran the 
actual trading country. 
The private traders and the American Fur Company had the advantage of 
selling goods to the Indians and collecting their furs before the factory 
exerted any influence. Irwin therefore decided to use the techniques of the 
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American Fur Company by sending agents of the factory (sub-factors) into the 
interior where they could c0t1pete directly with the traders. Thomas McKenney 
was skeptica1 of the feasibility of Irwin's plan, but he consented, in despera-
tion, to save the Green Bay factory.54 
The plan did not ir:lprove the financial condition of the factory, 55 but it 
d1.d bring into the open the hostility of the f~erican Fur Company. Located at 
their headquarters in Hackinac, Ramsay Crooks and Hobert Stuart were besieged 
by complaints fran traders in the interior of the difficulties which the fac-
tory and other government policies placed upon their trade. Accordingly 
Crooks and Stuart comr:nmicated the details of the trade situation to John 
Astor so that he could apply political pressure in Washington. Crooks and 
Stuart even suggested that ii.stor speak directly to the President. The facto-
ries were stifling private initiative, Crooks and Stuart e..xplained, and thus 
they must be abolished. According to Crooks and Stuart, Matthew Irwin's 
attempt to send sub-factors into the interior was a misuse of the factory 
system. Moreover Crooks and Stuart claimed that the factory was no longer a 
benevolent institution to aid the unfortunate Indians, but it was now a govern-
ment business in direct canpetition with the private traders. (This had 
always been the intention of the government system.) Crooks and Stuart 
therefore concluded that the government had entered into the field of private 
enterprise; and, because of its power, was not operating on equal grounds with 
the local tra.ders.56 This appeal. by the two chief agents of the American Fur 
Canpany to Astor was only the first step in the company's campaign to end the 
factory system. The seed of dissent was planted in Hashington•s political 
circles by John Astor while on the frontier the American Fur Company and the 
factory waged more open warfare. 
While Irwin admitted. that many British traders were, at various times, 
excluded. fran the trade, he com.plained that Astor's American Fur Ccmpany 
enjoyed virtual :immunity to such lawso The American Fur Ccmpany, according 
to Irwin, was staffed by British traders and in many instances degraded 
American interests in favor of the British. 57 Irwin wrote many letters to 
his superiors about the tactics of the American Fur Canpany, but letters 
were of little value in his struggle on the frontier. 
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The iunerican Pur Company adopted various tactics to dispel the factory• s 
influence at both Chicago and Green BSiY• The company often reduced the price 
of goods to undersell the factory. 56 At other times, advance agents of the 
canpany journeyed far into the interior to dissuade the Indians £rem trading 
at the factory. The factories also faced an abnormal manpower shortage. To 
trade with the Indians, the factory employed a number of interpreters, 
traders, and clerks. The American Fur Company often hired all the traders 
and residents of a particular area merely to stifle the effectiveness of the 
factory. 59 The company's most effective stratagem was its ability to in-
fluence local and national officials. Both Major Puthuff and Colonel Bowyer, 
who had refused to accede to the canpany's demands, were eventually removed 
from office due to pressure on national and local officials by the American 
Fur Company. Indian agents and military officials thus were more likely to 
aid the c0t1pany rather than the factory. Irwin became increasingly cognizant 
of the .American Fur Company's tremendous power and observed that 
• • • The agents of Mr. Astor hold out an idea that they will ere 
long be able to break the factories; and they menace the Indian 
agents, and others who may interfere with them, with diamission 
from office, through Mr. Astor. They say that a representation 
fran Messrs. Crooks and Stewart (sic) (Hr. Astor's agents) led to 
the dismission of the Indian agent at Hackinaci, and they also say 
that the Indian agent here is to be dismissed. 0 
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The hostility against the facto?"'J was often of serious proportions. In 
1820, Major Irwin reported an incident which seemed to indicate the enormous 
depth of feeling on the part of frontier traders and the degree to which this 
feeling was transferred to the Indians. In 1H20, .Mr. Armitinger, an indepen-
dent trader, went into the neighborhood of Lake Winnebago and was fired upon 
by the Indians. When Captain Whistler from Fort Howard ventured to the same 
area, he was also attacked. Jacques Parlier and Louis Grignon, traders of 
the American Fur Company, also entered this area, but they were unmolested and 
61 traded for a large number of furs. To Matthew Irwin and Thanas McKenney, 
the incident was sufficient proof of the hostility between American officials 
and the traders and Indians controlled by the American Fur Company. 
HcKenney and Irwin might have leamed another lesson from the incident 
at Lake Winnebago. While the American Fur Company encouraged opposition to 
the factory, the frontier trader was naturally opposed to the system. It was 
in direct economic competition with traders such as John Lawe, Louis Grignon, 
and Jacques Porlier in an occupation which for years they had pursued with the 
Indians relatively free from competition or regulation. The factory was a 
business, a prominent Green B~ trader surmised, which attempted to make a 
profit 11 ••• l.lllder the cover of care for the savages and of the pretended 
benefits that they receive from the factories •••• 1162 Thus the American Fur 
Canpany received the willing assistance of the private traders in the struggle 
against the factory. 
\'ibile considerable anphasis has been placed upon the Green Bay factory 
primarily because of the greater population and fur business at that point, 
the history of the Chicago factory illustrated many of the same conflicts. 
Under Jacob Varnum, the Chicago factory from 1816 to 1818 experienced a limited 
degree of success. i!Arly in 1817. McKenney recommended that Jacob Va.mum 
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receive a raise in salary because of the increase in the volume of trade at 
the Chicago factory. Vamum's salary was raised fran $800 to $1000 per year.63 
From the inception of the Chicago factory in 1816 to Harch 31, 1818, the fac-
~ory gained $2253 in the trade. The expense of running the establishment, 
however, amounted to $4093. Despite a total loss of $20001 the Chica.go factory 
was more successful than the factory at Green Bay.64 
There are several explanations for the greater success of the Chicago 
factory. The most probable reason was the influence which the Chicago factory 
iexerted before the har of 1812. The Indians had faith in the Chicago factory 
while the independent traders were still disorganized due to the \iar. The 
Chicago factory, from 1816-1818, proviled the only outlet for furs and the 
purchase of merchandise. By 1818, however, the American Fur Company had moved 
numerous traders into the Chicago area. By December, 1818, Jacob Varnum 
iacknowledged the presence of a large number of British traders presumably 
representing the American Fur Comµany. Vamum commented that 
The indiscriminate ad.mission of British subjects to trade with the 
Indians, is a matter of pretty general complaint throughout this 
section of the country. There are five establishments within 
limits of this agency headed by British subjects.65 
II'hese establishments to which Varnum referred, most likely were the American 
l"ur Company's posts along the Illinois .. Liver headed by Antoine Deschamps and 
the Chicago post directed by Jean Beaubien. The presence of this canpetition 
seriously hindered Vanium1s factory to the point where he doubtod whether he 
could afford the services of an interpreter for the coming year. 66 
The factories both at Chicago and Green BB\Y' received their most serious 
opposition not so much from the British traders themselves as from the goods 
they traded. The private trader effectively distributed whiskey to the 
Indians, and in this lay one of the chief causes for the poor business of the 
factories. At the Chicago factory, however, the liquor problem was the most 
serious, and its exposure provided the most clear example of the American Fur 
Company's involvement. 
Liquor sales to the Indians always had been a problem on the American 
frontier. In 18021 the Congress had passed a law authorizing the President 
to take such measures as appeared proper " • • • to prevent or restrain the 
vending or distribution of spiritous liquors among all or any of the Indian 
tribes. 1167 Yet this law did not actually prevent the use of liquor. In 1Sl6 
Governor Ninian Edwards of the Illinois Territory attempted to rectify the 
situation by obtaining passage of a territorial law which forbade the sale of 
liquor to the Indians.6S The Green Bay traders were promptly informed of the 
new law and the penalties attached.69 Yet they found the law both impractical 
and impossible for officials to enforce: 
You will notice, Sir, that liquor having once been allowed among 
the savages it is not possible to restrain them from it, and that 
moreover th7()0 is not force enough here to sustain such a 
regulation. 
Knowing that the law would be impossible to enforce, the traders 
carefully avoided the spirit of the law. The law only forbade the sale ot 
liquor to the Indians so that the traders, before going into the territory, 
would claim that any liquor in their packs was merely for private use.71 The 
law did not ban liquor from the Indian lands 1 and thus a large quantity was 
always kept by the traders themselves and at their depot at Green Bay. J0hn 
Bowyer, the Indian agent at Green Bay, attempted to ban the storing of liquor 
at Green Bay 1 but Governor Cass informed hlm that such action 1 although 
desirable, would be illegal.72 
Many times Irwin complained bitterly of the use of liquor in the Indian 
trade which induced the Indians to becane intoxicated and to sell their .furs 
at poor prices. Irwin explained why it was impossible to prosecute traders 
for selling liquor illegally to the Indians: 
A return to reasc.n will induce many of them (the Indians) to mention 
who sold them the whiskey; but it is deemed illegal to accept 
Indian testimony, so that the British and .American traders ••• 
may deal in whiskey without the smallest chance of detection.73 
Although the American Fur Company was not in full control or the territory 
before 18221 it was involved in the whiskey trade. The American Fur Company 
would have preferred not to deal in liquor because it was a.n expensive com-
modity for a trading outfit. Furthennore, liquor destroyed the India.n's 
desire and ability to hunt. These considerations have led sane authors to 
surmise that the .American Fur Campany refrained fran its use. 74 Nevertheless, 
liquor was a valuable item in competing with the factory a.nd the independent 
traders, tor the Indians often traded onJ.y with individuals who supplied the 
canmodity. In the Company's Account Books for 18211 the following items were 
shipped to Green Ba\Y' and Chicago: 418 gallons of High Wine, 30 gallons of 
Jamaica Spirits, 8 gallons of Brandy, and 35 gallons of Rio Wine.75 
A more damaging example of the American Fur Company's connection with 
the whiskey trade .occurred in 1821. At this time, Dr. Alexander Wolcott, the 
Chicago Indian agent, refused to grant James Kinzie a trading license for the 
z,:ilwaukee area. Wolcott was infonned by Matthew Irwin that Kinzie regularly 
sold liquor to the Indians. 76 Irwin told Wolcott of the incident so that 
Kinzie could not obtain a license at Chicago. H.amsay Crooks, with wham 
Kinzie was employed, detested the actions of Indian agent Wolcott. Wolcott, 
Crooks said, refused to grant Jam.es Kinzie a license on mere suspicion. To 
correct such an injustice to his agent, Crooks obtained a license for Kinzie 
from Colonel Boyd at Mackinac.77 Crook's ability to obtain a license :tran 
Colonel Boyd, despite the objections of Wolcott and Irwin, was typical of the 
enomous power of the American Fur Campany. Colonel Boyd, who issued the 
license to Kinzie, had been Crooks 1s choice for Indian a.gent at Mackinac to 
replace the recalcitrant Major Puthuff. In 1818, Govemor Cass, realizing the 
problems caused by an agent licensing a trader in Mackinac for trade in the 
Chicago area, had outlawed such procedures without the consent of both agents 
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concemed. Despite the action of Boyd, then, ~•olcott ordered Kinzie to 
close his trading outfit within sixty days and leave the territory. Irwin 
realized that the absence of Kinzie from the Milwaukee area would leave the 
Indians without a trader, and he was more than happy to enter this country 
controlled by the American Fur Ga:npany. Irwin, therefore, commissioned 
Jacques Vieau as an agent of the Green Ba.y factory. Vieau was an American 
citizen; and, according to Irwin, he was of impeccable character. Irwin gave 
him goods amounting to $21 228.25 with which to deal with the Indians.79 
Thomas HcKermey, the Superintendent of the Indian Trade, did not allow 
this incident to go unnoticed. On December 71 18211 he strongly criticized 
the American Fur Company in the Dai.l,y National Intelligencer with the case ot 
James Kinzie as an example. The people now knew, he said, the identity or 
" • • • 
blood • 
these invisible nobodies ••• dealers in whiskey, furs, and Indian 
so 
• • agents of this same American Fur Canpany. 11 
Crooks and Stuart were hardly pleased over the Kinzie affair. In 1821, 
Stuart accused Irwin of exaggerating the case against Kinzie in order to 
improve the national image of his facto:ey. Stuart threatened that, despite 
the attempts ot Irwin and 'Wolcott, the facto:ey system would be abolished 
within a year.81 Once the Kinzie affair reached the public news media., 
Robert Stuart and the American Fur CompaJ'lY' did a notable about race. Stuart 
was no longer willing to protect James Kinzie because he reared creating 
public antipathy toward the company. Thus Kinzie soon became the scapegoat. 
In 1822, Stuart suddenly found that James Kinzie was less than a reputable 
character and considered relieving him of his position.82 In April, 1822, 
Robert Stuart told James Kinzie to leave the Milwaukee area to another trader 
and return to Chicago.83 
To save the image of the American Fur Company, Stuart next tried to claim 
ignorance of any of Kinzie•s activities. He told Govemor Cass that 11 ••• 
whenever any person either employed by, or having dealings of whatever nature 
with us does not conform to the laws • • • governing the trade • • • we will 
al~s be willing and happy to have them entirely excluded from the country." 
Stuart then suggested that Kinzie be expelled from the territory. The only 
reason the company had been reluctant to act, Stuart explained, was because 
James Kinzie was the son of John Kinzie, an important and loyal trader in the 
Chicago area. 84 
Fran a perusal of the Account Books and Letter Books of' the American Fur 
Company, there seems little doubt that the company used liquor in the Indian 
trade to compete with the factory and opposing traders. Because of the 
can.petition of the American Fur Company, the continued operation of the fac-
tories at Green Bay and Chicago could only prove a financial liability to the 
government• 
On the national level, the factory system was under constant attack by 
the American Fur Campany and numerous national. officials. Congressional 
action was underway by 1818 when the House of Representatives requested 
Secretary of War, John Calhoun, to report on the feasibility of instituting a 
new plan for the conduct of the Indian trade. Calhoun iimnedia.tely wrote to 
those connected with the system soliciting their advice and recommendations. 
Thanas L. McKenney, whose concem for the Indians took precedence over any 
financial or political considerations, felt that the abolition of the factories 
could only bring harm to the Indians for the sole purpose of aiding fur 
traders to reap greater profits.85 Lewis Cass, on the other hand, approached 
the problem more realistically. Cass favored a new system to regulate the 
Indian trade. Since private enterprise was now sufficiently established in 
the Indian trade, benefiting the whole economy, Cass explained, the government 
should withdraw. In the place of government factories, Cass suggested that 
more stringent trade laws be enacted to control the traders and the use ot 
86 liquor. From these and other recommendations, Calhoun issued his Report 
in 1818 calling for the abolition of the factories. In their place, he 
suggested several new laws. Calhoun recanmended that trading licenses cost 
from $100 to $5001 thereby limiting the m.unber of traders in the territory. 
Traders were also to be confined to designated locations assuring closer 
supervision by government officials.87 Calhoun's Report was not immediately 
accepted by the Congress, and the factories ranained in operation. 
Opposition continued to grow against the factories in 184> when the 
Secretary of War sent the Reverend Jedediah Morse to investigate the operation 
of the factory system. Upon his return in 18Zl., Morse reported his findings 
to a congressional canmittee. Morse was not impressed by the operation of 
the factories at either Green BSiY or Chicago. Interviewing Matthew Irwin, 
Morse discovered that the Green BSiY factory conducted the majority of its 
business with the white traders and the military personnel at Fort Howard. 
Annual trade with the Indians did not exceed $16001 Irwin estimated, while 
trade with Fort Howard and people of mixed blood accomted for $5 1 500. Irwin 
placed primary blame for the failure of his factory upon the large number of 
traders in the territory 1 thus causing him to sell to white inhabitants. gg 
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Turning to Chicago, Iforse found that Vamum, for the past year, had traded 
for fUrs amounting to only $25. Although recognizing the influence of 
whiskey upon the trade, Morse said the Indians were not actually maltreated 
by the trader. The Indians dealt with the private traders because they wanted 
to and r: ••• it is evident, that by some means, the Indians have not con-
fidence in the government, as fair and upright in their trade. 11B9 Morse 
cited several reasons for the distrust of the factory by the Indians: the 
inferior quality of its goods, prior influence of British traders, and the 
harmful effects of whiskey. Morse concluded that the principal aim of the 
factory system, the civilization of the Indians, had been a total failure. 
Rather than advancing the Indians, horse said, the factory kept them in the 
hunter stage of' civilization by increasing their dependence on the fur tra.de. 90 
In 1821., the Canmittee on Indian Affairs in the Senate, held final 
hearings before abolishing the factories. Irwin again accused the .American 
Fur Company of ruining the factory. He stated that his sub-.facto?1', Louis 
Rouse, was dispatched to the interior where Crooks deliberately sent three 
men to oppose him. 91 Crooks rebutted such accusations by a.gain illustrating 
that the supplying of private traders was against the purpose of the factory. 
He claimed thc'1t Irwin supplied Rouse with goods totaling $3000 and that 
Rouse, in order to derive a profit, sold the goods at prices higher than 
92 required by the factory. 
John Biddle, the new Indian agent at Green Bay, presented testimony 
which showed a definite hostility to the factory system. Biddle stated that 
the goods supplied the factory were inferior in quality to those of the private 
traders. Further, he cla.ir:ied that Irwin had not only supplied large amounts 
or goods to sub-factors but also sold goods to private traders on credit. In 
aum. factors such as Vamun and Irwin had overstated their case against the 
British, Biddle e~lained, and had failed to realize the inadequacy of their 
own goods. The .factory was of no use to the frontier community, Biddle said, 
and its end would be a blessing to the Indians.93 
As congressional action neared for the closing of the factories, Thomas 
Hart Benton was the most outspoken critic in Congress. Benton wielded con-
siderable influence since he represented a frontier state and was a ranking 
member of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Benton was also a confidant 
of the American Fur Can.pany nnd worked closely with Ramsay Crooks and Robert 
Stuart throughout the struggle. 94 Thomas McKenney could not delay congres-
sional action indefinitely, and in 1821 he ordered Varnum and Irwin to begin 
preparations for the eventual close of the factories. 95 McKenney, however, 
steadfastly refused to accept the reasons advanced by Congress for such action. 
The factories were not ineffective because of the inadequacy of goods or 
Indian hostility, he claimed. Their decline could be attributed to the com-
petition of the American Fur Company, the efforts of Thomas Hart Benton, and 
the 11 • • • unsuitable provisions which exist for the regulation of the trade. 
Hord.es of private adventurers, availing them.selves of the looseness of the 
system have crowded into those parts on account of the superiority of furs 
which are taken. 1196 The closing of the factories, according to McKenney, 
would result in the alienation of the Indians fran the white population and 
eventual bloodshed. 
The final closing or the factories was a confused and tragic event. In 
1821, HcKenney ordered Vamum. and Irwin to begin the sale of their remaining 
goods on a cash or credit basis.97 This policy was in accord with John 
Calhoun's Report of 1818 that the .factories should be liquidated over a period 
or time. Thomas Hart Benton, however, urged on by the American Fur Can.pany, 
demanded their closing within two months. Several Washin£rton businessmen 
were cormnissioned to take charge of the final accounting. These men, ·Caning 
from the East, were totally unacquainted with the factory and the type of 
business conducted. 98 Needless to 88371 Benton's hasty action caused a loss 
of goverrmient funds and added credence to those who had claimed the .factory 
had always been an impractical scheme. In Chicago, Jacob Varnum had mer-
chandise t«>rth nearly $13 1 000. A. B. Lindsley, who was canmissioned to close 
the factory, eventually realized only $11 250 in cash from this merchandise. 99 
He took the goods to Detroit where they were sold at prices .far below cost. 
Lindsley totally ignored the outstanding debts of the Indians and whites in 
100 the Chicago area. Varnum, the Chicago factor, characterized the policy 
of Thomas Hart Benton and the Congress as completely inept: 
Hr. Benton had his own way. It was not probable that one in ten 
in Congress knew much about an obscure system for the benefit of 
the Indians, inaugurated long before a large portion of the mem-
bers were elected. He debated it alone ••• carried all measures, 
one of which w:as so absurd as to require a new set of agents to 
relieve the old one and whose duty it would be to wind up the con-
cerns. The effect of this measure, so far as the Chicago factory 
was concerned was a total loss of all goverrmient property. A. B. 
Lindsay (sic), a hanger-on about the offices for an appointment 
for years, obtained the situation • • • .101 
What was the basic cause for the failure of the factory system? Through 
102 the years scholars have advanced many reasons. The factory, it is true, 
was stocked with interior goods compared to the British manufactured products 
offered by the American Fur Canpany. The factory was also handicapped. by its 
inability to advance goods on credit to the Indians which was a practice of 
the private traders. Ordinarily, the factory was located at a central point 
such as Green Bay or Chicago where the factor waited for the Indians to bring 
his furs. The private trader, on the other hand, followed the Indians into 
the actual trading area and conducted his business long before the factory's 
influence was exerted. The employment of whiskey in the Indian trade by the 
.American Fur Company offered the Indians a canmodity they could not obtain 
at the factory. To a certain extent, the factory's personnel, compared to 
that of the American Fur Company, was inferior. Relative newcomers to the 
fur trade and the region, the factors could not hope to compete with the estab-
lished traders. A resident of Green Bay perhaps summed up most accurately the 
numerous problEID.B facing the Green Ba\Y and Chicago factories. Speaking of 
Major Irwin's Green Bczy- factory, Albert G. Ell.is observed that 
Major Irwin was a gentleman of intelligence, culture and integrity, 
and as well fitted for the trust as any citizen totally unacquainted 
with the Indian country, its trade and inhabitants, could be - that 
is, not fitted at all; and moreover, being furnished by the govem-
ment with goods unsuited to the Indian trade, and coming in compet-
ing contact with lifelong experienced, astute traders, of course the 
effort to gain confidence, trust and influence with the Indian was 
a total failure. His sleazy, woolen blankets, cheap calico, and 
worst of all his poor unserviceable guns, were all rejected by the 
Indians; and during his four yea.rs trade, he did not secure fif'ty 
dollars worth of peltries.103 
Granted that all the above causes did eventual.ly contribute to the 
.failure of the factories, they do not mirror the basic f'law of the factory 
system. From the very begirming, the success of the factories was impossible 
because of the government's inability to establish a consistent policy in 
relation to the Indian trade. In both Green Bay and Chicago, the Indian 
a.gents were licensing private traders while the factories were trying to 
establish Indian trade relations. By allowing private traders in the terri-
tory, the government provided the can.petition which ruined its own factories. 
Moreover, the factory was an organized business competing with frontier 
traders. Government policy seemed to have completely ignored the obvious re-
action of the frontier traders at Green Ba\Y and Chicago. Residents on the 
frontier for many years, the traders canpletely depended on the fur trade for 
their economic livelihood. Obviously, they would oppose with all the means at 
hand, this competing economic enterprise. The most important ingredient for 
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the success or failure of the factors was the confidence of the Indians, and, 
with the Indians, the traders held absolute influence. 
This was a period of great change on the frontier. The factory was not 
only faced with the problems of its own contradictions, but it also had to 
contend with the emergence of the American Fur Gompa.ny. In the years between 
1816 and 1822, the frontier, on the western shore ot Lake Michigan, witnessed 
the competition ot two business enterprises both outside its economic and 
political control. From the beginning the government was handicapped in its 
battle with the American Fur Company. How could a government business with 
appropriations ot only $300,000 compete with the emerging million dollar 
capital of the American Fur Company? 104 With the abolition of the factory 
system, the government finally acknowledged. its inability to follow a dual 
policy. Now the government merely sought to control and regulate the traders 
and the American Fur Company, not compete with them. 
With the withdrawal of the factories, the field for private enterprise 
was left wide open for the American Fur Company. In 1822, the American Fur 
Company already had taken several long strides in the f onnation of a frontier 
monopoly. Yet they were aided by the government in their efforts to capture 
the services of the independent traders. The trader could more easily oppose 
the factory with the f.ine supply of goods supplied by the American Fur Canpa.ny. 
Independent traders received. licenses under the law of 1816 primarily through 
the efforts of RamsBi.V Crooks and Robert Stuart. Thus the independent traders 
fell increasingly under the sway of the American Fur Ccmpany. 
In addition, there was a general dissatisfaction and a sense of help-
lessness among the traders as they faced the various government institutions 
driving them more quickly into what appeared to be the beneficent arms of the 
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American Fur Company. For example, the military posts at Chicago and Green 
Bay only interfered, as far as the traders were concerned, with the nonnal 
pattern of frontier life. A regulatory agency, the military enforced many of 
the laws relating to the tradeo Furthemore, military posts did not serve as 
an economic stimulus to areas surrounding the forts in these early years 
because agricultural surpluses were not sufficient to supply the posts. Until 
the middle 1H20 1s, moreover, contracts for the supply of the forts were issued 
to eastern merchants. When contracts were first handled by frontier residents 
in the late 1820 1s, these were filled by a few frontier merchants, not the 
fur traders.105 While the military was supposed to protect the settlers from 
the Indians, the fur traders were hardly in need of protection from an Indian 
society with which they had lived in harmony for years. Testimony to this 
disaffection between the military and the traders was frequently evident in 
the letters of traders such as John Lawe: 
There has been a great nwnber of United States troops garrisioned 
or that are stationed at Green Bay but what good does that do me 
it is only to assist in the ruining of me and the Pilfering or 
general stealing, Killing of cattle, and corrunitting of every kind 
of depredation that they can & do still continue that is the good 
they do for all there is upwards of 20 officers in that Station 
one would suppose that would keep the men in good order & at the 
sentries & throw a good deal of Cash and make the place lively 
but far from that they are only paid once a year & it is onl.y one 
man that benefits by it. I can assure you that I do not get one 
dollar in a month. They B.r'.:J a nuisance to society & in place of 
being put there for the £5gtection of the place they are the 
destruction of it • • • 
In the total picture of the hostility between frontier residents and 
governmant institutions, perhaps one of the most revealing episodes was the 
handling of private land claims at Green B~ in 1820. :'11th the imposition 
of American control, the government passed several laws regulating the title 
to land of fonner British traders. The whole process was disquieting to the 
traders. They had lived at the Bay for many years, built houses, and . .f'a.rrn.ed 
sr:iall tracts of land. Now they were required to explain and prove to Isaac 
Lee, the government commissioner to investjgate the titles at Green Bay, the 
validity of their claims to the lanct.107 For a number of' years, the rumor 
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circulated among the Green Bay residents that the gove!"n!llent would not approve 
their claims. In February, 1Sl9, they petitioned Washington for an :immediate 
confirmation of their land titles.108 By September, 1820, the goverrnnent 
still had not taken final action and many of the traders feared that they 
would lose the land.109 At this juncture, the traders were aided by the 
political power of the fil'llerican Fur Company in ~·Jashington and the land titles 
were r.iore quickly conf'inned.110 Once again, the American Pur Canpany, taking 
advantage of a frontier problem, utilized political power to strengthen their 
hold on the traders. 
From 1816 to 182~, the government employed military posts, Indian agencie~ 
factories, and national legislation to pacify the Indians and secure the 
frontier on the western shore of Lake :Michigan. This was the first exposure 
of future townsites at Chicago, Hilwaukee, and Green Bay to American in.flu-
ence, but the frontier inhabitants reacted negatively. At the same time, 
the American Fur Company moved into this region in order to exploit the fur 
trade. Utilizing the contradictions of government policy and the trader's 
discontent, the American Fur Company slowly established a monopol.y over the 
fur trade. From 1822 until the arrival of whi'te settlers in the 18.30's, the 
American Fur Company was the controlling force over the whole of the we stem 
shore of Lake :1:ichigan. The period of American Fur Company dominance was the 
next stage in the history of future townsites on Lake Michigan's western shore. 
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CHAPTIB II 
An Era of Frontier Exploitation: The American 
Fur Company in Chicago, 1817-1835 
In the years after the 't,'ar of 1812, the frontier on the western shore 
of Lake Michigan attracted the attention of both government and private 
enterprise. For approximately eight years, the government hesitated, experi-
mented, and faltered in an attempt to devise a suitable frontier policy. The 
American Fur Campany was present throughout the period, having been attracted 
to the area by the fur trade. For several years, the company contested govern-
ment policies, such as the license law of 1816 and the factory systan, in an 
effort to secure a monopoly over the trade. By 18221 when the factories were 
abolished, the fur trade was thro'Wll open as a field for private enterprise. 
But this was only half the story. Contemporaneous with its struggle with the 
government, the lunerican Fur Company moved slowly into the fur trade itself 
by devising business procedures, organizing traders and trading territories, 
and competing with other business enterprises. Along the lake shore at 
almost every juncture of rivers and Lake Michigan, fur trade posts were 
eventually established by the lunerican Fur Company; if occupied earlier by 
British or independent traders, such posts came under their control. These 
posts were the first establishments of lunerican business enterprise at the 
cities we lmow today: Green Ba.Y, Kewaunee, Manitowoc, Sheboygan, llilwaukee, 
Racine, Kenosha, and Chicago. At the smaller junctures, such as Kewaunee and 
Racine, these posts were occupied only during the summer months when the 
40 
Indiana returned from their winter hunt. At other points, notably at Green 
Bay and Chicago, more permanent settlements developed. 
Few areas of American history, however, have been as shaded by ranantic 
illusions as the fur trade.1 linages of the traders blaz:lng the first trails 
4l 
in the wildemess, of the independent traders bartering with the wily Indians, 
of great cities springing up where fur trade villages had once existed have 
become part of American folklore. The last is perhaps the most persistent 
generalization about the trade. In 1$93, Frederick Jackson Turner, :in his 
famous essay on ''The Significance of the Frontier :in American History, 11 
·wrote that 
.. • • The Indian trade pioneered the way for civilization. The 
buffalo trail became the Indian trail, and this became the 
trader's 11trace 11 ; the trails widened into roads, and the roads 
into turnpikes, and these in turn were transfonned into rail-
roads • • • • The trading posts reached by these trails were on 
the site of Indian villages which, situated as to coomand the 
water systems of the country 1 have grown into such cities as 
Albany, Pittsbur~h, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Council Bluffs, 
and Kansas City. 
Perhaps Turner• a essay was merely suggesting to scholars to embark on more 
detailed studies of the trade, yet nearly sixty years later a two-volume 
history of the fur trade concluded with al.most the same generalization that 
Turner had expoundedz 
The physical remains of this magnificent effort (the fur trade) 
are often quite imposing, for many important cities owe much to 
the tradin~ which took place in their vicinity. Among the best 
known are Montreal, Quebec, 1<.doonton, and Victoria; Chicago, 
Niagara, Detroit, fbany, Pittsburgh, Augusta, Mobile, New Orleans, 
St. Louis, Pierre. 
But was the fur trade the catalyst which led to the emergence of cities 
such as Chicago, l'1ilwaukee, Green Bay, or any number of secondary cities on 
the shores of Lake Michigan? Was the trade an independent and individualistic 
frontier business? What was the true role of the fur trade and the Ar.nerican 
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Fur Canpany in frontier expansion? Was there any positive econoudc or social 
connection between the fur trade era and the following period of town growth? 
The western shore of Lake Michigan provided a perfect opportunity to analyze 
not only the conduct of the fur trade as the first economic enterprise or 
future towns, but al.so to study the relationship between the fur trade and the 
towns it supposedly fostered. 
\·lhile John Astor and his two lieutenants, Robert Stuart and Ramsay Crooks, 
battled and cajoled national and local officials, they also took the first 
sure steps in creating an effective fur trade organization. John Astor always 
remained in New York to oversee the buying of goods for the trade and the 
selling of furs in the markets of America and throughout the world. Ramsay 
Crooks and Robert Stuart directed the actual conduct of the trade from their 
Mackinac headquarters. Fran Mackinac outfits, or the supply of goods for a 
particular post, were assembled and then loaded into boats called batteaux for 
transfer to the interior. The goods canpiled for the trade included every-
thing from i.mglish playing cards to tomahawks. Silk, gloves, breeches, and 
wrist bands were exchanged for the pelts of raccoon, mink, otter, bear, martin, 
red fox, deer, and muskrat. 4 Prices in the markets of the United States and 
foreign countries determined the amount of business transacted for any type 
of fur. Fran his offices in New York, John Astor kept close watch on the 
major markets of the world and regularly inf'onned Crooks and Stuart at Mackinac 
of price changes. Through Crooks and Stuart such infonnation t.;radually reached 
frontier traders little acquainted with the fluctuations of a world market 
affecting their trade.5 
Traders with the company were employed in different capacities and paid 
not only for the skill of the task but aJ.so for their knowledge of the Indians. 
Clerks and boatmen received from $150 to $200 per year. In 1821, Gurdon 
Hubbard, a prominent Chicago trader, received $125 for his services as a 
6 clerk. The more important traders who headed an entire territory, such as 
Jean Beaubien and John Crafts of Chicago, received from $800 to $1000 per 
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year. Most traders hoped for a salary since it guaranteed them against per-
sonal losses from the trade. Salaried individuals were rare, however, in the 
American Fur Ccmpany. Two alternative methods of compensation were introduced. 
The first of these methods was to supply independent traders with goods at 
slightly higher prices. These traders then could sell the furs they collected 
to whomever they wished. 7 For a long while, the Green Bay traders operated on 
this scheme. Finally, the traders could share the profits and losses of the 
trade with the company. These men would either receive one-half the profits 
of their outfit or suffer one-half the losses.8 Eventually, the Chicago out-
fit operated on this scheme. The American Fur Company preferred its traders 
to work on the pro.fit-sharing scheme since any losses sustained would not be 
completely bome by the company. 
Since the trade was mainly conducted with the Indians, the connections 
of the traders with the Indian population were especially important. The 
Chicago area was inhabited by the Fox, Potawatomie, and Ottawa tribes. 
Alexander Robinson and Billy Caldwell, who lived in the settlement at Chicago, 
were half-breed Indians acceptable to both the white and Indian populations, 
and who worked closely with the traders of the American F'ur Canpany. Such 
ties were essential for the successful operation o! the Indian trade. The 
Green Bey region, on the other hand, was occupied by the Menominee and the 
Wisconsin River Winnebago. Milwaukee was a mixed village of Potawatomi and 
Menominee. The Green Bay traders, who controlled both these areas, had 
married into the tribes. Leading traders 1 such as Jacques Porlier and 
Augustin Grignon, had Indian wives.10 Because of the closeness of the two 
societies, the Indians ordinarily placed a good deal of trust in these 
traders and their goods. 
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With the arrival of the American Fur Company, the independent and rather 
haphazard conduct of the fur trade came to an end. Astor employed large 
capital resources and the harsh business practices of an organized company. 
The company was often ruthless in its takeover of a trading territory. Can-
petition was usually handled in two basic ways. First, the independent trader 
was forced out of business by cutthroat practices, such as price wars, or 
political pressures on national or local officials. On occasion an indepen-
dent trader was offered employment in the American Fur Company either by 
salary or profit-and-loss.11 With a large capital and extensive organization,, 
the company gradually monopolized the whole trade on the western shore of 
Lake Michigan. 
Chicago was the first area to attract the attention of the .l'\.merican Fur 
Company. If the canpany was to dominate the trade of the Illinois country, 
it had to control Chicago. 1''rom Chicago trade goods could easily be carried 
to the interior by utilizing the water connections frcm the Chicago River to 
the Illinois River and fran there to the Mississippi River. Chicago was also 
one of the two sites on Lake Michigan of pennanence, Green Bay being the 
other, where the Indians and whites had carried on trade for years. Chicago 
itself was not a rich fur trading area, but it was a depot for the collection 
and packaging of furs from the territory and a point where goods could be 
transshipped frcm the lake to traders in the interior. Gurdon Hubbard, a 
praninent Illinois trader, was led to remark that 11by this time (1820) there 
~as a very limited trade here, in fact, this place never had been preeminent 
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as a trading post. 1112 Realizing this fact, Hamsa.y Crooks and Robert Stuart 
took the first step toward controlling the Chicago area by appointing John 
Kinzie to head the Chicago outfit.13 Kinzie annually received a large supply 
of goods fran Mackinac which he then sold to independent traders who filtered 
into the Indian country fran their Chicago base. 
To build an effective monopoly, the American Fur Company also established. 
the Illinois outfit which traded along the Illinois H.iver deep into the 
interior of the country. Under the leadership of Antoine Deschamps, the 
traders of this outfit assembled their trade goods at Hackinac and then 
travelled by boat to Chicago. The small boats skirted the east side of Lake 
Michigan averaging about forty miles per day. Once arriving in Chicago, the 
traders proceeded up the south branch of the Chicago River. The boats then 
had to be portaged or pulled through Mud Lake to the Desplaines River. The 
outfit next travelled down the Illinois Iliver on which trading huts were lo-
cated every forty to sixty miles. Throughout the winter, the traders bartered. 
with the Indians arriving at their huts or journeyed into the Indian country 
for trade. When spring came, the outfit, with the winter's supply of furs, 
again travelled up the Illinois River to Chicago for the return voyage to 
Mackinac.14 With the establishment of both the Illinois and Chicago outfits 
in 1817, the American Fur Conpany exerted control over the fur trade. 
They were not, however, the first American business interest to reach 
the Chicago area. In 1816, the Detroit based !inn on Conant and Mack had 
sent John Crafts to Chicago with a large supply of trade goods.15 Crafts was 
the first to supply the fonner British and independent traders with goods. 
When John Kinzie entered the area for the American Fur Company in 1817, his 
first task, of course, wa.s to overthrow Craf~s control of the trade. Grafts 
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roved to be a stubborn opponent, and by 1019 the company transferred a 
'-tilwaukee trader, Jean Beaubien, to Chicago to provide increased competition 
16 for John Crafts. Gradually Cra..ft 1 s profits from the trade dwindled to al-
ost nothing. Facing the competition of the American Fur (;ompany not only at 
hicago but at other locations, Conant and Mack eventually sold out to Astor's 
ti:nn. When this occurred in 1822, John Crafts turned to seek employment with 
the American Fur Campany.17 Thus the American Fur Campany had el.iminated its 
jor rival from the Chicago trade by applying direct can.petition and also by 
el:iminating the source of' supply. 
To insure control over the trade, the company also engaged independent 
traders who might otherwise be supplied with goods from other trading concerns. 
Conant and Mack, for instance, supplied an independent trader, Jean Chandonnai, 
with a small assortment of gocx:ls for the Chicago trade. R.ams8'}" Crooks offered 
Chandonnai a wider selection of goods at better prices, and soon Chandonnai 
contracted to trade for the American Fur Company.18 A sjrnj)ar incident 
occurred along the Illinois River where Gurdon Hubbard encountered the compe-
tition of Antoine Bourbona.is. In a short time Bourbonais, enticed by a more 
liberal off er from the company and fearful of their competition, joined the 
American Fur Campany.19 
Throughout the trading territory adjacent to Chicago, the company 
established trading outfits. Several traders were employed in the Milwaukee 
area. Solomon Juneau was given charge of the I::ilwaukee outfit in 1818, 20 
but numerous other traders were sent there from both Green B8'}" and Chicago 
during the season. James Kinzie and Jean Beaubien regularly participated in 
the Milwaukee trade from their base at Chicago. 21 
For years the traders had filtered throughout the Indian country 
haphazardly seeking a profitable Indian trade, but now the .American Fur 
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company brought a new organization to the fur trade. The Indian coun1;,ry was 
divided into specific trading territories with men assigned to each locality. 
In this way, the company could reach all the various Indian tribes and hunting 
grounds. Desertion from one's trading area or infringement on another trader's 
territory was frowned upon by Crooks and Stuart.. After opposing John Crafts 
in Chicago, Jean Beaubien returned to nuwaukee in 18Zl.1 an area which he 
considered his own private territory. To his dismay, Beaubien discovered that 
the company had moved both James Kinzie and Solomon Juneau into the area. 
Disgusted with the arrangement of Stuart and Crooks, Beaubien fonned an 
association with two or three independent traders to oppose the American Fur 
Company at Milwaukee. Beaubien's scheme lasted only a short time, for Crooks 
and Stuart warned him that the company could bring considerable business 
2') pressure on this venture. ·- Dissatisfied, but unable to form any other 
business connection, Beaubien was soon back in the employment of the American 
Fur Company sharing the Milwaukee area with many other traders. 
By 1823, the monopoly of the Chicago trade was beginning to take shape. 
John Kinzie withdrew from the burdensome duties of director of the Chicago 
outfit to undertake the post of Indian sub-agent at Chicago. Robert Stuart 
therefore needed a responsible trader to direct the Chicago outfit. Crafts, 
the former agent of Conant and Hack, was the logical choice 1 but he was 
difficult to bring to contract terms. Crafts demanded a very large trading 
area extending fran Milwaukee to areas along the Illinois H.iver. Stuart 
could not agree to such terms because these areas were already divided among 
other traders. 23 But Stuart could not afford to lose the services of John 
Crafts. He knew the Chicago trade and many independent traders who, i! 
supplied from anoth<:r source, could always provide cam.petition. Thue Stuart 
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offered Crafts a limited trading area but at a salary of $1000 per year.21+ 
Stuart would have preferred that Crafts work on a profit-sharing scheme 
dividing the profits and losses of the trade with the company, but exepdiency 
demanded that Crafts be given a more liberal trading agreement. Crafts 
joined the compan:'.', but Stuart remained displeased with the contract tems. 25 
Many traders did not obtain the same lucrative terms obtained by John 
Crafts; in fact, the general rule was poor wages for traders. Gurdon Hubbard, 
who traded with the Illinois outfit since 1818, received only $26o as a clerk. 
Hubbard became disenchanted with the company's wages, and in 1823, threatened 
26 to quit unless he received a substantial salary increase. Hubbard talked 
with representatives of the fur trading interests in St. Louis, but Stuart 
acted quickly.Zl Realizing that Hubbard had been employed with the Illinois 
outfit for five years and was well-acquainted with the trade, Stuart appointed 
him director of the Illinois outfit. 28 The patteni of the American Fur 
Company was clear; important traders who controlled a territory or traders 
who :~ight otherwise provide competition received liberal wage contracts to 
join the company. All policies were directed toward establishing a trade 
monopoly. The traders, nevertheless, rarely derived large profits or were 
they adequately compensated for their services. 
Under John Crafts1s leadership, the fortunes of the Chicago outfit 
steadily advanced. Yet, as always, competition occasionally filtered into 
the territory. In 18241 Captain Henry i•Jhiting, a retired army officer, 
purchased his O'W?l stock of goods and attempted to set up an independent 
operation in the Chicago area. 29 The American 1',ur Canpany moved in swiftly. 
At first, Stuart tried to employ Whiting at a specific location.JO ·whiting 
rejected this offer, and John Grafts was given the responsibility of dealing 
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with the problem.31 Crafts debated two alternatives; he could c01~pete "'lith 
.whiting for furs and the services of traders, or he could purchase ~Jhiting' s 
entire business. Stuart refused to make the f:inal decision and told Grafts 
that 11you know the resources of the Country and the extent of injury you are 
likely to sustain from his winter operations. 1132 Eventually Crafts purchased 
1dhiting's operation much to the dismay of ~villiam B. Astor in New York. To 
William B. Astor, the ccrnpany could not a.f'ford to buy out every competing 
trader. Robert Stuart, however,, defended Craft's action because competitive 
business procedures were often more expensive over several seasons.33 The 
Whiting affair nevertheless exemplified the business tactics of the company; 
independent operations in the fur trade were quickly ~prooted. 
~:ben the government factory system was abolished in 1822,, the government 
assumed a regulatory role over the Indian trade. The American Fur Canpa.ny 
thus was forced to maintain friendl..v relations with Indian agents and the 
military in order to temper government policies for the benefit of the can-
pany. In Chicago,, they met varying degrees of success in controllJng local 
officials. Control or influence of the Chicago Indian agent was of great 
importance. In 1821,, the cor.:tbined lt.tstions of the Potawatomi, Ottawa, and 
Chippewa had ceded five million acres of land t.o the United States. In 
return for this land, the government agreed to p~ the Indians an annual 
subsidy in currency at or near Chicago.34 These annuity pccyments were con-
trolled and administered by the Chica.go Indian agent. Thus the Chicago fur 
trade was actually conducted on two levels. First, there was the normal 
exchange of goods for the Indians' furs carried on at Chicago and along the 
Illinois River. Secondly, there was a considerable exchange of goods for 
money received by the Indians at the annuity p8'Yfilents. The American Fur 
company then would send large shipnents of goods to exchange for the money 
received by the Indians. In Chica.go, the company was fortunate in having a 
close friend, John Kinzie, serving as Indian sub-agent. In 18:..:4, the rela-
tions of Kinzie and the .American Fur Ccrnpany were especially evident. At 
this time, John Crafts, the head of the Chicago outfit, was in Detroit and 
the post was placed in the charge of John Hamlin.35 With the Indian annuity 
pB3Dlents due shortly .from v/ashington, Stuart cautioned Hamlin to prepare his 
goods carefully. Arly difficulties which might arise, Stuart told Hamlin, 
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can be discussed with John Kinzie despite his position as Indian sub-agent.36 
Thus Kinzie operated on both sides of the fence. Charged with protecting the 
Indians from the inflated prices of many fur traders, Kinzie also worked in 
close cooperation with the American Fur Company. 
At other times, the American Fur Company's influence was not quite so 
evident forcing Stuart and Crooks to exert political pressure or to disregard 
the laws relating to the Indian trade when they proved detrimental. In 18.24, 
the government passed a law designed to regulate the conduct of the Indian 
trade. This law required 
Indian agents to designate, from time to time, certain convenient 
and suitable places for carrying on trade with the different 
Indian tribes and to require all traders to trade at the place 
thus designated, and at no other place.37 
The law enabled Indian agents to exercise stricter control over the 
traders. In this way British traders could be eliminated, traffic in whiskey 
could be curtailed, and the Indian's welfare could be safeguarded. The law 
was originally supported by the American Fur Company, for it provided another 
legal means for the company to eliminate competition.38 In the Green Ba.y 
region and throughout the territory, licenses granted to an independent 
trader required him to trade at a designated spot. The American Fur Canpany 
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would then erect a post nearby and reduce the price of its goods so drastically 
that the private trader would be forced out of business. Once the private 
trader had been eliminated, the company again raised its prices to recoup 
the losses suffered in breaking down the opposition.39 The law was also quite 
favorable to the Green B(\y traders since the posts designated by the Indian 
agent were those ordinarily used by the traders.4° 
Although the law did not adversely affect the American Fur Company's 
interest in the Green Bay area, the Chicago outfit experienced considerable 
difficulty. The local Indian agent, Dr. Alexander Wolcott, refused to grant 
trading locations desired by Robert Stuart and the American Fur Compa.ny.41 
Thus Robert Stuart suddenly became an opponent of the 18.24 law where the 
interest of the company required such action. Stuart immediately' wrote to 
Governor Cass stating his displeasure with the law. Knowing that Cass favored 
the develoµnent of private enterprise in the trade,42 Stuart hoped that he 
would apply the law leniently. The law operated unfairly in the Chicago area., 
Stuart explained, because the canpany•s traders, being known throughout the 
area, would be required to locate at a specific post. Meanwhile, private 
traders, unknown by the Indian agent, would be able to locate wherever they 
desired. Applying the levers of political pressure., Stuart requested Governor 
Cass to temper the attitudes of Dr. '•Jolcott at Chicago toward the American 
Fur Company: 
I hope, Sir, that you will have the goodness to request Dr. Wolcott 
to grant Mr. Crafts licenses for this reason, with the usual privi-
leges that is, not to be confined to a designated spot, for others 
have the liberty of running about in the vicinity of their posts 
and it would be ruinous for him not to have the same advantage.43 
Knowing that Governor Cass could not act .immediately and to avoid losing 
the profits of the 1824 Chicago outfit., Stuart adopted another expedient to 
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escape the regulations of the law. He wrote to George Boyd, the Indian agent 
at ;:.fackinac and friend of the American Fur Company, requesting him to grant 
John Grafts licenses for one year.44 In this way, Hobert Stuart hoped to 
supercede the authority of Dr. Wolcott at Chicago who refused to grant such 
licenses. ·'tihile Stuart worked behind the scenes pulling political strings, 
he wamed John Crafts to obey the law only as far as the situation pennitted.45 
As the w;.nter trading season approached, Stuart became more adamant in 
his objections to the law. To his surprise George Boyd at Mackinac had re-
fused to grant the privileges requested. Stuart knew that the law only for-
bade traders to conduct trade in furs and goods outside the designated post, 
while sewing nothing about extending credit to the Indians. Thus he advised 
John Crafts to circumvent the law by following the Indians into the territory 
not for trade but for the purposes of collecting debts and establishing 
credit.46 Furthermore, Stuart suggested a means whereby the law could be 
totally ignored: 
• • • But in the event of his adhering to his first determination, 
and that your trade suffers; you must, altho very repugnant to the 
inclinations of the Company, or its agents, use the only means left 
you in securing us fran serious loss, which is to confine your 47 unlicensed trade to the lands ceded to the United States • • • • 
Since the Indian agent only possessed jurisdiction over the Indian 
territory, Crafts could trade along the botmdary between ceded and tmceded 
lands without being required to locate at any definite post.48 By the Indian 
Treaty of 18216 large segments of land in the Chicago area had been obtained 
by the United States. This land, then, would constitute the area in which 
Stuart and Crafts could once again avoid the laws of the United States. 
Despite his many objections to the law, Stuart received little aid fran 
Governor Cass or the national government. The law had little affect on Green 
Bav. but it was trouble sane in Chicago and other trade regions. In 1826. 
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stus.rt was still quite active in attempting to secure the law's repeal. 
;_,;riting to the Committee on Indian Affairs, Stuart cited two principal objec-
tions to the law. Because the Indian trapping areas varied from year to year 
due to the increasing scarcity of game, Stuart explained, the trading posts 
had to follow such movementn. Stuart feared that a post established one year 
might be located too far away for effective trade the next. Secondly, Stuart 
claimed that it was extremely difficult to advance the Indians any credit 
under such a system. If the trader could not follow the Indians into their 
hunting grounds; he could not determine the prospects of the trade, nor coU::.d 
he be assured, af'ter advancing credit, that the Indians would deliver the 
rurs.49 Since it was precisely these abuses which the government wished to 
eliminate, the law remained on the books. Many times the trader advanced the 
Indians credit, and then he paid a low price for the furs, dragging the 
Indians deeper into debt. With designated posts, the Indian agent prevented 
many such abuses. In Chicago, though, the .American Fur Company ordinarily 
succeeded in avoiding the law's impact. 
Similar to many large corporations, the American Fur Company faced 
innumerable personnel problems. The traders continually protested over their 
poor wages and limited trading territories. The canpa.ny handled each case 
differently. Usually the trader was at the mercy of the company because there 
were few alternatives on the frontier to employment with the American Fur 
Canpany. Jean Beaubien who consistently can.plained of the poor trading terri-
tory at Hil.waukee fell into disfavor with Crooks and Stuart and often received 
a very small supply of goods. 50 Disgusted, Beaubien left his designated 
trading area and returned to the neighborhood of Chicago. Because of 
Beaubien's refusal to abide by company regulations, Stuart and Crooks ignored 
his complaints of economic hardship.5l 
Despite these several problems, the Chicago trade advanced under John 
craft's leadership. By 1825, he felt safe in abandoning his previous wage 
52 agreement with the company for $1000 per year. Y.nowing that the Chica.go 
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trade faced bright prospects: Crafts chose to work on a profit-sharing scheme. 
crafts•s ideas on the fortunes of the Chicago trade were well-calculated. 
In September, 1825, however, Crafts died and a delicate problem arose 
53 concerning the new head of the Chicago outfit. Beaubien•s belligerent 
conduct while Crafts was head eliminated him from the post. Gurdon Hubbard, 
now head of the Illinois outfit, was available but not canpletely familiar 
with the personnel in the Chicago area. John Kinzie finally emerged as 
Stuart's first choice for the position. Kinzie possessed two attributes which 
made him especially valuable to the company. First, he was an experienced 
fur trader, a life-long resident within the area, and on friendly terms with 
the Indians. Secondly, Kinzie was then Indian sub-agent for the Chicago area 
under Dr. Alexander Wolcott. This position not only gave Kinzie a strong 
connection with the Indian population, but placed him close to Dr. ,blcott who 
had been unfriendly to the company in enforcing the trade law of 1824. John 
Kinzie was thus a?pointed head of the Chicago outfit with Jean Beaubien as 
his assistant.54 Beaubien1 s assignment as assistant rather than head of the 
Chicago area was occasioned by Stuart's distrust of his ability: 
It is probable that Hr. Beaubien might have conducted the whole 
tolerably well, but as I have not full confidence in his capacity 
~or ~~ e=;tensivo ~ concern r 5~hought it best to associate •• r. Kinzie with him •••• 
Stuart made it perfectly clear that Kinzie's decisions would take 
precedence over those of Beaubien. Beaubien never really acquies~ed in this 
arrangement and continually feuded with John Kinzie over the Chicago trade. 56 
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The forgotten man in the plans of the American Fur Company was Gurdon 
Hubbard. Although the Chicago and Illinois outfits experienced several pors-
perous years between 1824 and 182'7, Hubbard was a good example of how the 
canpa.IlY prospered while the traders floundered. In 1825 1 Hubbard received 
$400 per year, but he expected a raise when Crafts died.57 With the assign-
ment of Kinzie to the Chicago post, Hubbard was prepared to leave the Indian 
trade and take the post of Indian sub-agent which paid $500 per year. 58 
The Chicago area experienced several years of successful trad.e.59 In 
1825 Stuart, pleased over the returns of the Chicago outfit, sent John Kinzie 
an even larger supply of goods for the 1825-1826 season confident that Kinzie 
could manage the whole affair.60 Stuart's optimism was not justified. In 
August, 1827, Stuart had to report to John Astor that the Chicago outfit had 
suffered a considerable loss. This failure was blamed on the large number of 
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credits which Kinzie had not collected. Another possible explanation was 
that the Indian annuity payments which the Chicago outfit had so heavily 
62 depended upon had been moved a considerable distance fran Chicago. More-
over, the trade was affected by the natural depletion of game from the 
territory. As early as 1825, a military officer passing through Chicago had 
commented that 11 ••• the quantity of game in this part of the colmtry is 
diminishing very rapidly, and ••• it is barely sufficient for the support 
of the Indians • • • • 1163 
In 182'7, John Kinzie resigned from the .American Fur Canpany.64 This was 
also the last year that the company sent a large supply or goods to the 
Chicago area.65 When Kinzie resigned, Gurdon Hubbard also changed the char-
acter of his trade. Hubbard, in 1825, was one of the :few traders to realize 
the changing character of the frontier. 66 He noticed that soon the trade 
-with the white population would be of primary importance. Knowing that 
Chicago was still a sparsely populated area with a diminishing amount of game 
and Indians, Hubbard in 182'7 moved to Danville, Illinois. Here he conducted 
a brisk trade with the greater white population. 67 In 1828, Hubbard sent a 
special request to Jol.n Astor in New York to supply goods suitable for trade 
with white settlers. He could not obtain such goods at Hackinac since their 
stock was still geared to the Indian trade.68 In addition, Robert Stuart 
and RmnsSiY Crooks objected to the abandonment of the fur trade for a retail 
69 business. 
Finally, in 1828, Hubbard became a partner in the company for the trade 
of the Illinois Hiver district. The American Fur Company reluctantly agreed 
to furnish him with the necessary goods both for trade with the whites and 
Indians. Hubbard no longer wished to trade in the Chicago area. Instead, he 
bought out the canpany 1s rights at Danville and along the Illinois River 
where there was a greater concentration of population. The company agreed 
not to supply any other traders in that area if Hubbard would assume their 
outstanding debts amounting to $500. 70 With the resignation of John Kinzie 
and the departure of Gurdon Hubbard, Jean Beaubien finally became the chief 
Chicago trader. The American Fur Company now merely supplied traders on an 
individual basis. For all intents and purposes, 1828 marked the end of the 
fur trade society in Chicago. 
From 1816 to 1828, the American Fur Company controlled the economic 
destiny of the westem shore of Lake Michigan. In Chicago, along the 
Illinois Itiver,, and in Milwaukee, the canpany slowly brought the majority of 
independent traders under its control. Those who refused to comply were 
beset on aJ.l sides by company personnel. Depending upon the situation, the 
government and its regulator-y policies were utilized or ignored. For. the 
traders, economic and social life centered on the company. In effect, the 
American Fur Company was the principal agent of frontier control, but was it 
an agent of frontier expansion? 
57 
While under the control of the American Fur Campany, Chicago changed its 
character ver-y little. In 1821, a government surveyor passing through the 
settlement comnented that "the village of Chicago consists of about nine or 
ten houses. 1171 In 1825, a i·iisconsin resident visited Chicago and saw only 
fourteen houses and about seventy-five people.72 As late as 1827, a visitor 
canmented that the settlement had not changed since 1821.73 To successfully 
conduct the fur trade, the American Fur Company, of course, had to maintain 
frontier conditions. White settla:nent, extensive production of staples, and 
the develoµnent of retail merchandising were changes which the American Fur 
Campany opposed by necessity. 
From 1816 to 1832, the company managed to control the character of 
settlement, the econanic life of the region, and the traders. In 1825, the 
first tax assessment was levied on Chicago for the purpose of determining 
voter eligibility. The entire valuation amounted to $91 047. The largest 
segment of this valuation was registered in the name of John Crafts and 
belonged to the American Fur Company. Thus the people of Chicago held only 
$4,047 on their Olm. Further, examining the figures one can connect several 
names as associated with the American Fur Company as either clerks or boatmen. 
Adding their value to the American Fur Company, one finds that only $975 of 
the total tax assessment was in no wa:y, or none that can be traced, connected 
with the American r'ur Company. 74 
Beginning in 182$, though, the Chicago fur trade entered a period of 
relative decline. A few traders were still supplied on an individual basis 
-;ith Jean Beaubien heading the general operations in Chicago. Bernadtia and 
David Laughton operated a small post on the Desplaines Hiver to trade with +~x_ 
potawatani, but since the Laughtons were only expected to collect three to 
four hundred dollars worth of furs, their trade was quite small. 75 Pa.rt or 
the reason for the decline in the fur trade was the gradual purchase of 
Indian lands in Illinois and the eventual movement of the tribes west of the 
Mississippi. With the departure of the Indians, the most essential element 
in the fur trade disappeared. In 1833, after the Blackhawk War, the tribes 
ceded their last remaining land east of the Mississippi fli.ver.76 This event 
marked the end of tho fur trade in the Northwest as it had operated for a 
hundred ye are. 
The Treaty of 1833 was the last major economic operation of the American 
Fur Company in Chicago. At the Treaty I the eovernment purchased land rran 
the Indians and agreed to p~ the fur traders and settlers for property lost 
due to Indian outrages. These claims went as far back as the War of 1812. 
Many who came to Chicago in 1833 wished to advance claims for property sup-
posedly stolen by the Indians, others were land speculators, while the 
majority saw the opportunity to make a fast dollar before their Indian 
brother departed for lands west of the }fississippi.77 The American Fur 
Canpany was no exception. W. G. Brewster, agent at Detroit, wrote to David 
Laughton requesting him to consult all local traders who wished to present 
claims at the Treaty. This was done in order that they might give Brewster 
the power of attorney to handle their claim.s.78 Robert Stuart was also at 
the Treaty to push through the enormous claim of the American Fur Company. 
lndiVidual traders, such as Jacques Vieau and Solomon Juneau, arrived to 
Pl'eaent snall claims, but, even more importantly, they brought a large supply 
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of goods to tra.de.·/'7 Interesting, too, was the fact that Governor Cass, Jean 
Beaubien, and Gurdon Hubbard were witnesses to the Treaty.80 The spokesmen 
for the Indian tribes were Alexander Robinson and Billy (.;al.dwell, both of 
whan had been closely connected with the fur trade and traders since the early 
81 1s.20•s. Governor Porter, the chief government commissioner, was a personal 
friend of the Klllzie family. The Kinzie family eventually drew large grants 
fron the Treaty. Many of the goods distributed to the Indians by the govern-
ment were purchased from another Kinzie relation, Joseph Kercheval.82 
Throughout the history of Indian relations and especially in the Old 
Northwest, these treaties were the scenes or graft and corruption.83 The 
Treaty of 1833 was little different. Meeting in Chicago, the Indians were 
freely supplied with liquor despite the fact that the government had only 
recently passed a law introducing strict regulations against any liquor in 
the Indian trade.84 At the Chicago Treaty under the eyes of Governor Porter, 
Indian agent Thomas Owen of Chicago, numerous local officials, and foreign 
visitors, the traders plied the Indians with whiskey to obtain their money. 
The traders were unrestrained; much of the Indian payment arrived in fifty 
cent pieces and strangely the traders sold beads, bread, and whiskey at the 
rate of fifty cents a purchase.85 
But trade alone did not attract the American Fur Campany and traders. 
By the Treaty of 1833, the Indian ceded their rema.ining lands east of the 
Mississippi amounting to approximately five million acres. In return, the 
government agreed to take care of any debts levied against the tribes in 
addition to providing lands west of the Hississippi. The .American Fur 
Company and the traders presented innumerable claims against the Indians. 
According to the payment schedule of this treaty and four others, Gurdon 
Hubbard received nearly $6,ooo, various members of the Kinzie family received 
$2.J,OOO, Jean Beaubien $3 1 0001 and finally the American Fur (.;ompany garnered 
nearly $17,00o.86 
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Official Washington never forcefully reacted to the corruption surrounding 
the treaty, but questions were raised about the large stUnS granted individual 
traders and the American Fur COL~pany.87 'Ihe most cursory consideration of 
the Treaty indicated that the American Fur Company and the traders received 
a large payment considerably out of proportion to the damages suffered. 
Hardly a year before the Treaty, Indian agent Owen of Chicago had claimed 
that losses in the trade due to Indian ravages had never amounted to any 
significant amount in the Chicago area. 88 Then just a year later the traders 
drew large sums from the Treaty. Why did the government al.low such depreda-
tions and fraud to take place at Chicago and elsewhere in the 18301s? Anxious 
to obtain title to Indian lands and to speed the removal of the tribes, the 
govermnent was little disposed to '~icker" excessively with the Indians.89 
Due to long years of business relations, the traders and the American Fur 
Company held a certain degree of influence over the Indians. If prohibited 
from trade at the treaties or denied their claims, the traders could have 
easily blocked the successful conclusion of a treaty because of their in-
fluence over the Indians. Thus partially to expedite matters 1 the traders 
and the company were given free rein at the treaty sessions. 90 
The Treaty of 1833 brought forward another interesting aspect of the 
trade. None of the leading traders who drew p~ents frcm the Treaty could 
claim the money as their own. The Kinzie family was faced with the debts 
that John Kinzie had compiled during his early years in the fur trade. 91 
Gurdon Hubbard, who had traded for many years in the Chicago area, was in 
debt to the American Fur Company for $6,uoo. Stuart even attempted to stop 
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Hubbard's claim from being pa.id on the grounds that the money rightfully 
belonced to the cornpany. 92 Jean Beaubien, who received $3,UOO fran the Treaty 
of 1833, was eventuaJ.l~r forced to pay $2,000 of this sum to the company. 93 
Thus the 1irnerican Fur Company not only received a large claim but was also 
able to collect the debts of !onner anployees. The pczyments were significant 
in judging the fur trader's success. The company had exploited the Chicago 
area for nearly twenty years, and many times derived large profits from it. 
The traders, however, had never realized profits. Partly through their own 
careless financial habits and partly through the exploitative policies of 
the American Fur Company, the Chicru~o traders, in 1833, had littlA investment 
capital as Chicago was about to entAr a period of commercial growth. 
Immediately after the Treaty of 1833, Chicago experienced a population 
boom. The lands ceded to the United States were now opened for settlement. 
In 1830, the population did not exceed 100, but by 1835 Ghicago numbered 
nearly 3500 people. 94 Almost as quickly the fur trader passed into obscurity. 
Land sales were controlled by eastern speculators and town promoters. The 
fur trader knew little a.bout the town springing up about h:i.mo John Kinzie, Jr., 
when he went to file pre-emption claims for the land his father ha.d settled, 
failed to claim all the land that was rightfully his. In his own words, 
Kinzie was happy with just enough land to live on.95 Gurdon Hubbard proved 
to be one of the few traders who actually benefited f ran or contributed to 
the town growth of Chicago. In 1835, Hubbard invested in land speculation. 96 
The new town now under the influence of speculators began new industries, 
agitated for harbor improvement to increase lake commerce, and drove to com-
plete the Illinois-!1ichigan Canal. All such o.oves were designed to increase 
the rate of commercial growth. Chicago, indeed, had bridged the gap between 
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a fur trade village a.nd to'Wll. The people who initiated such changes were not 
even residents of the city two years before. The capital employed was de-
rived fran land sales, eastern banks, and -=ovenunent internal :llnprovement 
achenes. Fur traders passed out of Chicago history; that is, they rarely 
emereed as leaders of the camnunity. 'I'he actual course which the traders 
followed was not clear because their names were not involved with the business 
of thn new town. Hany remained in Chicago while others moved westward where 
their skills were still required. 
The fur trade, though, did not automatically or suddenly cease in 1833. 
For some time, the traders existed side by side with the citizens arriving 
tran the East. Jean Beaubien was supplied by the American Fur Company until 
1835 when he purchased their remaining goods and buildings. 97 As late as 
1839, many furs were still collected in Chicago for shipment to the East, 
but it was a trade conducted on an individual basis by commission merchants 
or owners of dry goods and clothing stores to supplement their incomes.98 
The heydczy- of the .fur trade had passed, and the trade which remained paled 
into insignificance alongside the new economic forces being generated in the 
frontier town of Chicago. 
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more successful and yielded greater profits. While his generalizations re-
main tUlproven, they certainly deserve consideration by scholars. See Clayton, 
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CHAPT.:I.R III 
An :~ra or E:::ploita.tion: 
The .American Fur Co.11pany in Green Bay, 1815-1$40 
From 1816 to approximately 1833, much the same situation existed in 
Green Bay as in Chicago; the American Fur Campany moved in to fonn a monopoly, 
exercised complete control or the traders, and when business declined left 
behind a number of traders indebted to the company. In the history or the 
Green Bay trade, the operations of the American Fur Campany were clear. It 
utilized the methods and practices of a major business enterprise exploiting 
for the moment the traders and the country. This, of course, was the design 
of the company, to make money while favorable conditions prevailed. But the 
period of the American Fur Company• s control of Green Bay and other posts 
along the more northerly shore of Lake Michigan had little or no relation to 
the region's economic growth and an adverse affect on the economic and social 
destiny of the traders. The fur trade period at Green Bay y,>oints even more 
clearly to the generalization that the fur trade contributed little to west-
ward expansion and even less to a generation of frontier inhabitants. 
During the period fran 1Sl6 to 1822, the traders at Green Bay were 
seriously hurt in the trade by the competition of the factory system and 
numerous government regulations such as the license law of 1816. Utilizing 
political influence to temper government policies on the Green Bay traders, 
the American Fur Company slowly brought these traders under its influence. 
Throughout 18201 the independent traders cmtinually complained about their 
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dwindling profits because of government interference.1 Gradually each.trader 
turned toward the American Fur Company and purchased goods to trade for the 
2 Indian's furs. Each trader, however, was canpeting with his neighbors at 
Green Bay and business did not noticeably improve. The trade wa4 disorganized 
and conducted in a haphazard fashion. 1'18.ny areas were visited by several. 
traders while other regions were left untouched. The majority of trading 
occurred in the :i.moediate neighborhood of Green Bay, but on occasion a trader 
would joumey up the Fox to the ~Jiscons:in River. other traders periodically 
visited ~Iilwaukee.3 
The American Fur Company was also dissatisfied with the conduct of the 
trade. Their profits were apparently reduced because of the abundance of 
traders and unorganized fashion in which they operated. Rams~ Crooks and 
Robert Stuart decided to alter their arrangements at Green Bay by reducing 
the ntunber of people employed, defining areas of trade, and instituting a 
sound organizational structure.4 To reduce losses, Ramsa\Y' Crooks selected 
the most canpetent Green Bay traders to form a partnership. The agreement 
inclu:led five traders: Louis, Pierre, and Augustin Grignon, John Lawe, and 
~acques Porlier. .:!Ach agreed to share 1/5 the profits or suffer 1/5 the 
losses. Operating under the title of the Green ~ Company, the trade goods 
!Were to be obtained from the American fur Canpany. The co~tract forbade the 
Green Bey Company fran buying goods or exchanging furs with any canpeting 
enterprises. The agreement was to last for three years. One signatory of 
the contract was to remain at Green B8i}r handling the administrative details 
and the packaging and shipping of furs to Mackinac. The remaining traders 
Were to hire boatmen and clerks as needed and locate themselves in selected 
~gions of the Indian country. 5 
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By establishing the Green Bay Company, the American Fur Carn.pany dropped 
from its accounts many other traders previously supplied on an individual 
basis• These traders probably obtained goods fran competing firms, but Crooks 
ard Stuart seemed to feel that a centrally organized Green Bay Company would 
be able to subdue rival interests. Ramsay Crooks, though, was careful to 
employ the most skillful personnel and those who might otherwise provide 
extensive competition. \·men the contract for the Green Bay Company was 
originally signed, Jacques Parlier, a leading resident of Green Bay, was 
absent. I Rather than lose his services, Crooks signed his name to the contract. 
Later Crooks convinced Porlier of the propriety of joining the Green Bay 
company instead of remaining an independent trader.7 Other traders :in the 
are& were less fortunate, and Crooks bluntly refused to supply goods except 
to the i"i ve partners of the Green Day Canpa.ny. 8 
While Chicago was only a small settlement, Green B~~ P.ad a greater 
population and was an established community. For years the fur trade has been 
conducted in relative freedan fran outside regulation. Until 18221 the 
.American govenunent appeared to be the most imminent threat to the nonnal con-
duct of the trade. The traders soon discovered that their nomal. methods of 
conducting the trade were also seriously curtailed under the direction of 
the American Fur Company. It assigned each individual a specific location, 
usually a.long the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. Areas which "the Green Bay traders 
had formerly visited were now allotted to traders frcm different regions. 
For example, the Green Bay traders had often journeyed down the \·;isconsin P..iver 
all the way to the Mississippi River in search of favorable trade. By 18221 
h<>lfever, this territory was controlled by other traders of the American Fur 
Cclnpany, notably Joseph Rolette operating from Prairie du Chien. 9 In 1822, 
r------------------------------------TI-, 
Augustin Grignon of the Green Bay Company continued the practice of trading 
l 
along the lower '.:isconsin River despite the American Fur Company's directions 
that this area belonged to Joseph Rolette. Robert Stuart at Mackinac con-
s:idered Grignon's conduct symptomatic of his general lack or principles.10 In 
the winter of 18221 Augustin Grignon and Joseph Rolette bitterly fought for 
the Indian trade along the Wisconsin River. At one point, Augustin Grignon's 
ll trading post was burned by the Indians. Grignon immediately accused Rolette 
of inciting the Indians and requested that his trading license be revoked by 
the government.12 Govemor Cass, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
recommended that the Indians be punished and that Rolette lose his license, 
but government action was never taken.13 
The strangest aspect of the feud with Rolette was the attitude of the 
American Fur Company. Crooks and Stuart were disgusted not with Rolette•s 
ccnduct, but with that of the Green B~ traders. Their outfits were never 
profitable, and the company showed little patience with unsuccessful ventures. 
Thus the .American Fur Company supported Rolette at every juncture because he 
was of more value to the ccmpan,y. He was supplied with a finer assortment of 
goods ani given a free rein in the territory. Rather than crush all opposi-
tion, however, Crooks cautioned Rolette about his policy with regard to the 
Green Bczy- traders: 
I am perfectly aware that the capital placed in your hands by the 
Campany gives you the power to injure all your competitors, if 
not to destroy their business altogether, and I am not ignorant 
of the advantages which such a result would secure nor have I 
the smallest doubt that such is your a.:im - Still however obvious 
the benefit, mcxieration toward those who derive their supplies 
from us, must be the eoveming principle •••• 15 
The Rolette feud was temporarily halted in October, 1823, when Joseph 
Rolette and Augustin Grignon agreed to share trading territories on the orders 
Joseph Rolette. In the early 1820's there was considerable fur trade com-
petition arow1Ci Green Bay. Being one o! the few permanent settlements on 
Lake i·1ichigan, Green Bay was naturally t.he first place business enterprises 
in the fur trade stopped along the western shore of Lake Hichi3an. Stuart 
suspected that the Green Bay Company occasionally purchased goods fran 
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agents of American Finns in Detroit.18 Fearing that the competition would 
only ruin a large outfit, the AL~erican Fur Company consistently refused to 
supply all the trade goods desired by the Green Bay Company.19 In areas such 
as Prairie du Chien and Chicago, where t.heir monopoly was ;,;ore secure, the 
American Fur Company sent more substanti.al outfits. 
The total economic effect, however, was to handicap the traders of the 
Green Bay Canpany. They could not canpete with the other trading outfits in 
the Bay area or with Rolette simply because their supply and selection of 
goods was inferior. Year after year, tlle Green Bay Company lost heavily in 
the Indian trade, and consequently the traders increasingly fell into debt 
to the American Fur Comµmy. 20 Crooks and Stuart were convinced that the 
Green Bay Company would never yield pro.:fits, yet they persisted in maintaining 
an interest. at Green Bay. 'Why? These entrepreneurs had very practical 
business considerations in mind. If the American Fur Company could maintain 
a token opposition against other fur trading interests, perhaps the canpeti-
tion Would never gain a real foothold at Green Bay and naturally never be 
able to threaten more profitable trading areas. Writing to Joseph Rolette, 
.!iobert Stuart expressed these tactics itl regard to the Green Bav traders: 
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For they (Green Bay traders) have got goods fran Irwin at the bay, 
(which he got from Detroit) •••• besides I know that Lockwood 
made them a liberal offer to supply all their wants; and let the 
result be loss agaizl, they would have strengthened his opposition, 
so as to make it of serious consequence to your operation for 
their would be no restraint whatever; and it would be throwing 
them completely into the arms of our opponents, which as I have 
already stated, might be of no beneficial result to either of 21 them, but still must have turned out of serious detriment to us. 
Had Robert :>tuart and Hamsa;y- Crooks given up their hopes of monopoly in 
the Green Bay area by 1822? This seems the most plausible explanation. The 
competition which Stuart and Crooks most feared was nore than just the passing 
interest of other fur tra.d.ing companies. They were, or seemed to be in 18221 
permanent residents of the Day who could not easily be defeated. Thus Stuart 
and Crooks used the Green Dey Can.pany as a hindrance to the trade of compet-
itors, never expecting a profitable return except in the broader perspective 
of a free field for trade elsewhere along the lake shore. 
In purely business t;, erms, the tactics of the American Fur Company were 
certainly apropos. The competition to the canpany centered in the area of 
Green Bey known as Shantytown. The area originally consisted of taverns and 
small stores for the supply of the military personnel at Fort Howard. 22 In 
182)1 Daniel Whitney arri. ved at Shantytown where he opened a sraall trading 
store. Soon he was joined there by two other merchants, William Dickinson 
and Hobert Irwin, Jr. Th.e presence of these stores gave the few residents 
ot the Bey opportunities to purchase goods at competitive prices. 13ut the 
retail trade with the white settlers was not of sufficient volume, and these 
merchants soon directed t 1ieir attention toward the Indian trade • .23 At first, 
Robert Stuart could not believe that Whitney was actually participating in 
the Indian trade. 24 He a.1so derided Robert Irwin's efforts to hire traders 
at Green Bay. ',:riting to Jacques Porlier, Stuart observed that 
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---------------------------------------------------, I believe the house of which Hr. Irwin is said to be a.gent will 
create more noise than effect: the Lord knows the trade is 
already bad e{!Qugh; but if more fools will come, why we must 
wel cane them. 2' 
The Amr:dca.n Fur Canpa.llY did welcane these new traders at the Day; at 
least the canpa.cy did not, in the beginning, oppose their interests. The 
Green Bay Company, as intended, would provide enough competition to hold 
the Shantytown merchants at bay. 
' .. hile the business tactics of the American Fur Canpacy assured that the 
competition would not damage the general profitability of the Indian trade, 
the Green 13a,y traders were £'acing economic ruin. The Shantytown merchants 
quickly established. business relations with the Indians. Daniel Whitney and 
his cohorts were able to se11 trade goods at lower prices than those allowed 
by the American Fur Campany 1 and naturally the Indians increasingly directed 
their business toward Shantytown. 26 John Lawe instructed the partners o:f 
the Green Bl\)' Company to conduct all their trade with the Indians as f'ar 
awiq .fran Green Bay as possible in order to keep the Indians from trading at 
Shantytown. At one point, Lawe even considered spreading the rumor that 
amaJ.1 pox was ravaging the Green Bczy citizens in order to keep the Indians in 
the interior. Zl Lawe had good reasons for contanplating such radical action. 
The Indians often accepted their trade goods on credit f rarn the Green Bay 
Canpany, and then at the end of the seasoo sold their furs to Irwin, 
Dickinson, and ~Vhitney. 28 'This action, of course, left the Green Bay 
Company no W83' to liquidate its debts to the American Fur Canpany. 
The Green Ba,y traders slow:Ly realized the strategy behind the American 
Fur Company's establishment. of the Green Bay Company. In 1822, Jacques 
Porlier bitterly canplained that the American Fur Canpany was supplying other 
P90ple with cheaper gocxis and locating them at trading territories which, 
~--------~--~-:-------~-------TI--, tor years, he had occupied. Robert Stuart, of course, denied all such 
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accusations. John Lawe, however, added to Porlier's testimony by summarizing 
the many complaints of the Green Ba.r traders: 
As I wrote you last year they made us fonn a Company at the Bay 
but it is mere Burlesque for to throw us into misery & trouble 
they pretend it is for our own good - it is true it would be if' 
we had the privileges of others (that is to get our goods as low 
as they could really give them & with a good profit) & at least 
liberty to go where we please - but no it is quite the contrary -
they doo •t wish I believe to ruin us for fear an opposition might 
form & come into the country .30 
Lawe explained that the American Fur Company had sent traders into areas 
where they had alwczys traded - at Milwaukee, at the Portage of the Fox-
31 Wisconsin Rivers, and even on the Hock River. In September, 18.23, the 
Green B~ Canpany again contracted for goods fran the American Fur Company 1 
but John Lawe did not expect to make any profit. In fact, Lawe seriously 
doubted whether any of the Green Bay traders would ever recover from their 
losses in the Indian trade.32 
John Lawe had good reason to question the economic plight of the Green 
B&y' Canpany because years of competition and the tactics of the American Fur 
COlllpany had placed them in inextricable economic difficulties. By November, 
1822, Robert Stuart estimated the total indebtedness of the Green Bay Company 
at $16,1.-00. At this early date, Stuart proposed that the traders mortgage 
their land and claims to land to the American Fur Company. He also demanded 
that these mortgages be of short duration, for he realized the bitterness 
lilich the traders harbored against the company. 33 
In April, 18.23, the American Fur Company merged w:i. th Stone, Bostwick, and 
Ccmpany of Detroit necessitating a complete accounting of the Company's 
business ledgers. Stuart used this opportunity to disband the Green Bczy 
· Company and settle its debts. 34 He decided new trading arrangements were 
,,.. __________________ -:--:-----:----:----:---~-:-:--------:-~~--:-7-,8 
, necessary, but expressed confidence only in Augustin Grignon and John Lawe to 
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ever comuct a profitable trade. After 1823, therefore, the American Fur 
company again supplied goods to selected traders in the Green Bq region. 
The trade steadily declined after 18.23. The principal reason was the 
greater competition especially that of Daniel Whitney and the other merchants 
at Shantytown. Rather than withdraw from the region, the American Fur Company 
supplied :individual traders hoping a few would derive a fair trade. In 18.25, 
roirteen separate traders were employed with goods totaling $8,344. In 1826, 
t~nty-two traders received $111 617 worth of goods.36 Thus the profits which 
could be garnered by any single indi victual were considerably reduced as the 
territory was flooded with traders. 
Robert Stuart attempted to reduce the losses of the American r'ur Company 
bf urging the traders to follow more strict economic procedures. Michael 
Dousman was sent to Green Bay to work with John Lawe and the other Bay traders. 
Furthermore, Stuart instructed the traders to issue no more credits to the 
Indians tor a winter's outfit. The large number of traders now in the terri-
tory, Stuart said, left little hope of ever obtaining the furs credited to the 
Indians. To prevent the merchandise stores of Shantytown from obtaining their 
ture, he told Mr. Dousman to erect a store in the Shantytown area enabling him 
to keep a careful watch on the opposition. Lawe was also instructed never to 
ld'Vallce the white population any credit since they h~ too few occupations to 
gu&rantee pa.vment. Although Stuart did not at this time outlaw trade with the 
White settlers, he was against making such business a supplementary occupation 
ot the traders. Therefore, he required that trade with the white settlers be 
Oanducted on a cash basis.38 
The strategic economic moves made by Stuart for the benefit of Green Bay 
Ind the canpany had little effect. For the trading season of 1825 .. not one 
79 r Green Bay trader realized a profit. Stuart. blamed this failure on the 
opposition provided by Daniel Whitney •39 He knew that 'ifuitney was a serious 
threat to the Green B~ traders, and advised them to hire the traders which 
Whitney had employed. Stuart himself attempted to hire Paul and Amable GrignonJ 
two of ~~itney•s more enterprising agents.40 These men refused to join the 
American l''ur Canpany, and in the next season Whitney employed seven traders. 41 
Therefore, Sb.art (to protect the American Fur Company) warned his traders not 
to reduce their prices in order to compete with Whitney• s men. Rather, Stuart 
said, hold your goods and let hhitney' s men compete with each other. 42 
In the 1826-1827 trading season, Stuart expected heavy losses at Green 
aq, but he hoped that soon all the traders would be forced into other occupa-
tions. 43 Stuart's fears were not without justification. Green Bay had its 
worst season collecting .f\l.rs to the value of only $800. The season was equally 
bad for Daniel \·~hitney, and he offered to sell his interest in the trade to 
the American Fur Company.}+:.+ Always the master strategist, Stuart refused 
Whitney's offer. Conditions were now favorable to the American Fur Company, 
for Stuart merely wished to produce a stalemate in the Green Bay area. Comment· 
ing on Whitney's offer, Stuart clearly expressed his viaw: 
Whitney must have suffered severely - and wishes me to buy him out, 
but he may make the most of it for altho we cannot abandon that 
trade, I would rather he should supply some of the people, than we; 
for whether there is opposition or not, no money is to be made 
there.45 
After 1828, the American Fur Canpany sent fewer goods to Green Bavr and 
comucted the majority of business through John Lawe. If he wished, Lawe was 
all.owed to divide the trade goods among his friends. The American Fur Canpa.ny 
bad accanplished their objective; the trade was unprofitable for all concerned. 
H°" harsh were the business practices of the company? The story is not complet~ 
1fithout realizing that the Green Bq traders, in many instances, contributed to 
ri'their own difficulties. 
80 
The correspondance between Mackinac and Green Bay 
indicated that the traders had little desire or ability to conduct an economi-
cal business operation. They were a generation of froo.tier inhabitants who 
were accustaned to relative freedan in the Indian trade, and they never quite 
adjusted to the changing conditions of the frontier's economic life brought 
by the government and the American Fur Company. The traders often did not 
bOther to go into the interior to obtain the Indian's furs.46 At other times, 
John Lawe gave his friends goods on credit knowing that their ability to pay 
was questionable. Stuart constantly warned Lawe about the outstanding debts 
ot his friends. If Lawe refused to act, Stuart made it clear that he would be 
held responsible.47 Stuart once characterized the Green Bay traders• business 
habits as 11there exists among the gentry of that district an unconquerable 
aversion to economy, and their only care seems to be to get into their pro-
fession the means of pampering their indolence •••• ,/+B Finally, there was 
considerable evidence that the American Fur Canpany, while trusting John Lawe, 
worried over his excessive drinking which affected his conduct of the trade. 49 
Despite these numerous problems 1 there seemed little doubt that the 
American Fur Company exploited the comtry and the Green Bay traders. The 
principal reasons for the increasing indebtedness of the traders were the 
bueiness tactics of the American Fur Company. 50 The company occupied many of 
the choice trading sites fonnarly used by Green Bay personnel, and thEV often 
re.fused to supply Green Ba.Y with an adequate stock of goods to oppose their 
can.petition. In effect, the American Fur Canpany' s control of Green Bay was 
a b.isiness tactic designed to safeguard more valuable trading areas in the 
interior by preventing the competition from gaining a base at Green J3ai1. The 
traders~ unaccustomed to business tactics and economy 1 naturally .faltered and 
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Like the country, they were exploited as the frontier monopoly 
shaped the economic destiny of the western shore of Lake Hichigan. But why 
did the traders continue their affiliation with the American Fur Company? The 
traders had few alternatives. Fur trading was their only skill and really the 
onlY business enterprise at this sta:"~e of frontier development. Only in later 
years with the growth of towns would commercial enterprises offer the possi-
bility of new opportunities. Faced with the decline of tlY! fur trade and the 
machinations of the American Fur Company 1 the traders confronted a dilemna. 
F..a.rly in the 183J 1s John Lawe best expressed the problems of the Green Bay 
traders: 
I will canmence in s~ing that the first year after the ~;ar was the 
last year I saved myself for eveey year since I have been losing 
money and not a little in that cursed Indian trade that l have al-
ways persisted & do still persist to continue which will soon put 
me a beggar (but you may well say or ask the question why do you 
still continue since you find it a loosing business) I will say I 
do not know what to do else as ~ am not capable of doing or follow-
ing any other kind of business. l 
Fran 1828 to 18371 therefore, John Lawe and many other French inhabitants 
continued their involvement with the American Fur Can.pany. In the early 1830 1sJ 
John Lawe and the Grignons exploited the old trading areas along the Fox River. 
Aa the years passed1 the traders, following the Indians, moved further north 
in the present-day state of Wisconsin. 52 The traders and the American Fur 
Campany also remained at Green B8'f' for the occasional payment of Indian 
annuities. At various times since 1829, the government had purchased land 
from the Imians and in re tum agreed to pay the Indians an annuity. As in 
Chicago 1 the American Fur Company supplied goods on these occasions to obtain 
the lniian•s money. John Lawe depended heavily on these P81!11ents for his 
tl'lde. The importance of these annuity payments was apparent in the early 
l.83o•e when the government subsidy arrived too late for the Indians to purchase 
goods and still reach t.he hunting areas for the winter. 53 For John Lawe, 
this meant no winter's hunt; and for the American Fur Company, it meant a 
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reduction in the number of furs collected. Thus Ha.msay Crooks exerted politi-
cal pressure on the v:ar Department to pay the Indians at least by early August. 
Through Janes Doty, an influential territorial politician and friend of the 
secretary of War, Lewis Cass, E.amsa.y Crooks pressured Washington for earlier 
Indian pa.yments. 54 Immediate action was not forthcoming ar.d in both 1834 and 
1835, John Lawe again lost money in the trade. On his 1834 outfit, Lawe 
lost approx:imatel.y $2700. 55 
Ramsay Crooks steadily cautioned John Lawe against giving credit to 
either whites or Indians. Even though the Indian annuity payments arrived 
late, Crooks prohibited goods being released on credit. He was also, as a 
general policy, against the selling of any goods to white settlers. Thus 
Lawe could not conduct a retail trade with the white settlers who, by 1835, 
more and more began to drift into the Green Bey area. 56 In November, lS.35, 
Crooks admonished John Lawe for presenting the canpany a list of debts totPling 
$1000 which were owed by white settlers. Crooks observed that 
You certainly lose more by bad debts, and you have always done so, 
than you can possibly gain by the good one, and if you did not 
sell a dollars worth at all to the whites, you would be better off 
at the end of the year.57 
Repeated failures by Lawe and his canpatriots plus the inroads of white 
settlement finally convinced Ransay Crooks that the American Fur Company 
should withdraw fran Green Bay. Crooks left the final accounting to his 
agent, Samuel Abbot. 58 Infonned of the Canpany•s intention, Lawe inunediately 
wrote several letters charging that the canpany had always flooded the terri-
tory with traders and charged outrageous prices for goods. Crooks refused to 
listen to Lawe's complaints and informed Samuel Abbot to disregard Lawe•s 
charges when assessing the debts of the traderso Crooks apprehended that Lawe 
and the other Bq traders were raising a furor in order to justify their con-
templated repudiation of the debts.59 Wishing, however, to maintain f'riend.ly 
relations with the Green B~ residents, Crooks did write several letters 
attempting to explain the company's business policies.60 Arter 1837, nonnal 
operations of the American Fur Company were terminated at Green B~. John 
Lawe was occasionally supplied with goods even as late as 1840, but this was 
merely a gesture to maintain Lawe' s friendship. Thus the fur trade era had 
passed. 
But one might legitimately question why the American Fur Company remained 
involved in the Green Bq area a.s late as 1839-1840. Writing to John Lawe, 
Ramsay Crooks implied that the company was motivated only by friendship for 
John Lawe: 
We would prefer to close all our affairs in your quarter, & shall 
be pleased to hear that you have made better arrangements for your 
own interest than those that have recently existed between us, for 
we have only continued you, under the impression that it was for 
the advantage & convenience of an old & much est~emed friend, & not 
for the sake of the profit the business gave us.bl 
Crook's statement told only half the story. As early as 18241 the trade 
was unprofitable but the American Fur Company remained for tactical business 
reasons. In the 18301 s, the fur trade declined as the territory filled up 
with white settlers, yet the company remained despite its policy against re-
tail trade with the whites. The company's actions were again occasioned 
primarily by economic interests. Beginning in the 1820's as the traders fell 
into debt, they mortgaged lands to the company. This deeding of land continued 
throughout the 1830 1s, and the company, of course, remained to assure the 
payment o:f debts. In 18331 Robert Stuart strongly advised Augustin Grignon 
to sell any land which he might hold to the inccming white settlers.62 
Grignon naturally was expected to use the profits fran the sale to pay hie 
debts to the company. 
In 1834, the American Fur Canpany itself underwent a major transformation 
with John Astor selling his interest to Ram.say Crooks and several other finan-
ciers. To expedite the final accounting of company funds., all outfits were 
to be closed out and their debts liquidated. For the Green Bay traders, this 
could only mean complete economic disaster. John Lawe faced the future with 
great anxiety: 
• • • I am very much af ra.id indeed and God knows what is going to 
becan.e of me and you all for I do not know which way to turn my 
head at present. I owe so much that there is not a day passes 
over my head but what I am thinking o&j!lY great troubles & what I 
am go:lng to do about my debts • • • • 
The debts owed by Lawe and his fellow traders were astronomical. James 
Duane Doty was employed as the company's attorney in 1834 to expedite the 
transferrence of land into the American Fur Company's hands. The extent of 
the trader's indebtedness can not be accurately computed. A reliable indica-
tion, however, was that all the land mortgaged in the l.B20's and early 1830's 
was foreclosed to liquidate the debt of $35,00o.64 After 1834 the traders 
continued to deed land to the American Fur Canpany indicating that the debt 
exceeded the Stml of $35,ooo.65 
As the American Fur Canpany acquired land titles in Green Bay, the region 
along the western shore of Lake Michigan witnessed the arrival of thousands of 
tanners and town dwellers. Rather than withdraw fran Green Ba.r, the lands 
deeded to John Astor and Ramsay Crooks were plotted into the town of Astor. 
The value of land, of course, increased rapidly in the era of town speculation, 
but the traders never shared in its developnent. A contemporary resident 
described the conditions which led to the plotting of Astor: 
••• The land was originally owned by John Lawe and the Grignon. 
family. Together with other real estate, it was taken in payment 
of balance due the old Green Dczy Company to the former Company; 
the debt having accrued by loss in the Indian trade for in this 
business it generally happened that the small traders who purchased 
their goods at higher prices after years of toil and privation 
spent in the trade, came out with nothing ••• leaving the great 
monopoly, the lion's share of the profits. The consideration re-
ceived by the former o~ers was trifling compared with the present 
value of the property. 
Since Ramsay Crooks intended to engage in town speculation a.round the 
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Bay, it becomes obvious why the American Fur Company continued to supply John 
Lawe and attempted to maintain friendly relations with the residents. James 
Doty, who served as attorney tor the company and agent for its town property, 
argued strongly in 1834 that John Lawe be permittad to retain his property. 
Otherwise, Joty explained, public opinion at Green Ba\Y' could jeopardize the 
success of the town at Astore67 John Astor agreed with Doty's views, and 
Lawe was al.lowed certain parcels of land and supplied with goods for years in 
order to improve the image of John Astor and the American F'ur Gompany.68 
At various times, however, the company collected small portions of the 
remaining debts owed by the traders. The most advantageous time for collecting 
debts was, as in Chicago, at the various Indian treaties when the zovernm.ent 
paid the claims of traders agamst -~he Indians. In 1836, a Treaty with the 
Henominee was concluded at Cedar Point, Wisconsin, and the claims were to be 
paid in 1837.69 ltamsay Crooks considered journeying to the BB\f or at least 
sending an agent so that the Green Bay traders would be forced to pay their 
debts before spending the 1noney on land or goods.70 In late 1837, at 
Washington the government concluded treaties with the V!isconsin Winnebago and 
Sioux. Crooks urged Lawe to go to Washington and press his claims, for part 
of the money was owed to the company. 71 When the clair:is were eventually paid, 
the i\m.erican Fur Company demanded nearly $6,uoo in back debts from .John Lawe. 72 
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As late as 1840, Lawe signed a contract acknowledging that he alone owed the 
. Fur c , .... 22 500 73 American ompany ~ 1 • 
During these final years of the trade :in Green Bay, two eras of frontier 
society existed side by side, but there were few relations between them. 
Without land or capital, the old fur trader did not invest to any significant 
degree in the land speculation along the 1.ake shore. r.:.Xcept for supplying 
John Lawe for public relations purposes, the American Fur Canpany moved its 
trade further westward.. Ramsa_y Crooks steadily refused to conduct a retail 
trade with the whites, and thus the traders only business connection was of 
little use in the econcmic life of the new town. 
Much the same thing occurred in Milwaukee. In Milwaukee, the fur trade 
never attained the same character as it did in Chicago and Green Bay. 
Milwaukee typified the conduct of the trade at the more transitory locations 
on the lake shore such as Racine, Kewaunee, and Manitowoc. Settlement never 
developed arotmd .these areas until the 18301s, nor were they ever centers 
for the collection of .furs. The first employee or the American Fur Company 
to reach Milwaukee :for regualr trade was Solanon Juneau. He remained 
Milwaukee's principal representative of the American Fur Company tmtil lS,36-
1837. Throughout his tenure, however, the compa..w supplied numerous other 
traders at Milwaukee. Jean Beaubien located there at different times as well 
as James Kinzie and Jacques Vieau. 74 John Lawe tran Green Bq also sent a 
representative to Milwaukee, but as usual found the American Fur Company 
solidly entrenched at this location.75 
The 1'1ilwaukee trade remained on this basis throughout the 1820 1 s~ and 
early 18JO•s. Atter John Astor sold out to Ramsay Crooks, consideration was 
given to closing the Milwaukee outfit. The principal reasons were again 
declining game, the influx of white settlers, and the gradual movement of the 
Indians to lands west of the Mississippi.76 By 1837, the Milwaukee outfit was 
definitely closed out, but Juneau received an occasional supply of goods until 
1840.77 In all these areas, the fur trade did not automatically end. In 
Milwaukee and Green B~, retail merchants periodically bought and sold furs.78 
The fur trade was again conducted by individuals with only small capital in-
vestments. As in Chicago, the fur trade wa.s no longer of any economic sig-
nificance at Green ~ and Milwaukee. 
Solanon Juneau, who had always been Milwaukee's principal trader, hardly 
noticed the changes taking place in frontier society. As in Chicago and Green 
Bay, Hilwaukee in the 1830's rapidly grew from a fur trading post :into a 
frontier town. Juneau did not realize the value of his land until Morgan L. 
Martin, an enterprising frontier lawyer, instructed him on the :intricacies 
of town develoIJ11ent and speculation.79 Juneau remained part of the history ot 
town growth in Milwaukee, but this was not due to his foresight or capital, 
but to the proddings of eastern capita.lists and western entrepreneurs. 
For nearly twenty years, therefore, the fur trade was the economic base 
of the frontier on the western shore of Lake Michigan, yet was this trade a 
significant step in westward. expansion and the later growth of towns? There 
seems little question that the fur trade had no significant effect on regional 
growth. Obviously, the fur traders and the American Fur Company had a vested 
interest in sustaining frontier conditions; the advance of white settlement 
could only represent the decline of the frontier monopoly. Thus the American 
Fur Canpany, operating from sites which would later become towns, controlled 
the countey for nearly twenty years. This :initial period of town history can 
be most adequately described as an era of exploitation. When white settlement 
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finally reached this region, the canpany moved further west rather than change 
its basic economic framework for trade w~.th the whites. 
i·,bat did the American Fur Company .leave behind? In its wake were a 
generation of frontier inhabitants indebted to the cooipany. In the middle 
1S30's, land speculation was the chief economic interest of town residents, 
but the traders possessed little capital and almost no land to enter into the 
mainstream of town developnent. Perhaps a recent historian of the fur trade 
adequately summarized its significance: 
• • • The above evidence lends support to the contention that the 
fur trade as such did not play a very important role in our 
dynamic westward expansion. It is true that some trappers even-
tually became guides for government and emigrant expeditions, but 
their contributions were minor • • • • The number of persons 
:involved (in the trade) was insignificant and the value of the 
trade even locally, not very impressive. This is not to say that 
the American fur trade had no importance as a vehicle of westward 
expansion, but ~at its importance must be sought in areas other 
than economics. 
The fur trade and indirectly the .American Fur Company did make contribu-
tions to the later histOI"J of towns, but these were really minor. The fur 
trader did sustain canmunities at both Chicago and Green Bay. Hore importantlyJ 
the fur traders located new posts in the interior and along the lake shore, 
and, to a certain extent, solidified the geographic site of later towns. In 
the t~ansportatian of goods to the interior along the major communication 
arteries, especially the Illinois River to Lake Y.dchigan connection and the 
Fox-Wisconsin waterway, the traders indicated the possibilities for the large-
Sl 
scale shiµnent of goods. Finally 1 the traders and their descendants were 
trained in the basic methods of retail merchandising. This training enabled 
a few to enter the business canmunity of the new towna.82 But all these minor 
influences only serve to underscore what has becan.e increasingly apparent; the 
developnent of towns required capital and technical skill, neither of which 
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the fur trade left to town sites on the western shore of Lake l:ichigan. 
In 1833, the site of future towns at Green Bay, Milwaukee, and Chicago 
were in the same stage of economic and political developnent as when the story 
opened :Ui 1816. Neither the traders, nor the American Fur Canpa:ny, nor the 
military had any significant effect on their developnent before lSJJ. It was 
an era or 11 stage 11 of frontier history which sustained frontier traders and 
filled the coffers of the American Fur Compa:ny.83 The town sites remained the 
same, and to speak of a westward movement before 1833 is really :Uiaccurate. 
But in that ver-y year conditions were changing; new forces were astir :Ui 
American life which would hasten the developnent of towns in less than a 
decade. This would be the true era of economic expansion, of the westward 
movement, of town growth. As in the period before, the major winds of change 
began in the east in government councils, in the financial districts of New 
York, and in the actions of enterprising capitalists. To these developnents, 
we must now turn. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Founding or a Town: 
Chicago and Its Financiers, 1833-1837 
The decade of the 1830's was a transitional period of the towns on the 
western shore or Lake Michigan. While the fur trade, conducted under the 
auspices of the American Fur Company- and then later by individual merchants, 
slowly declined as a significant econanic factor, new forces were operating on 
the destiny or locations such as Chicago, Milwaukee, and Green Bay. The 
changes were rapid and occurring along with the demise of the fur trade society 
so that often town pranoters operated next to the old fur traders. Thus to a 
certain extent there was not a clear division or the frontier's various stages, 
for fur trader society did not autana.tically cease with the arrival or tmm 
promoters. Perhaps Ray Allen Billington's brilliant summary or frontier 
history made the point more explicit: 
No orderly procession or 11trappers 1 frontier", 11farmers 1 frontier, 11 
and 11urban frontier, 11 moved westward across America; the scene 
rather was of kaleidescopic patterns constantly changing within a 1 broad zone that was itself slowly advancing with each passing year. 
On the other hand, the 18J0 1s marked a significant stage in rrontier 
development. The growth or towns just did not occur during the heyd.~ of 
the fur trade for its very nature and aims hindered such developments. With 
the decline of the .fur trade at the beginning of the 1830'e, the real process 
of western expansion and town growth proceeded with unparalleled rapidity. All 
along the western shore of Lake Michigan, speculators and capitalists utilized 
the old fur trading posts established where rivers ran into Lake Michigan to 
I: 
promote townsites. One Chicago resident described the mania of townsite 
speculation in the 183u 1 s: 
So utterly reckless had the community grown that they chased 
every bubble which floated in the speculative atinosphere. The 
more absurd the project, the more remote the object, the more 
madly they were pursued. The prairies of Illinois, the forests 
of \'dsconsin and the sandhills of £fi.ichigan presented a cha.in 
almost unbroken of supposititious villages and cities. The whole 
land seemed staked out and peopled on paper • • • • Often was a 
fictitious streamlet seen to wind its romantic course through the 
heart of an ideal city, thus creating water lots and water privi-
leges. But where a real strear:i, however diminiutive, did find 
its way to the shore of the lake, no matter what was tho character 
of the surrounding country, sane shrewd operator would ride night 
and day until the place was secured at the Govemment price. Then 
the miserable waste of sand and fens, which lay unconscious of its 
glor.v on the shore of the lake, was suddenly elevated into a 
nighty city, with a projected harbor and lighthouse, railroads and 
canals, and in a short tine the circumja.cent lands were sold in 
lots • • • • Not the puniest brook on the shore of Lake Hichir;an 
was suffered to remain without a city at its mouth, and whoever 
will travel around that lake shall find many a mighty mart staked 
out in spots suitable only for the habitations of wild beasts.2 
In the 1830's, there was never any significant agricultural hinterland 
to support the frontier towns or contribute to their comoercial growth, but 
the towns steadily increased in population and in the number of canmercial 
businesses placing the towns in the forefront of westward expansion. The 
importance of towns in rostering westward expansion is a uost significant new 
interpretation of western history. Frederick Jackson Turner devoted little 
attention to the role of the town or village in his writings on frontier 
history. In the jli.se of the New V.'est, nevertheless, 'furner wrote what became 
a truism of western historians: 
The rise of an agricultural surplus was transforming the west and 
preparing a new influence in the nation. It was this surplus and 
the demand for markets that developed the cities just mentioned. 
As they grew the price of land in their neighborhood increased; 
roads radiated into the surrounding country; and farmers, whose 
crops had been almost worthless from the lack of transportation 
facilit~es, now found it possible to market their surplus at a small 
profit. 
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But the frontier did not operate as Turner had described: towns following 
in the wake or agricultural expansion. In 1959, lli.chard c. Hade wrote 1h!, 
Urban Frontier; The Ilise or Western Cities, 1790-1830 in which his opening 
-
line marked a significant departure in writings on frontier history: 11The 
towns were the spearheads of the frontier. Planted far in advance of the line 
of settlement, they held the West for the approaching population.'!+ In 1966, 
Ray Allen Billington in America's Frontier Heritage acknowledged his debt to 
Wade's theme of the urban frontier. 5 Moreover the most recent generaJ. history 
of American urban growth called for the discarding of the belief than an 
expanding agricultural settlement brought towns and commercial growth in their 
path. Rather, the authors claimed that 
• • • American expansion was largely a function of urban expansion, 
and that the civilization which pushed the edge of wilderness al-
ways toward the Pacific drew igost of its impulses and took most 
of its direction fran cities. 
One of the leading American econanic historians, Thomas c. Cochran, gave 
added weight to Wade's original concept at the 1967 meeting of the Organization 
of American Historians when he observed that businessmen in the guise of 
speculators and town investors were often the first settlers to locate on the 
frontier. 11Seen another way, 11 Cochran explained, "early towns show that much 
of the movement to occupy virr).n farming land was the filling up of the empty 
areas around pioneer business centers. 117 
The "process 11 of westward expansion or the movement of the urban frontier 
has been a key word among recent historians. The elements of town growth such 
as land speculation, internaJ. improvements, and retail merchandising have been 
treated as part of a process, yet even more basically these factors were the 
result of individual decisions and the business skills of capitaJ.ists and 
entrepreneurs.8 The men who were involved in townsite promotion at Chicago 
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and other points along the shore of Lake Hichi;_;an were not nameless runc•tion-
a.ries in the process of town growth but its most important ingredients. For 
this reason,, their methods of operation,, backgrounds,, and contributions to 
town growth will form the story's focus. 
Land speculators were probably the most important agents of town growth. 
In Chicago, these men were present as early as 1833, at least two years before 
any significant migration of canmercial. or farming elements. The role of the 
land speculator and land speculation in western development has been a neglect 
and confused issue in American history. Frederick Jackson Turner did not even 
mention the land speculator in his f nmous essay on 11The Significance of the 
Frontier in illnerican History. 119 :c:arly writers who did discuss land specula-
tion usually found that the land speculators dela\Y'ed frontier expansion because 
they prevented the cheap and quick disposal of the public domain. In 1924, 
Benjamin Hibbard's A History of the Public Land Policies concluded that land 
speculation was detrimental. to the proper functioning of a democratic land 
system. Hibbard claimed that when the speculator held land off the market 
waiting on a rise in price,, he delayed the settlement of the country by the 
small fanner and inhibited the building of roads,, schools, and public build-
incs.10 Writing in 1932, A. M. Sakolski in The Great American Land Bubble 
made the first canplete study of land speculation. Sakolski 1s conclusions 
were basically the same as those of Hibbard; the land speculator was a nega-
tive,, rather than a positive force in westward expansion.11 
More judicious treatments of the land speculator began in the 1930 1s 
with the works of Paul Wallace Gates. Gates pointed out the many different 
varieties of speculators from the small farmer to the large eastern corpora-
tion.12 Studying the speculative period in Illinois fran 1830 to 1837, Gates 
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at first a.greed with the interpretations of most earlier historians blaming 
the speculators for Illinois's crushing state debt of ig37 and the slow pace 
of Illinois' develoµnent in the early 1840 1s.13 Continuing his studies, Gates 
tempered his views in the 194G1 s. Although he still claimed that land specu-
lation was the principal cause of farm tenancy, he admitted that many times 
the affluent speculator was the only source of capital for local intenial 
improvements. In addition, Gates granted that the speculator's capital often 
played an essential role in encouraging nationalizing projects such as roads, 
canals, and waterways.14 ~ihile rocognizi.ng their importance, Gates neverthe-
less remained a consistent critic of the speculators: 
For better or for worse, the speculator whether absentee or resident, 
squatter or banker, local politician or easteni senator, was present 
on every frontier. He affected ever-J phase of western developz.1ent 
and left in all places his indelible mark. His motives and his 
deeds one may deplore but so characteristically American was he, so 
dynamic a part did he play in shaping land and cultural patterns 15 that it is difficult to imagine an American frontier without hlm. 
Generally the writings on land speculation have assumed that anything 
placed in the way or the farmer's ability to obtain land quickly and cheaply 
16 
was a corruption of American ideals. Most authors, however, have failed to 
distinguish between speculation in prairie lands and in town lots.17 In the 
towns, the speculator was not depriving the settlers of fa.nn. lands, nor was 
he investing in land which could be put to better use. In fact,, speculation 
is a.lrn.ost an inaccurate word for the business investments of eastern and 
westeni capitalists in western towns. They invested in town lots hoping for 
a quick price increase,, but at the same time they contributed to the town's 
development by creating the image of a prosperous town all over the cotmtry, 
by financing the building of stores, bridges, and the paving of streets, and 
by loaning money to small retail and commercial businesses. Naturally, many 
r ~ r-----------____, ~eculators sold their lots again and again in order to gain profits, but 
these profits were often reinvested in additional lots and improvements. The 
iarge eastern investors often took not only a business interest but also a 
personal pride in their involvement with a struggling western city. In this 
study of town growth, the focus will be on the individuals who initiated the 
town's developn.ent, and among these the land speculators loaned largest in 
the fortunes of towns along the western shore of Lake Michigan. 
Chicago was long recognized as a possible townsite because of its 
critical location. As early as 1808, Albert Gallatin mentioned the importance 
of a possible connection between Lake Hichigan and the Illinois Fiiver.18 In 
lSl 7, Major Stephen Long investigated the feasibility of a canal at this 
point.19 Little action was taken but lmowledgeable observers never failed to 
canment on Chicago's strategic location. In 18211 Henry R. Schoolcraft 
praised the fertile fa:nn lands and commercial possibilities of the area between 
Chicago and Milwaukee. 20 In 1825, William H. Keating disagreed with most of 
Chicago's earlier visitors. He believed that the soil was not nearly as 
fertile as previously claimed and that lake shipping off'ered few inducements 
to merchants. Yet even as a critic, Keating was forced to admit that Chicago 
was located on a direct line of ca:nmunication between the Great Lakes and the 
Mississippi River. 21 
Despite these reports, Chicago remained an isolated fur trade village 
throughout the 1820's, but certain factors indicated that the frontier was 
slowly moving westward. Of prime importance was the extinction of Indian 
title to land, its survey, and then sale through govemment auctions. Land 
cessions in Illinois began as early as 1804 and continued into the late 1830ts.22 
As the land was purchased, government surveys prepared the way for its eventual 
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sale to farmers. The town of Chicago itself was actually plotted in 1829. 
1826-1327, Congress had granted the state of Illinois alternate sections of 
iand along a proposed route for the Illinois and Michigan Canal. This grant 
included the limits of Chicago, and, in 1829, the canal conunissioners laid 
In 
out the original town. The land was then sold in lots to p~ for the cost ot 
the survey.23 Fur traders and white merchants were the principal purchasers of 
the town lots. The price pa.id for these lots was extremely moderate. 24 De-
spite ti·:e fact that Chicago was plotted, the Illinois and Michigan Canal pro-
posed, and some Indian lands ceded, Chicago waited several years before 
attracting the attention of migrants a.rd capitalists pushing westward with the 
favorable economic conditions in the East. 25 ft,or the Chicago area, the 
Blackhawk War, which ended the last vestiges of Indian control, and the Indian 
Treaty of 1833, which opened large tracts of farm land, were the principal 
events which directed white settlement toward the Chicago area. The Blackhawk 
War and the Treaty of 1833 advertised to all concerned the opportunities 
awaiting the first settlers. 
The first people on the scene were not farmers or merchants btt. the 
eastern investors. The speculator arrived nearly two years before the migra-
tion of town artisans and merchants and even longer be.fore farmers arrived in 
any significant number, and for several years the speculators were the principa 
architects of Chicago's developnent. There were many different varieties of 
lanct speculators, for sooner or later eveey individual bought farm land or 
town lots hoping for a quick price rise. There were fur traders and squatters 
with little capital or interest in the land who sold their claims when popula-
tion pressure brought a negligible price increase. Among the small speculators 
were also eastern capitalists and western residents who might own one or two 
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rots in a town hoping for a small profit. For the history of the American 
frontier, the most important speculators were the major eastern capitalists 
who invested from $5,000 to $1CXJ,000 as individuals or as a corporation in 
townsites and fann lan:i. 26 Major eastern speculators ordinarily employed 
agents throughout the country to supervise the buying and selling of land, the 
paying of taxes, and the beginning of improvements. In the towns, the conduct 
of speculation was the same for the large and small investor, for both wished 
to increase the town's value through improvements. What type of men were these 
speculators, how did they operate, and how did they underwrite the develoIJ!.1ent 
of Chicago? 
During the lg30 1 s 1 Arthur and Frederick Bronson were two of the most 
active speculators at Chicago. The brothers were members of a praninent New 
York banking family led by their father, Isaac. Isaac Bronson had amassed a 
considerable fortune by judjcious land speculation and money lending to small 
businesses. By the 1830' s, he was recognized as an authority on banking pro-
cedures being especially noted for his opposition to wildcat banking. 27 
Arthur Bronscn associated with Charles Butler a wealthy businessman and poli-
tico of New York. As a young man, Butler worked in the offices of Martin 
Van Buren an:i slowly became identified with the controlling faction of New York 
28 
state politics, the 11Albany Regency. 11 Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler 
first cooperated in trying to establish a banking institution at Cincinnati, 
Ohio. Fearing the opposition of Ohio citizens to eastern capitalists, Bronson 
and Butler -worked through one of Cincinnati's leading citizens to gain a major 
interest in the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company. 29 
The econan.ic interests of Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler extended 
further west than Ohio. In January, 183.3, they discussed. plans for a general 
tour of the West to consider land speculation and business investments. Their 
interest in Chicago had been stimulated by the reports fr(El Illinois during 
the Blackhawk War and the knowledge that soon many tracts of land would be 
30 
ready for sale. &<J late January, 1833, the plans for a western tour were 
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canpleted and the two men set out to accumulate as much information on the 
area as possible before deriarture in the spring. Arthur Bronson first turned 
to his friend, General ,dnfield Scott, who had led the military forces against 
the Indians in the Blackhawk War. Scott had just recently returned to New 
York City from the Illinois country, and he assured Arthur Bronson that it was 
a suitable area for :hiveatment. Scott was especially impressed by the possi-
bilities of Chicago to eventually become a major commercial center.31 
Bronson and Butler next contacted numerous merchants of New York City 
one of vtiom had, on occasion, supplied goods for the early Chicago Indian 
trade. Fortunately for the future growth of Chicago, Robert A. Kinzie, a son 
of John Kinzie the Chicago fur trader, happened to be in New York and in con-
tact with this merchant. Kinzie was :immediately contacted, and he strengthened 
Bronson's opinion that Chica.go was the place to center his investments. At 
the Sal:le ti.me, Kinzie offered to sell Bronson and Butler his title to several 
tracts of land in Chicago.32 A tentative agreement was drawn up givine Butler 
and Bronson the option to purchase this land after a suitable inspection once 
they arrived in Chicago.33 
By August, 1833, Butler and Bronson had reached their main western 
destination--Chicago. Standing amidst what could only have been the crudest 
imitation of a town, Charles Butler expressed his vision of Chica.go's future: 
If I were a young man and unmarried I would settle down at Chicago: 
it presents one of the finest fields in America for industry and 
enterprise, and though at present a journey to this point is at-
tended with great privations, fatigue, exposure, and difficulty, 
in a few years we shall think no more of going to Chicago than we 
now think of going to Buffalo. There will be lines of steamships, 
sta es and railroads the entire distance f ran Alb to the Fort 
at st. Louis on the Mississippi, Chica.go being an important and 
canmanding point on this great thoroughfare.34 
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At Chicago, the two men wasted little time in securing an interest in the 
t.o .. m. After hiring a surveyor to examine the land offered to them by Robert 
A. Kinzie, Butler and Bronson rejected his offer. Kinzie owned only a partial 
share in a tract of land, am Butler and Bronson felt that successful townsite 
speculation required complete ownership of any specific investrnent.35 However, 
they next discovered that an army officer formerly stationed at Fort Dearborn, 
Captain ,;avid Hunter, owned considerable land in the central sections of the 
town. Correspondence was opened with Captain Hunter, and in November, 18341 
Arthur Bronson alone purchased Hunter's land for ~20,000.36 The purchase was 
quite large including a tract of eighty acres adjoining the town, nineteen 
town blocks, and portions of many other blocks.37 Bronson later sold this 
property to Charles Butler for $1001 0001 five times the original purchase 
. 38 price. 
Despite this sale, Bronson remained the rost active investor. He bought 
additional land. fran :many residents of Chicago and maintained business con-
n~ctions with countless Chicago citizens. In AUaC7Ust, 1S33, he made large 
purchases of town lots from Thanas J. v. Owen, the Chicago Indian agent, John 
H. Kinzie, James Kinzie, and Richard J. Hamiltm.39 Bronson's land specula-
tion activities were extremely diverse ranging the whole western ~country. 40 
Because of this diversity, he could not alone handle the buying, selling, and 
improvement of this property. In Chica.go, he had business connections with at 
least ten Chicago residents, several of whom acted as his authorized agent in 
the buying and selling of property. In late 1~33 1 for example, Richard J. 
Han.Uton bought lands for Bronson totaling ~;;3,426.41 
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Arthlll" Bronson not only employed agents for his town speculation projects, 
but he also shared many purchases with frontier residents. In this way, he 
supported a number of western speculators. Initially sharing purchases with 
Arthur Bronson, these western entrepreneurs soon had garnered sufficient 
profits to undertake their own speculations or invest their money in more 
stable commercial pursuits. In Chicago 1 for example 1 Bronson 1 s chie .f partner 
and agent was John Temple. Tfl'llple was a physician who, upon reaching Chicago 
in the 1S30 1 s, gave up his chosen profession to engage in land speculation and 
then later in commerce.42 In late October, 1833, Temple and Bronson agreed to 
share in the purchase of Chicago tCMn lots and their subsequent improvement. 
For his services in superintending the property, Temple was not required to 
provide as much capital as Bronson. Tanple supervised occasional sales of 
the town lots, and then reinvested the money in additional lots and their 
:improvement.43 Often the purchasers of lots from Temple and Bronson were 
required to build houses or stores upon the property.44 
John Temple remained a consistent advocate of Chicago's commercial 
future, and he continually wrote to Arthur Bronson about the ever increasing 
need .for eastern capital to support city improvements. In June, 1S34, Temple 
commented that "Chicago has so grown that you would not know it & all on this 
side the river, three streets built up with about two houses for a lot, 
rurming parallel with the main branch of the Chicago P.iver. 11 Temple was 
pleased with the arrival of merchants and artisans, but he still recognized 
that Chica.go's major requirements were the skill and capital of eastern 
businessmen. 45 
In 1S35, Bronson and Temple tenninated their partnership in a dispute 
over the management of the property. 46 Bronson then transferred his business 
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-;,.ffairs to another Chica.go resident, Walter Newberry. 4·r Yet the association 
had been beneficial for both men and for Chicago. Through his association with 
Bronson, Temple had access to large capital resources to purchase lots and 
make improvements. Later Temple was able to invest in land and COI.'ll!lercial 
businesses on his own being typical of the spawning of western entrepreneurs 
from eastern sources.48 
Arthur Bronson also had occasional dealings with John H. Kinzie, the son 
of the Chicago fur trader, who had purchased several lots in 1830 at the 
canal sale. Bronson owned the town lots contiguous to the l\inzie interests 
and it was of benefit to both men to see the property advertised and improved. 
In 1834, Bronson had the town map of Chicago printed and then he person~ 
distributed it to interested ea.stern investors while John Kinzie circulat<..>d 
the ~ap to various western businessmen.49 Typical of most eastern capitalists, 
Bronson was at first hesitant to spend great sums in improvine his Chicago 
property; but due to the constant pr<Xiding of men like John Kinzie, B:Mnson 
slowly acquiesced in large scale improvements. In 1834, Kinzie alone built 
a warehouse, and three other buildings in order to provide places of business 
for retail merchants. 50 He adtlsed Bronson that he should also build on hia 
property explaining that buildings would bring fran twenty-five per-cent to 
fifty per-cent profits through renting, not to mention the effect on the 
general appearance of their section of the town. Larc_::er financial projects 
required the cooperation of many property holders, and Bronson was asked to 
contribute to the building of a hotel or public house.51 
Tho intricacies of land speculation also required the skills of a lawyer, 
and Bronson early employed James Grant to handle sane of his legal affairs in 
Chicago including ascertaining clear title to land, paying taxes, loaning 
llloney to town residents. and trying court cases aris~ fran non-pa.vment of 
r 
loans or debts. In 1835, Grant loaned money in behalf of Arthur Bronson to 
several Chicago merchants in addition to a $5,UOO loan to Hiram Pearsons who 
probably emplo3red the capital for street improvements on his lots next to 
Bronson's property. 52 
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In these early years, Bronson performed many services for the young town. 
He employed various people to handle his affairs, shared purchases with town 
residents, advanced capital for lot improvement, and loaned money to prospec-
tive town merchants. Yet Bronson was an investor and always his principal. 
consideration was profit. From his Chicago holdings, it is very difficult to 
detennine the extent of his success, but perhaps two examples are indicative 
of the skill with which he invested. His original purchase from Captain Hunter 
for c~201000 was sold a year later for $100,ooo.53 In 18331 Bronson purchased 
several town lots for ~27.25; three years later he sold these lands to a 
New York associate for $15,ooo.54 Bronson, however, alw8\}Ts reinvested in 
Chicago property so that land sales ultimately benefited the town by bringing 
more financiers into involvement with Chicago's economic growth. 
The Bronsons were only the first of many eastern capitalists to invest 
their money in Chicago real estate. In 18281 Gurdon Hubba.rd, the former 
employee of the American Fur Company 1 realized that the fur trade was declining 
and moved to Danville, Illinois, to open a retail trade with the white settlers 
there. He returned to Chicago when its fortunes as a center of white settle-
ment seemed to increase in 1833. Hubbard knew that land speculation, commer-
cial pursuits, and retail businesses would soon be of great importance in the 
town. Similar to other fur traders of his generation, however, Hubbard owed 
debts to the American Fur Company which hindered. his ability to invest in 
Chicago's growth. 55 If only he could find a source of capital, Hubba.rd could 
~ ~ 
surmount this difficulty. But where was Hubbard to obtain capital for any 
type of econonic investment? Fortunately, Gurdon Hubbard was originaJJ..y from 
the East having l..Uldertaken the occupation of fur trader as an adventurous 
young man of eighteen. His family in Middletown, Connecticut, apparently 
possessed sane capital, for Hubbard began writing relatives and old friends 
about the profits involved in land speculation at Chicago. :;•:ventually, he 
attracted the interest of two brothers, :&!ward A. and Samuel Russell of 
Hiddletown. 56 The Russells were representatives of a major shipping company 
which was primarily involved in the China trade. Moreover, the Russell 
family and the relatives of Gurdon Hubbard were partners in a small manufac-
turing firm in Hiddletown. 57 
By late 183.3, .: :dward A. Russell, who handled the fa.'D.ily 1 s western land 
investments,, had authorized Hubbard to purchase a large number of Chica.go town 
lots.58 The arrangement was actvantageous for both ,1arties. As land agent for 
Edward Russell, Hubbard finally had an occupation which enabled him to enter 
the mainstream of Chicago's econanic life. Hore importantly, eastern capi ta1 
was again employed in underwriting Chicago's growth. 
Edward Russell was very cautious in the conduct of his townsite specula-
tion. Having utilized his friendship with a government surveyor who had 
surveyed the land aromd the town, Hubbard sent the field notes to J<.:dward 
Russell for his own perusai.59 Russell, however, instructed Hubbard that the 
lllajority of his capital should be 1nvested in the town of Chicago itself. 
~ubba.rd was al.so directed to purchase lots only in these sections of the town 
!Where it seemed likely that business would center. Additional purchases, 
~ussell said, should be made where major roads or communication arteries en-
rter and leave the town.60 Edward Russell was not a novice at townsite 
llO 
speculation having invested in both New York City and Buffalo. 
in townsite speculation, he tried to :impart to Gurdon Hubbard: 
His .experience 
I may be mistaken, but one thing is certain, that the place where 
business will actually center will be the place where lots will 
becane most valuable, and the further you radiate from the centre 
(.!!£), the less valuable will lots be. In New York, lots a mile 
from the centre (sic) of business, never came into canparative 
value, for twenty years. • • • I merely mention these suggestions 
to guard you a~ainst being carried away with the spirit of specu-
lation • • • • 1 
With this advice in mind, Hubbard invested the capital of I:i.:dward Russell 
primarily in the old town of Chicago, which was originally plotted by the 
canal commissioners in 1829, and close to the streets bordering the branches 
of the Chicago River. 62 Lots contiguous to the branches of the Chicago Iliver 
were caJ.led "water lots 11 and were the most desired by all capitalists for 
here was the center of commerce and trade. In January, 18341 when Chicago 
was still little more than a fur trading post, Gurdon Hubbard judged the sig-
nificance of water lots in Chicago: 
As Chicago will be a market for the whole N Western part of our 
state • • • it will be a point where large quantities of beef and 
pork will be packed for the Atlantic market & these water lots 
are well adapted for that business there being a sufficiency of 
water to admit vessels of any burden for several miles up this 
branch at all seasons of the year. I am of the opinion they will 
be used exclusively for that purpQse & will command cash at any 
time, at a considerable advance.bJ 
Fran the beginning of his interest in Chicago, Edward Russell was 
convinced of the propriety of improving his lots. He claimed that stores and 
buildings often were of more value in future years than the lot itselt.64 
Thus Gurdon Hubbard cmtinually advised Edward Russell on the most needed type 
of buildings for a specific area of the to'WJ'l.65 The capital of Edward A. 
Russell was also drawn into other areas of the town's develoµnent. In 1835, 
Gurdon Hubbard subscribed money for the Russells toward the building of a 
lll 
bridge and the paving of streets.66 Edward Russell, of course, was alWB\Y'S 
primarily interested in increasing the value of his town lots for an eventual 
sale. The capital which he invested in Chicago, nevertheless, contributed to 
improvements not otherwise possible. His storc.~s and warehouses were often 
rented to merchants lacking sufficient capital to build their own stores. 
Moreover, the improvements undertaken by Edward Russell through Gurdon Hubbard 
had thP. secondary effect of providing jobs for carpenters and mechanics in 
a town not yet able to employ its residents with a nonnal economic livelihood. 
The large eastern speculator never invested in only one area or a town 
or even one town along the lake shore. Hubbard bought lands for the Russells 
throughout the state of Illinois and along the lake shore.67 By 1835, 
Hubbard himself was able to share in these investments. In 1835, he sold 
portions of his Chicago property in New York for $801 000, which originally had 
cost only $51 000.68 He now al.so had capital resources which he then rein-
vested in Chicago businesses and in other tams on the lake shore. In 1835, 
Hubbard attended a public land sale at Green B8'}7 where he invested in lands 
at Hilwaukee and Green Bay, but he al.WB\Y'S maintained that Chicago would be 
the preeminent town on the western shore of Lake Hichigan. 69 Later he became 
one of the original. proprietors of Racine, Wisconsin, calculating that it too 
would one day be an important commercial center.70 
Starting his career as merely the westem agent of Edward A. Russell, 
Hubbard's fortunes blossomed as the years passed. He opened his own land 
agency to handle the investments of eastern businessmen. Hubbard employed 
his brother Christopher, who still resided in the gs.st, to interest easterners 
in lots at Chicago or adjacent fann lands.71 By July, 1835, Hubbard's land 
agency was a startling success, and Christopher Hubbard was instructed to 
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r • ~cept no more small investors. Hubbard was by now in the enviable position 
of requiring that his clients must be organized c001panies of eastern capitalist..l! 
with assets of at least $200,000.72 Thus Hubbard's career was typical of many 
western residents who were at first dependent on eastern capital and then 
slow1Y achieved the status of entrepreneurs themselves. 
Hubbard still devoted substantial time toward handling the property of 
:Edward A. Russell despite his other activities. Bdwa.rd Russell or his brother 
Samuel occasionally visited Chicago to check on their property and the progress 
of Chicago.73 With the peak in land prices in 1835 and 1836, Edward Russell 
desired to Gell many of his lots hoping for large profits. Gurdon Hubbard, 
however, tried to stall such action claiming that additional improvements 
could only bring higher prices in the future.74 Writing to Russell in 1835, 
Hubbard tried to impress him with Chica.go's qrowing camnercial potential by 
tj 
pointing out that retail businesses had equalled the volume of business for 
last year in one month this year. Delay the sale of your property, Hubbard 
advised, for " • • • last week we had 14 schooners in Port ••• & are antici-
pating a very heavy fall business. 1175 According to Hubbard, the camn.ercial 
basis of Chicago was stable preventing any appreciable decline in land values. 
Edward Russell remained intent on selling his property. He was familiar 
with financial conditions in the East and feared a business recession because 
of the general insecurity of banking establishments.76 On instructions from 
Russell, Hubbard began his search for a suitable buyer for the property. His 
first consideration was, of course, to sell to a group of capitalists who 
lfOuld continue to ir1prove the property and contribute to Chicago• s growth. 
Hubbard even suggested that Russell try to sell his property to Arthur Bronson 
and Charles Butler :in New York. 77 Bronson and Butler were not interested1 and 
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Hubbard next contacted Hobert Sedgwick, a capitalist who already had .consider-
able property at Chicago. Sedgwick offered $2001 000 for the property with 
Hubbard assuming a share.78 The Sedgwick negotiations collapsed, and Hubbard 
now tried to form an association of Chicago businessmen to purchase the 
Russell's property. Major James B. Campbell was to supply the majority of 
capital with Hubbard also having a large share. 79 While Hubbard searched 
frantically for a buyer, Edward Russell was becoming more skeptical about the 
New York money market and the country• s precarious financial condition. In 
April, 18.36, he decided that the Campbell deal was too great a risk. gven 
though Russell admitted that a sale to a group or company would benefit 
Chicago and assure the continued improvement of the property, he knew that the 
payment of ~.200,000 would be spread over several years. Fearing a financial 
depression, Russell decided to sell his lots in a number of small sales where 
r 00 the purchase
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s would be required to pay within a year. Hubbard, therefore, 
advertised Russell's property in the Chicago newspapers, and then sold it 
piecemeal. at a public auction.81 The deeds of sale required 40 per-cent cash 
down and the balance in twelve months carried at 10 per-cent interest. After 
the sale, Edward Russell still remained involved at Chicago with a few lots 
82 in the business sections of the city. 
In their involvement in Chica.go, the Russells were responsible for many 
of the town's improvements, but they were also instrumental in drawing more 
capital into the Chica.go area fran the 38.st and from 1'ilgland. Interested 
friends of Ed.ward Russell continually contacted Gurdon Hubbard for advice 
on real estate investments. In June, 1836, r..dward and Samuel Russell a.greed 
to a scheme in which they would again purchase Chicago lots and adjacent farm 
lands for sale to foreign capitalists. Their land purchases were to be shared 
~with Gurdon Hubbard and his brother. The Russells, of course, supplied the 
buJk of the capital while Gurdon Hubbard was responsible for selecting the 
land. Christopher Hubbard was conmdssioned as the trio's land a.gent to sell 
the property in fulgland. 83 The plan never matured until the lc'l40' s, 84 but 
its fonnulation was a clear example of the efforts of eastern capitalist in 
western town develOIJllent. 
Charles Butler of New York also initiated his own land speculation 
schemes. Butler had accompanied Arthur Bronson to Chicago in 1833, but he 
had not purchased any land at that time. In 1835, however, Butler purchased 
the Hunter property fran Bronson for $100,000.85 Next Butler organized the 
American Land Company in association with New York and Boston capitalists. 
Charles Butler was elected president of the company which was capitalized at 
$1,000,000. The company's investments were spread throughout the west in-
cluding both farm land and townsites.86 Butler then selected his brother-
in-law, William Ogden of New York, to handle the company's investments in 
Chicago and surrounding areas.87 Ogden came to Chicago with considerable 
business and political experience. In 1834, he represented Delaware County 
in the New York State legislature attaching himself to the ''Albany Regency," 
the democratic faction of New York politics. He was a constant advocate of 
intemal improvements calling for state aid to build the New York and Erie 
Railroact.88 
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Commissioned as agent of the American Land Company, William Ogden arrived 
in Chicago :in May, 1835. His .first task was to survey the American Land 
Canpany•s property, then arrange it into town blocks and lots for sale at 
future dates. To increase the property's value, Ogden paved streets and 
erected buildings. In 1836, Ogden and Butler poured $15,000 into the property's 
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· ~provement. 0 " b.'ven though he prepared the property for sale, Ogden wa.s 
skeptical, reeling that people "WOuld never invest in a wilderness such as 
Chicago. To Ogden's surprise, he sold one-third of the property in 1835 for 
$lOO,OOO, the price paid for the entire property a. year ea.rlier.90 Thus Ogden 
so0n realized Chicago's commercial possibilities, and he decided to make the 
frontier town his permanent home. 91 Ogden later became one of Chicago's 
leading citizens and oost enterprising businessmen. 
Deciding to establish permanent residence in Chicago in 1836, Ogden's 
first means of an economic livelihood was a.s general agent of the American 
Land Company. At the same time, he handled various real estate transactions 
for Arthur Bronson. Gradually he increased his contacts with eastern specu-
lators drawing more capital into Chicago. 92 Ogden also invested his own 
excess capital in townsites and farm land throughout the territory. In 
addition, his operations enabled smaller speculators or town residents to gar-
ner profits. He was occasiona.l.ly contacted by government surveyors, military 
personnel, and town merchants who knew of valuable town lots and rann land but 
lacked the necessary funds to purchase. In this case, Ogden supplied part of 
the capital and entered the deed in his own name. ~;hen the property was sold 
on the speculative market, he shared the profits with the small western in-
vestor. 93 
In ld37 and 1838, Ogden expanded his activities. Letters advertising his 
land agency were sent throughout the eastern states. Ogden offered to buy 
tracts of land, pa;r the annual taxes, and make ir:i.provanents for a commission 
usually amounting to 5 per-cent on the eventual sale price.94 Like most other 
large speculators, Ogden was not only caicerned with imtlediate profits, but 
also contributed to the commercial well-being of Chicago. From the beginning, 
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be claimed that Chicago lots must be continually improved through the building 
o! houses and stores and the paving of streets. In 1836, Ogden expressed his 
ideas on town pranotion: 
Large contigious interests in any town of merit can be by 
capitalists improved and brought forward into market under very 
much improved and favorable circumstances and the value much 
enhanced. To give time to persons that will buy & build is ot 
great consequence as it enables you to get better prices and in 
the improvement made you are better secured while the property 
in the vicinity much benefited.95 
When Ogden sold the lots of eastern investors, he often required the 
purchaser to build a store on that lot.96 At other times, Ogden sold lots to 
merchants giving them nearly three years to pay and thus enabling new busi-
nesses to gain a sound financial basis. Ogden also built stores himself in 
order to provide business locations for new merchants. At one point, Ogden 
offered the Michigan Lumber Company three lots in the central business sec-
tions at a giveaway price merely to attract lumber and shipping interests to 
Chicago.97 Ogden and his partners were in no sense philanthropists, but 
they did realize that property values depended on Chicago's economic growth. 
The interests of speculators and the financial needs of Chicago fortunately 
coincided. 
Land speculation was not alone the prerogative of major companies dealing 
in town lots and prairie lands. During the 18301s, speculators of every 
variety were conspicious along the .lake shore and in the interior. All their 
activities served to bring capital into the area and hasten the arrival or 
more pennanent and steady town artisans and tanners. While the Bronson.a,, the 
Russells, and the American Land Company represented the largest interests in 
. 
Chicago, various other agencies speculated in Chicago and its h1lnterland. 
Fran as far away as Aberdeen, Scotland, George Smith arrived in the village of 
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~Chicago in 1834. Financed by a group of Scottish investors, Smith innnediately 
purchased Chicago town lots and adjacent fa.nn lands. Returning to Scotland 
in 1836, George Smith told the Scottish financiers of the camnercial possibili-
ties along the westem shore of Lake Michigan. Following ~.lmith's recommenda-
tions, a joint-stock canpany was fonned in Aberdeen, Scotland, known as the 
Illinois Investment Company for additional land speculation in America. In 
the la.te 1S30 1s, George Smith returned to Chica.go as agent of this finn. 98 
There were various other speculators at Chicago. The Rockwell Land 
Company invested in lands at Chicago. Its board of directors included many of 
the area's most prominent speculators: Dixwell Lathrop, John B. F. Russell, 
and Janes Campbe11. 99 The story of Chicago land speculation, however, would 
not be canplete without mentioning the smaller speculators, whether fran the 
East or the West, who purchased perhaps one lot or ten, improved the lots, 
and then sold out. Perusing the records and correspondence of William Ogden 
and Gurdon Hubbard, one encounters the names of countless eastern residents 
who, to various extents, financed the early growth of Chicago. One such was 
John Wright from Sheffield, Massachusetts, who purchased lots in Chicago in 
partnership with an uncle in Brooklyn, New York.loo Justin Butterfield of 
Watertown, New York, hired a westem agent to invest in the townsites along 
the proposed Illinois-Michigan Canai.101 l;'hile their investments were smaller 
than those of the major Chicago speculators, they, nevertheless, pl~ed an 
important role in Chicago's develoµnent. 
The principal econanic activity of Chicago's population for several 
years was land speculation. A single town lot often changed hands several 
times as each owner added an improvement and then sold when the price assured 
a profit. The actual methods of buying and selling were a mixture of private 
r;:t.rarisactions between individuals, public auctions, and government land sa:J.es ~ 
· J:n Chicago, the most active periods of land speculation took place between 
~ and the close of lake navigation in October. In the summer, Chicago was 
a bustling village as speculators travelled up and down the western shore of 
t.ske Michigan searching for profitable investments in townsites. In the 
1iiJlter, the business of land speculation switched to New York. Large specu-
].B.tors like Arthur Bronson, Charles Butler, and Edward Russell constantly 
~raded Chicago property with other tina.nciers.102 Edward Russell found it 
necessacy to remain in constant communication with Gurdon Hubbard, hie western 
103 agent, so that their sales would not be duplicated. The constant exchange 
o! land seemed to indicate to aJ.1 concerned that Chicago was financially 
prosperous. At various times, Chicago speculators traded land among them-
selves. In 1835, Hubbard traded lots with 1·Iilliam Ogden of the American Land 
Company.104 In 1836, Hubbard estimated that $150,000 in property was ex-
changed between the major Chicago speculators. These transactions, Hubbard 
claimed, were not that profitable for the speculators; yet they produced 
excitement in the town and precipitated a flurry of land sales among other 
speculators and a corresponding price rise.l05 
\bile the transactions among the speculators spurred the constant 
improvement of Chicago, the most important events both for the town and the 
investors were the government and state land sales at Chicago. Until June, 
1835, most of the lots bought and sold in Chicago wre those plotted by the 
Canal commissioners in 1829. The majority of farming land was not surveyed 
end ready for sale until 1834 when the government established a land office 
at Chicago and announced its first public sale for June, 1835.106 The public 
8ale offered fann land in the interior to squatters and settlers. In addition1 
~--------------------------------------ll-,9 iand immediately adjacent to the original plot of Chicago was also readied for 
saJ.e. The second most important public sale wa.s in Jl.ll'le, 1836, when the state 
of Illinois sold additional lots along the route of the proposed Illinois and 
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The time of a public land sale was the most active for any town on the 
lake shore. Speculators, merchants, and fanners were all jammed into the 
frontier town as the sale began. As the time for the government sale ap-
proached at Chicago in 1835, Chicago entrepreneurs expected a rush for town 
lots and farm lands.108 Before the public sale in 1835 and 1836, F.dward 
Russell infonned Gurdon Hubbard that a large number of capitalists were 
leaving the Ea.st for Chicago.109 Many individuals attested to the excitement 
in Chicago at this time. The editor of the Ghicago American commented that 
the large number of capitalists streaming into the to\oll indicated that all 
believed Chicago was to be the commercial center of the West.no An English 
visitor to Chicago in 1836 witnessed the following scene at the time of the 
public sale: 
I never saw a busier place than Chicago was at the time of our 
arrival. The streets were crowded with land speculators hurrying 
from one sale to another. A Negro, dressed up in scarlet, bearing 
a scarlet fiag and riding a white horse with housings of scarlet, 
anno\ll'lced the time of sale. At every street corner where he 
stopped, the crowd flocked around him; and it seemed as if some 
prevalent mania infected the whole people. The rate for specu-
lation might be so regarded. As the gentlemen of our party walked 
the streets, storekeepers hailed them frcm their doors, with offers 
of fanns, and all manner of land lots,~~vising them to speculate 
before the price of land rose higher • .L.L.L 
Many, however, thought that the speculators had gone wild at Chicago, 
One observer commented that "I think they are all crazy. I do not know if I 
shall be able to find a foot of land but what sane one makes claim to •••• Jl.2 
In August, 1835, the Oneida l·-!11i.g, a praninent New York newspaper, printed the 
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impressions of one financier who considered the Chicago land sale pure folly. 
According to this view, Chicago real estate was purely a 11speculative11 invest-
ment for Chicago did not have a commercial or agricultural basis.113 Because 
of the degree of land speculation and the number of people who were involved, 
the above was clearly the minority opinion. Yet bad publicity in eastern 
papers could only hurt Chicago. Thus the editor of the Chicago American an-
swered such charges in an effort to prove Chicago's commercial potential. 
Citing the growth of population, the increase of business establishments, the 
number of vessels entering the Chicago harbor, the Chicago American claimed 
that: 
• • • Chicago exhibits all the bustle and animation of a prosperous 
and rapidly growing town. And what is the cause of all this? 
Surely not the extravagant delusions of our citizens. It is ~ii; 
cause Chicago possesses rare and striking natural advantages. 
In following articles, the Chicago American described Chicago's great advan-
tages; the proposed Illinois and Michigan Canal, fertile fann land, and an 
accessible port to handle the shipnent of goods. With this evidence, the 
editor of the Chicago American concluded that •• • • • Chicago can present 
arguments enough to satisfy the skeptical, that property here has not merely 
an imaginary value • • ).15 • • 
Neither Chicago's ea.stem critics nor the newspapers of Chicago told the 
whole story. It is certainly true that when the speculators first arrived 
in the town in 1833, there was really very little to justify large scale invest 
ments except Chicago's geographical location and the dreams of capitalists. 
But that is exactly the point: the speculators built the town of Chicago. 
Through the efforts of men such as Arthur Bronson, Edward Russell, and Charles 
Butler in the East and their western agents, Gurdon Hubbard and William Ogden, 
and a host of smaller investors, the basis of Chicago's economic growth was 
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laid. The constant exchange of property brought more and more financiers into 
the Chicago camnunity. Working through their westem agents, large speeulabrs 
built stores, warehouses, and made capital available to small merchants. While 
the speculators continually sold their town lots when the price increased, 
profits were often reinvested in the town. In addition, men who had begun 
their careers as western land agents soon shared in the speculative profits, 
and then later turned toward other economic pursuits relating to the town's 
camnercial life. But all the aspirations and capital investments of entrepre-
neurs depended on the arrival of artisans and merchants who could give suste-
nance to the groundwork prepared by the speculators. 
-MAP EXPLANATION 
The town of Chicago was sold by lots and blocks. A block was usually 
320 by 360 feet with each lot measuring 80 by 180 feet. Lot sizis varied, of 
course, with the course of streets and the contours of the lake. 
Not all land in Chicago, however, was sold in lots and blocks. Chic.ago 
was first plotted in 1829 by the canal commissioners and these lots and blocks 
were lm~n as the Original Town. On the map, this area is indicated by a 
heavy black border. As the years passed, "additions" were made to Chicago, 
that is, new areas were brought within the city limits. Speculators, such as 
Arthur Bronson an::i Edward Russell often purchased land adjacent to the plotted 
town calculating that business would slowly push the borders of the town out-
ward. 
Business in the town originally centered along the Chicago River especia.JJ.;j 
where it first enters the city from Lake Michigan. 11Vlater lots" or those 
bordering directly on the Chicago River were the most valuable for ships could 
navigate a good distance down the Chicago River. Forwarding and commission 
houses, dry goods stores, and g~neral business establishments were located as 
close to the River as possible. 
One must also remember that surveyors only plotted the various blocks a.rd 
lots. Later the specula. tors a.rrl owners of town property were forced to ac-
tually lay out the lots arrl cut streets and avenues through the wilderness. 
Arthur Bronson's property - Actually Bronson owned a great deal more 
property than indicated here, but this consisted of his major purchases.3 
- The property of Edward A. Russell was located throughout the town on both 
sides of the Chicago River. The areas indicated rere thus show only portions 
of Russell 1 s holdings. It is very hard to establish which lots were owned by 
specific individuals because of the constant exchange of lots.4 
FOOTNOTES 
MAP EXPLANATION 
1Homer Hoyt, One Hundred Years of Land Values In Chic (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1933 , pp. 28, 428. For a can.plate discussion of 
the manner in which cities and towns of the United States were planned and 
expanded see John W. Reps, The Makin of Urban America: A Histo of Cit 
EJ.aming In the United States Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 5). 
2.rhere are various early descriptions of Chicago indicating the location 
of the principal business establishments. One of the best was written by a 
visitor to Chicago in the 1830 's. See Daniel Gold, "The City of Chicago In 
1837, 11 Daniel Gold Papers, Chic ago Historical. Society. Additional information 
can be found in A.T. Andreas, A History o! Chicago (Chicago: A.T. Andreas 
Publisher), I, PP• 128, 131-133, 136-137. 
3The loo ation of Bronson's original purchase was compiled from the 
description of the purchase in a Legal Deed between Arthur Bronson and David 
Hunter, Novanber 1, 1834, Arthur Bronson Papers, Letter Folder I, Chicago 
Historical Society. 
lt.rhe location of Edward Russell 1 s property was taken from two letters: 
Gurdon Hubbard to James Campbell, February 22, 1836, Hubbard Papers, Letter 
Folder II, Chicago Historical. Society, and Edward Russell to Gurdon Hubbard, 
April 14, 1836, Russell Papers, Letter Folder I, Chicago Historical Society. 
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CHAPTF:.R V 
The Growth of a City: The Partnership of Capitalists 
and Town Residents in Commerce, Retail Businesses 
and Internal Improvements 1 1833 to 1842 
While the contention stands that Chicago's initial growth was stimulated 
by the participation of eastern and western entrepreneurs in land speculation, 
Chicago's continued expansion necessarily turned upon the developnent of com-
mercial and retail businesses. All the speculator's efforts in erecting an 
image of Chicago's prosperity were of little value without the mechanics, 
merchants, and professional people moving from eastern towns to relocate in 
the frontier village of Chicago. The real flood of town migration began in 
late 1834 and increased dramatically in 1835 and 1836 only to taper off in 
1S37 as a shroud of economic depression spread over the i!Ast Coast limiting 
the resources of those desiring to move West.1 In the period £ran 1834 to 
1S36, however, Chica.go solidified its economic position by increasing the 
number of retail trade establishments, establishing communication and trade 
with the interior portions of the state, and encouraging the growth of Lake 
Michigan shipping. When Chicago entered the depression period in late 1837, 
there were commercial leaders and eastern capita.lists with an interest in 
sustaining and even advancing Chica.go's canmercial developnent during the 
depression years. By 18421 when normal financial conditions returned, Chica.go 
emerged as the pre-eminent city on Lake Michigan's western shore. 
'fhe merchant, the artisan, and less directly the farmer were the backbone 
of any city, and Chica.go's develoµnent depended upon their acceptance of its 
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potential as described by capitalists and speculators. But how did such 
people learn of Chicago's existence and the opportunities available? Many 
eastern urban dwellers learned of Chica.go through letters and personal con-
tacts. Often a relative or friend undertook a journey to the v/est searching 
for a town with commercial opportunities. Typically a young man travelling 
in the \.'iest wrote home describing the advantages of each town he visited. 2 
There is no wa:y of gauging either the volume or effectiveness of such letters 
or later personal. contacts in stimulating western migration, but in the case 
of Chica.go evidence does exist that such contacts were important • .3 In same 
cases letters from the west received wider circulation than just the corres-
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pondents. In 1834, a young man from Hartford, Connecticut, toured the western 
towns in hopes of finding a suitable location for a retail business. As he 
travelled, his letters were displayed in the local post office. Eventually, 
he selected Chicago as his new home, a choice which certainly affected later 
emigrants from that area.4 
Interest in Chicago as a site for economic investment and commercial 
businesses was also stimulated by the innumerable travelogues and reports of 
foreign visitors to America. Chicago attracted a considerable number of such 
callers in the 18.30 1s with the conclusion of the Blackhawk har and the re-
sulting Indian Treaty of 18.33. Curiosity, of course, was the magnet which 
attracted many early travelers, but their accounts, published in 1835 and 
1836, often included judgments about Chicago's future. In 1835, Charles Fanno 
Hoffman's A Winter In the West cited Chicago's strategic location for canm.erce 
and predicted its rapid rise as the new trade center of the '.Jest. 5 A 
Scottish traveler canmented that 11Almost every person I met regarded Chicago 
as the germ of an inunense city, and speculators have already bought up, at 
high prices, all the building ground in the neighborhooct.rr6 
--
134 
But such foreign and native travel accotlllts probably appealed to .and 
were read only by the more educated urban dweller in the East. What of the 
small shopkeeper, the artisan, and finally the ranner preparing to move West? 
For these people, guidebooks describing the western country were popular 
sources of 1ni'onnation. One of the more famous was written by John Mason Peck 
in 1834. While investigating the Illinois cotllltry, Peck visited Chicago and 
:immediately sunnised that it 11 • • • will eventually become the greatest place 
for business and canmerce in all the northwest.7 Later when Peck published 
his Gazeteer of Illinois, Chica.go was mentioned as the most important town 
g 
on the shores of Lake Michigan. Such rave reviews tllldoubtedly attracted a 
good number of town migrants. 
Newspapers were also effective conveyors of info:nnation about the West. 
They were cheap and accessible to most prospective emigrants. Eastern news-
papers regularly canmented on the most favorable townsites in the West. 9 
The degree of publicity received by any western town in an eastern newspaper 
really depended upon the establishment of newspapers in western cities. 
Until Chicago could boast of its own weekly publication, eastern newspapers 
could only print the occasional reports of travelers and personal correspon-
dents. Without a newspaper, there was no agency in a westeni city for collect-
ing facts about population, commerce, and the surrounding farm land and then 
distributing these facts to the general public. It was not tlllusual for the 
Chicago post office to receive letters from the East inquiring about living 
10 
conditions, wages, and commercial opporttlllities. Without a dedicated postal 
clerk or an interested western entrepreneur, such letters remained unanswered. 
A principal reason for Chicago's early popularity was that as early as 
November, 1S33, the Chicago Danocrat was founded. Two years later, Chicago 
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-;ossessed two newspapers when the Chicago American began publication. 
C{llll'JlUilications and correspondence were then opened with newspapers throughout 
the country. .&iitors throughout the East perused the columns of the Chicago 
~ocrat and Chicago American extracting items of interest for their own 
readers and the prospective emigrant. In 1836, for example, the Philadelphia 
COJTh~ercial Herald sent a questionnaire to all westeni newspapers asking for 
a description of the town, its location, the number of merchants, the volume 
11 
of commerce, and the number of buildings. The American answered these 
questions through its editorials knowing that the reply would be printed in 
newspapers throughout the country.12 Compiling the reports of travelers and 
the information gleaned fran a western newspaper, eastern editors then advised 
their readers on the merits of various western towns. Chicago received a 
good deal of favorable cam::ientary. In 1836, for example, the Niagara Democrat 
described Chicago in the following manner: 
In the list of towns that have sprung up with incredible 
rapidity, Chicago deserves a conspicious place - probably the 
first rank. It is now a little more than three years old; 
numbers 5000 inhabitants; is a scene of bustle, industry and 
enterprise, which a few years since would have been deemed the 
work of fifteen or twenty years to produce. Its commanding lo-
cation has drawn, and is continually drawing towards it, the 
capital of this and the eastern states • • • labor is high and 
COO!lllands cash; merchants and mechanics are thriving; lawyers and 
doctors if they do not flourish in their professions, make it up 
by speculation. All is brisk and promising.l.3 
Easteni newspapers performed a vital service in advertising Chicago's 
opportunities, but the two Chicago newspapers were of even greater significance. 
In the first years of their existence, the Chicago American and Chica.go 
Democrat were little more than advertising brochures; important national news 
usually found coverage only on the back pages. The aim, of course, was to 
provide information for eastern editors and for emigrants passing through 
Chic~o in search or a western haven. At the same time. the Chica.go newsnaners 
~-------------------------------------------------13-,6 had a surprisingly wide circulation in the East not only among other newspaper 
offices but among individuals.14 Thus the colunns of the Chicago publications 
were oriented toward attracting carpenters, masons, and merchants. In 1835, 
the Chicago American cautioned the prospective migrant that: 
Our distant readers must not judge the business of this place by 
the meager appearance of our advertising colunns, for we can 
assure thsn that they do not present a fair criterion. Many mer-
chants are extensively engaged in a wholesale and retail business; 
our harbor is enlivened by the arrival of fi~e, ten, fifteen, and 
sometimes more vessels, in the course of a week • • • plainly show 
that Chicago is fast rising to an eminence which will be equalled 
by few, and surpassed by none, of the towns now springing up in 
this • • • western wilderness.15 
For the prospective agricultural pioneer upon whose future Chicago would 
depend for commerce and good supplies, the American initiated a column entitled 
"Hints to Ihlgrants 11 in which favorable farm lands -were described, methods ot 
obtaining the land fran the government were explained, and the most needed 
and suitable products for market were discussed.16 That Chicago required mer-
chants, artisans, and farmers was clearly evident in newspapers both East and 
West. 
Having learned of Chicago, the eastern town dweller still faced innumerab 
obstacles before migration to the West became a reality. First and foremost, 
the tide of westward migration was regulated by the prevailing .financial 
situation in the East. Most historians today agree that Frederick Jackson 
Turner's concept of the West as a safety-valve tor eastern discontent operating 
during periods of financial depression was incorrect.17 The real westward 
movement began during the favorable econcmic period which prevailed in the 
1S30 1 s. However, it still remained true that many who came West were seeking 
a freer field of economic opport'Wlity. Eastern newspapers continually urged 
Young merchants to go West where they might more easily enter into the business 
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communityo18 Since most historians directed their attention to the movement 
o! farmers, the writings on Wflstward migration have rarely considered the 
causes and character of town migration.19 Artisans and merchants who moved 
rrom eastern towns to the West were of many varieties. Some possessed suf-
ficient capital to establish their own stores and sell goods. Others had 
little capital, and depended upon loans fran speculators to rent a store and 
purchase goods. Mechanics, carpenters, and clerks were also in evidence. 20 
Their journey was perhaps the least expensive. If passage from the East was 
obtained, an emigrant could readily find work in the town of Chicago in 1835 
and 18,36. The Chicago Democrat and American constantly advertised for workers 
on public improvement projects such as the harbor, streets, and the Illinois 
21 and Michigan Canal. It also seems likely that many tanners worked in 
Chicago for a few years until sufficient capital was accumulated to start a 
fann. The speculators who had arrived earlier prepared the way for these 
emigrants by creating the occupations which sustained the town migrant. 
Town migration was particularly unique in that many people moved directly 
tran town to town. The records and correspondence which remain from this 
early period of Chica.go history indicate that ordinarily totm migration was a 
long jump, that is the emigrant, whether he was a merchant, lawyer, or artisan, 
left his residence in New York or New England and travelled across the country 
to Chicago. Certainly many stopped enroute at Buffalo and Detroit, but these 
towns by 1835 already possessed nl.Bl1.erous mercantile P.Stablishments; the freer 
field for a young merchant or professional person was Chicago. 22 
The path to Chicago from New .England and New York was difficult and 
tedious. By the end of the Blackhawk War, however, various improvements in 
transportation and communication had assured that Chica.go would receive its 
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share of the new migration. The Erie Canal, opened since 1825, brought the 
eJlligrant as far as Buffalo to await passage on the Great Lakes. Before 1833, 
passage fran Buffalo to Detroit was regular, but few steamboats had ever ven-
tured to navigate the waters of Lake Michigan. The Blackhawk La.r again, 
a].biet indirectly, provided an impetus to the settlement of Chicago. In need 
of troops quickly to combat Blackhawk1s uprising, the government decided to 
charter steamboats to transport the troops to Chicago rather than using the 
overland route. These steamboats were the first to reach Chicago proving that 
navigation o.r Lake Michigan was both feasible and practical. 23 From then on, 
Chicago gained an early lead as the chief' port on Lake Michigan's western 
shore. Thus Chicago received the majority of €migrants, and for a long while 
those wishing to settle in towns or country further north on the lake shore 
were often forced to travel by land from Ghicago.24 
Many travelers avoided the all water route to Chicago from Butta.lo 
tearing the dangers of lake travel. The most favorable alternative route was 
to disembark from a steam.er at Detroit and then travel overland by the 
Chicago Road. 25 Others preferred to take the Chicago Road only as far as 
St. Joseph, Michigan, then board a steamboat or schooner to Chicago; a regular 
26 fleet of steamboats journeyed between these points in the la~er 1S30's. 
But again the story of westward town migration appears only as a process, 
but it was, in reality, an adventure undertaken by individuals. Perhaps by 
observing the experience o! just a few, generalizations on town migration will 
appear in a somewhat better perspective. Richard Ela of Lebanon, New Hampshir 
for example, saw no hope for a mercantile career in Lebanon and decided that 
11 
• • • the West is our object; there is no other hope left for us • • • • n'Zl 
Setting out from Lebanon in 1834, Ela stopped for a short period in Buffalo to 
earn his 
~-------------------------------------------------D-,9 ~entua.lly, he reached the West and by-passed Chicago to settle at Plain.field, 
28 
nunois. Many yotmg men moved from urban areas in the East to seek their 
.rortuna in western towns. This was not a haphazard journey, but those with 
a little capital picked their future home with great care by looking over each 
frontier metropolis noting its particular advantages. Elisha Pease tran 
Hartford, Connecticut, indicated the care with which town migrants came ':·Jest: 
I left home with the intention of spending fran 3 to 4 months in 
travelling and learning what the chances were !or a yotmg man in 
this part of the cotmtry. I will say to you frankly that a man 
cannot live as pleasantly here as at the East, but that with a 
small capital and proper management he cannot fail of laying the 
foundations for an independence if' not a forttme in a few years. 
I am as tmdecided about any business as when I started. I have 
concluded to go as far as St. Louis then I shall stop and review 
what I have seen, calculate the chances and make a bold push.29 
For Pease, Chicago was already too settled with merchants, and thus he 
moved further along the lake shore.30 The same was true of David Roberts or 
Fredonia, New York, who looked over various towns including Chicago. Arriving 
in Chicago in 1833, Roberts thought it already too crowded and moved to Joliet, 
lllinois.31 Others, though, f'ound the crowded conditions and excitement in-
dications of Chicago's great future. Lemuel Freer departed from New York in 
the spring of 1836. Buttressed by a small amount of money, he stopped at all 
the lake port towns evaluating the commercial possibilities of each. Cleveland: 
Detroit, and Mackinac were, according to Freer, already too well-supplied with 
retail stores while Green Bay and Milwaukee were too involved in lot specula-
tion to indicate the soundness of their economic position. But Chicago was 
different in Freer•s jud8'Jllent: 
I do not believe she has her equal in the tmion. There is more 
buoyancy and enterprise than I ever before saw • • • • Chicago 
has acquired a f'onn of progression that nothing can stop for 
twenty years • • • • There are forty merchants here, ten of whom 
sell goods to the amotmt of sixty thousand, twenty forty thousand 
and ten to the amotmt of from fifteen to twenty thousand • • • ..32 
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- On the steamboat to Chicago, Freer had the good fortlllle to meet .another 
merchant frcm New York who was also spying out a suitable town to locate his 
general retail business with goods valued at $101 000. Arriving in Chicago, 
the two men formed a partnership with Freer employing his capital to buy a 
lot and rent a store. Once established, they soon found their original stock 
of goods inadequate and sent to New York for an additional $30,000 worth or 
supplies. Because of his connections with New York merchants, Freer's partner 
was able to obtain these goods on credit thus enabling the two merchants to 
maintain a lucrative trade.33 
Similarly Charles Walker from New York sent a relative to Chicago in 
1834 with a stock of boots, shoes, and leather speculating that such trade 
might prosper. Later his brother-in-law, who was floundering in a small 
village in New York, was sent West to serve as a partner in Charles Walker and 
Ccmpany.34 
Perhaps an even more interesting case was the career of Benjamin Barker. 
Barker was frcm Buffalo, New York, and came i·:est in 1832. His brother, 
Jacob, was a leading Buffalo forwarding and commission merchant.35 With a 
small amount or reserve capital, Benjamin Barker visited various westem towns, 
but finally decided that Chicago was to be the major center of the West.36 
After his joumey, Barker had little capital left, and for all intents and 
purposes Barker and his !smily were marooned in Chicago two years before the 
heaviest migration.37 Life was extremely difficult as attested to by his 
letters, yet Benjamin Barker was able to find assorted jobs in cutting wood 
and clerking for other merchants. His dream was to set up a small grocery 
store, but al~s he lacked the capital. From his arrival in Chicago, he 
constantly wrote his brother asking him to finance a business in Chicago.JS 
r:;. October, 1833, Benjamin Barker tried to convince his brother of the 
... 
propriety of such an investment: 
If we lllSiY judge fran the start Chicago has taken this stunmer we 
may fairly anticipate it will shortly become one of the largest 
towns in the Western world ••• now is the time to make money 
here • • • • I have no doubt a rail road or canal between this 
& the Illinois will be commence within one or two years taking 
al 1 these things into consideration. I don't see that there 
can be much risk in commencing business here on a small skale 
(sic)39 
Jacob Barker soon gave in to his brother• s requests and agreed to finance 
a grocery business at Chicago.40 In some cases, therefore, eastern business-
men also directly financed the establishment of retail trades. 
r1any immigrants who cane to Chicago were not as fortunate as Benjamin 
Barker or Lemuel Freer, for they had neither capital nor eastern connections 
to sustain them in the first difficult years. Fran 1B34 to 1836, neverthe-
less, Chicago supplied many jobs for the laborer providing a means whereby 
countless urban JJ.igrants accumulated capital and entered the class of small 
merchants. F.dward Talcott came to Chicago virtually penniless, but he knew 
that, for a time, he could work as a land surveyor.4J. Many other merchants 
and artisans streamed into Chicago from 1B34 to 1836 knowing that wages were 
high and jobs plentiful because of the various building projects initiated by 
the speculators such as Gurdon Hubbard and v!illiam Ogden. 42 A prospective 
merchant did not have to build his o'Wl'l store immediately because he could rent 
noor space in a structure erected by the speculators. The marginal retail 
merchant and general laborer owed much in his first years to the economic 
tround~rk prepared by the early Chicago capitalists. 43 
Accepting the thesis that the capitalists and speculators ~ed the 
transition of eastern town dwellers into the frontier to'Wl'ls, one must yet 
deal with the common generalization that the speculators and capitalists 
l°iindered the path of the agricultural frontier. As the years passed, the 
growth of Chicago increasingly depended upon the production of its hinter-
land and without the develoµnent of an agricultural market, Chicago's 
develoµnent would have been seriously curtailed. In the view of most histori-
ans, the speculator corrupted the basic ideals of America's land system by 
monopolizing large sections of fertile farming land and holding it out of 
production until a suitable price was gained. When actual land sales did 
occur, such as at Chicago in 1835 and 18361 the speculat'Or supposedly manipu-
lated the sale and government officials so that the settlers were deprived 
of the choice fanning sites. Finally when the settler lacked the capital 
to purchase a fa.rm, the speculator used the opportunity to loan money at 
usurious rates of interest.44 There is certainly truth to all the various 
charges hurled against the land speculator, but there is another side to the 
story which indicates that in many cases, especially in Chicago, the land 
speculators advanced the general progress of westward expansion both in the 
town and in the country. 
Speculation is endemic to any system of capitalism and private ownership.4! 
When public land sales were held, the nineteenth century American was foolish 
to believe that he could escape the appearance of speculation. In defense of 
the land speculator, it should be realized that he indirectly aided the 
agricultural pioneer. Many settlers who came 'vvest had little capital. They 
located for a time in a frontier town like Chicago where, through various 
jobs, they accumulated sufficient funds to return to farming. 46 Moreover, 
the speculator was hardly in a canrnanding position in relation to the settlers. 
Farming pioneers often disobeyed laws or established extralegal organizations 
to ward off the speculator's competition.47 At the Chicago land sale in 1S35, 
the squatters formed a committee to protect the claims of each member. The 
r.:;;,cuJ_ators were prohibited from ever raising the cost of public lands 
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the minimum. government price. Several speculators tried to bid on fanning 
].and previously claimed by a settler, but they were forcibly ejected .fran the 
sale. Protesting to the legal and military authorities at Chicago, the 
speculators found that the community, in general, wished to see its farmers 
receive their just claims. 4B In fact, the Chicago American editorialized that 
at the 1835 gove:mment sale, the settlers received fair treatment a.nd the 
town 1 s speculators and capitalists had not cheated anyone, but only purchased 
land not previously claimed or entered by anyone else.49 
Neither did the speculators alwa;ys hold land off the market waiting for 
a price rise nor did they monopolize large tracts of farm land. Pure logic 
would seem to indicate quite the reverse. A speculator wished a quick return 
on his property, and to hold land off the market in large sections could only 
deter settlement and force settlers to other areas.50 Again Chicago specula-
tors provided a convenient ex.ample. Arthur and Frederick Bronson bought con-
siderable farm land in Illinois a.nd Wisconsin yet always stipulated that to 
garner profits and foster the growth of the whole area, town and country, the 
property must be disposed of as quickly as possible. Ordinarily the Bronsons 
avoided monopolizing large sections of land. They realized that if a whole 
section was purchased the settlers would just avoid that area.. Thus the 
Bronaons instructed their western agent to purchase small tracts in separate 
locations so as not to deter the normal pattern of settlement. 51 The Bronsons 
knew that once settlement was established around their locations, their ta.nn 
land would command a. high price. In no case did the Bronsons consider holding 
land off the market longer than two years.52 
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settlers and other frontier residents were often equall;{ guilty. Officials 
of the local land offices, the register and receiver, were notorious for 
engaging in land speculation. Because of their position, they could effective 
lY select the choicest land. 53 Yet surprisingly perhaps to critics of the 
J.and speculator, Uilliam Ogden, one of Chicago's major town speculators, was 
the chief spokesman in Chicago against the abuses of the land system. Ogden 
.round tha.t many unscrupulous settlers advanced claims f'or land which already 
bad been improved by a wealthy farmer or capitalist. Furthemore, Ogden 
claimed that the whole structure of the local land offices encouraged corrup-
tion and fraud. Officials of the land office, Ogden explained, were political. 
appointees lacking special qualifications for dealing with the legal problems 
surrounding land sal.es. 54 Ogden certainly was accurate in his criticism for 
officials of various land offices decided most ca.see involving the confusion 
of land titles. Ogden also resented the susceptibility of local land office 
officials to bribes fr<Jn wealthy speculators and fa.naers. 'Ihus he reca:amended 
to the Coounissioner of the General Land Office that all cases involving land 
titles should be decided in ~ashington by knowledgeable lawyers away from 
the partisan frontier atmosphere.55 
But this is not to sa:y that the town and farm speculators did not take 
advantage of their position as Chica.go's chief source of capital. Profits 
were their first consideration and to this all else was frequently subordina-
ted. Both Edward A. Russell and William Ogden invested their capital and that 
ot other easterners in loaning money to settlers who lacked the resources to 
purchase their claims. In 1B35, Russell sent $41 000 to Hubbard specifically 
for loans to sett4ers.56 In the late 1SJ0 1s, Ogden loaned $151 000 in the 
same manner.57 The rates of interest were often usurious avera about 
1zt, but then one must balance this fact against the realization tha.t the 
speculator provided the settler the only possible means of purchasing a farm 
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or the squatter of securing his claim. Without the capital of Edward Russell, 
William Ogden, and countless others like them, the agricultural hinterland of 
Chicago might have developed at a slower pace eventua.11y affecting the growth 
of Chicago itself. Perhaps William Ogden expressed the view of the speculators 
most clearly. His view is similar to that of capitalists throughout .American 
history, but criticism of their position must always consider the system 
under which they operated and the advantages which they provided. Writing to 
an eastern investor, Ogden described his attitude toward charging high rates 
of interest: 
Neither does this large scale advance upon money give offense to 
the purchaser, he seeks you knowing your rates and desires you to 
buy his claim for him which he not having the money to buy would 
otherwise lose, together with his house, barn, fence and frequently 
improvements equal to fifty or more acres under cultivation of the 
plough.58 
To make sweeping generalizations about the role of the land speculators 
on the agricultural. frontier would be to distort the picture. Certainly the 
speculators were as guilty of abuses as they were responsible for certain 
advances. The conflict occurs in historical. writing because to each fa.I'l:ler or 
each town resident the case was different. To one, the speculator was a 
villain while to another he was a hero. This same ambiguity existed even in 
the 1830' s. Harsh judgments about the speculators often appeared in the 
press. A notable example was in 1836 when the AJ..bW Evening Journal attacked 
the American Land Company as a monopoly for purchasing govenmient lands. The 
editors claimed that the canpany's charter was drawn up by Charles Butler's 
brother, Benjamin Butler, then Attorney General of the United States. Accord-
ing to the Albany ;Wenipg Journal, various high goverrn:tent officials were 
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r;;:..I'<)lllinent stockholders in the American '.'""d Canpaey thereby indicating its 
' -ttempt to defraud the general public.5) The Chica.go American printed the 
charges against the American Land Coupany, but it was equally significant that 
they presented a rebuttal from Charles Butler, President of the Company. 
Butler ably defended the actions of the company. Admitting that the majority 
of the charges were true, Butler pointed out, however, that long before 
settlers journeyed to Illinois's interior, the American Land Company had aJ.-
60 
ready invested .lll the future growth of the country. As in all western 
cities, Chicago was at times critical of its capitalists and the American Land 
Company, but generally the speculators were welcomed to the city because of 
their contributions to its economic life.61 
The involvement of capitalists and speculators extended far beyond 
merely town and prairie speculation, loans to settlers, and the construction 
of houses and stores. As Chicago grew commercially its most continued need 
was for internal improvements and chief among these was the building of the 
Illinois and !tl.chigan Canal. Here too the speculators worked in conjunction 
with a rising class of western merchants to extend Chicago's communication 
arteries. 
Chicago's major attraction to eastern investors and to fanners had 
alw~s been its location on a possible thoroughfare between the Great Lakes 
and the ilississippi River. As early as 1808, Albert Gallatin suggested that 
a canal between the Illinois F~ver and Lake Michigan could be a major communi-
cation artery.62 Hhen Illinois was admitted as a state in 1818, there was 
every expectation that a canal project was in the offing. During the 18201s, 
several charter companies were fonned to begin work but all soon collapsed. 
Finally in 1827, the national government granted Illinois alternate sections 
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~------------------------------------------------------, of land a.long a proposed canal route to aid in financing construction of the 
canal, but the project was still in the planning stages in lBJJ.63 When 
Charles Butler and Arthur Bronson arrived in Chicago in 1S33, they realized 
its potential but also sa.w the nounderjng attempts at a canal project. Butle 
was amazed that the state legislature did not recognize the dependence of the 
entire state upon such a project.64 The Chicago Democrat also berated the 
state for failure to act, 65 but all efforts Aeemed to have little effect until 
Butler and Bronson arrived on the scene. 
While in Chicago, Butler and Bronson were approached by concerned 
western citizens, such a.s John Temple and John Kinzie, and asked to expend 
their capital and efforts in obtaining a charter fran the Illinois state 
legislature for a new private canal company.66 Butler and Bronson returned 
to New York assuring the Chica.go citizens that they would consider the project. 
In New York, the seemingly shelved the idea, but John Temple in Chicago 
flooded their New York of'.f'ices with requests for a private canal company. In 
early 1834, Temple contacted numerous state politicians and received their 
assurances of support for a private canal company. This information he sent 
to New York, but still Butler and Bronson delayed action. 67 In Hay, 1$34, 
Temple appealed to their business sense and desire for profits: 
Now my dear friend allow me to scold you a little, for you deserve 
it, and no doubt anticipate already the subject - The charter -
the charter - .None have yet come to hand • • • • Away with your 
fickleness my Friend - send me the Charter for a. Canal - He have 
now within our grasp one of the most splendid prizes ever presented 
before & if we do not seize it, ours will be the folly and the loss 
- indecision is the ruin of all great undertakings - I have been down 
into the State three times since the year commenced and have ma.de it 
my business to prepare the public mind for a canal & for having it 
constructed immediately & indeed there seems no opposition now & the 
time is ripe for the work. Do send the Charter & recollect our main 
dependence is u~n you. To get that Charter fran the Legislature, 
we will insure. 
,,,....-_______________________________________________________ u._,s 
-
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Later in June, Temple assured Bronson that a private canal ccmpany would 
bring greater profits than any of his land speculation projects.69 Butler 
and Bronson finally drew up a charter for a canal company stipulating that 
the state must convey its land grant to the campany. 70 In the intervening 
years, however, various elements in the state realized the immediate need for 
a canal which they now felt should not be controlled by eastern capital. 
Editorializing in November, 1834, the Chicago Democrat called upon the people 
of Chicago and Illinois to construct their own canals and avoid the hegemony 
of eastern financiers. 71 Conscious or this hostility, Bronson dropped his 
interest in a private canal company. Bronson never really wished to build 
the canal himself, unless it was absolutely necessary. Therefore he decided 
that since sentiment in the state now seemed to assure the quick constructio~ 
ot a state-operated canal, he warned his western agent not to meddle in the 
project any longer for 11 • • • if the state will undertake either on her own 
account, our desire being rather to have same camnunication opened than to 
do it ourselves. 1172 
In 1835, Chicago indeed pushed for the immediate construction or a canal. 
Newspaper editorials increased as Chicago realized that products shipped via 
an Illinois and Michigan Canal over the Great Lakes to New York would reach 
market quicker than any southern route to New Orleans.73 The standard exhorta-
tion in 1835 was 11Give us this canal, and Chicago will soon be to the West 
what New York is to the East. 1174 
But the state had always been hindered by lack of proper financing until 
1835 when the state itself contracted for loans to begin construction.75 
However, it was again eastern financiers who opened their coffers to .finance 
the Illinois and Michigan Canal. Arthur Bronson, for examplf.: 1 was one or the 
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' iargest holders of canal bonds. When the canal bill was passed in ,January 1 
1.B.36, Gurdon Hubbard, William P. Thomton, and William B. Archer were appointed 
canal commissioners. It was significant that two of these men, Gurdon Hubbard 
and William B. Archer, had extensive connections with eastem capitalists 
serving as their agents in land investments. While Hubbard invested for the 
Russells of Connecticut, Archer shared land purchases with Micajah T. Williams 
of Cincinnati. 77 Thus leadership of the canal project itself fell to specu-
iators and capitalists. 
Net only did eastern money finance the canal, but land speculators such 
as Bronson, Hubbard, Williams and Russell bought heavily in the sale of canal 
lands at Chicago in July, 18.361 to finance the canal's construction. 'l'he 
IDinois and Michigan Canal never became a reality of Chicago 1 s commercial 
system until late in the 1$4.0's, yet it had definite effects on the city 
before that time. Among the towns on the westem shore of Lake Michigan, 
Chicago was the first to consider and actually begin construction of a canal. 
For capitalists and speculators investigating investment opportunities in 
Lake Ifichigan town.sites, Chicago thus seemed to offer the best security.78 
Moreover, the beginning of construction in 18.36 provided many jobs for 
laborers and artisans.79 In its earliest stages, therefore, eastern capital-
ists contributed to the financing and construction of the Ulinois and Mi.chig 
Canal. 
Commercial. growth depended upon improving and inaugurating a canrn.un.ica-
tions network. !<'or Chicago and all towns on the western shore of Lake 
Michigan, harbor improvement assumed primary importance. As early as 18291 
when the Illinois state legislature was petitioning Congress for aid in 
constructing the Illinois and Michigan Canal, a request for harbor improvement 
150 
ttaB also made. In the early 1S30 1s, there were no adequate harbors on 
Lake Ilichigan. At Chicago, ships were forced to dock outside the mouth of 
the Chicago River and transport goods and passengers to the shore by small 
boa.ts. The principal obstructions to entering the Chicago Iil.ver were sandbars 
which had to be continually dredged away fran the river's entrance. Chicago, 
hoWever, was the first town on Lake Michigan to receive steady appropriations 
for harbor improvement. The first $25,000 was granted in 1833 and construction 
of a harbor and the dredging of sandbars began. The early improvement of its 
harbor gavo Chicago a considerable lead over the other towns on Lake Hichigan 
81 
and a virtual monopoly for a few years over lake traffic. For many years 
after, the Chiago newspapers continually editorialized on the need for harbor 
inprovement.82 By 1837, ships entered the Chicago River and unloaded goods 
and passengers at wharves in the principal business sections of the city.83 
As with the Illinois and Hichigan Canal, harbor construction at Chicago 
served a dual purpose; it not only incroased the town's comnercial potential, 
but also provided jobs for emigrants seeking a livelihood in the ~lest. As 
early as 1834, the p_hicago J\merican pleaded for laborers on the harbor pro-
ject. a4 In 1835, construction was actually slowed when the government engineer 
was lo::.;ing workers because of the high.er wages offered by speculators in 
building stores and houses in the town.85 
As Chicago increased in population, its needs for connections with the 
interior grew correspondingly. In 1836, a transportation company was formed 
between merchants of Chicago, Ottawa on the IDinoia !liver and even some 
towns further south. Its purpose was to transport goods fran the East into 
the interior of Illinois and bring foodstuffs back to Chicago.86 Yet the 
interior of Illinois was not filling up rapidly enough to supply f a.nn products 
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tor Chicago, which by 1835 had approximately 3500 people. Chicagoans therefore 
--
depended for f oodstu!f s upon areas to the $outhwest centering on the Wabash 
Valley which al.ready was a market oriented agricultural region. Chicago adver-
tised its need for farm products and requested the f'anners of' the Wabash area 
to bring their surpluses to Chicago where the highest prices could be ob-
tained. 87 In 1834, a railroad from Chicago to Vincennes was proposed to tap 
the resources of the Wabash Valley. One contemporary Chicago resident ex-
plained the importance of this railroad to Chicago: 
The subject of a rail-way fran Chicago to Vincennes, is one of 
deep, I had almost said of vital interest to our citizens. It 
is true many fanns are opening in the neighborhood of Chicago, 
and the country is rapidly filling up, with a population • • • • 
But the increase of population in the country is such that it is 
not able to sup;ily itself with produce; much less is it able to 
feed the rapidly increasing population of Chica.go. This must 
continue to be the case for five years to come • • • • Thus the 
conclusion forces itself upon us, that we must forever remain 
depencrnnt on the ~.abash country for san.ething to eat • • • • 88 
But who could build such a railroad to the interior'! 11.e;ain the same 
names appear in fostering Chicago's developnent. In 18351 a company was 
formed and a federal land grant was obtained for a railroad from Chicago to 
Vincennes; and among its principal directors and stockholders were Arthur 
Bronson, John Kinzie, Gurdon s. Hubbard, and George Dole. Hubbard and Bronson 
were to sell shares of stock a.t both New York and Philadelphia a.s well as at 
Chicago. s9 Even though the project proved abortive, its inaut,'Uration was 
symptomatic of the sources of leadership and capital for Chicago• s improve-
ments; it was a combination of eastern capitalists and a generation of western 
merchants whose careers had begun in land speculation. 
A similar example was evident in 1836 when the Chicago Hydraulic Company 
was charter'°d to bring fresh water into the town. Among its principal stock-
holders were J&les l..!ampbell, Hobert Kinzie, Gurdon Hubbard., John H. Kinzie, 
152 ~d Richard I. Hamilton, all of whan had previously been involved in .land 
speculation and presumably were reinvesting their capital gains in Chicago's 
growth 0 90 This became increasingly clear as additional commercial establish-
ments were founded in 1835 and 1836. John Kinzie operated a forwarding and 
commission business as did Gurdon Hubbard. Each owned shares in various 
steamboats and established connections with the major shipping lines operating 
on the Erie Canal. 91 In this way 1 the orderly and e.f'ficient transshipnent ot 
goods .from New York to Chicago was assured. Hubbard and Kinzie also provided 
leadership in other areas ot town life. Both were involved in town politics 
serving as councilmen and both were directors of the Chicago branch of the 
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state Bank. William Ogden was also involved in the commercial. and political. 
history of Chicago. In 1836, he was the. principal organizer of Chicago's 
own steamboat canpany to build and charter boats for the Chicago trade. He 
interested many Chicago merchants, but eventually he turned a.gain for the 
support of various eastern capitalists. 93 In addition, his project was 
supported by two representatives of the Illinois Investment Company from 
Scotland. 94 
As Chica.go expanded commercially, therefore, community leadership was 
controlled by a class of merchants, land speculators, and general entrepreneurs 
In most of the major commercial undertakings, certain men pleyed a dominant 
role in Chicago and appear again and again on the rolls of new companies and 
in the city government. Host of these names we have already encountered in 
the history of Chicago: William Ogden, Gurdon Hubbard, John H. Kinzie, and 
John Tanple. In March, 1837, Chicago was finally given a city government to 
replace its old town status, and in the .following May a mayoral election was 
held. The two candidates were William B. Ogden and John H. Kinzie.95 At 
first, the Chicago American showed definite hostility to Ogden because he so 
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clearly represented eastern capital, feeling that a native son might better 
serve the interests of Chicago. 96 This, however, was a minority opinion for 
Ogden was elected Chicago's first mayor indicating the leadership of the 
city's canmercial. class. 97 In 18391' Chicago's third nayor was Benjamin 
p..aymond, a deal.er in dry goods and one of the city's wealthiest mcrchants. 98 
AB the city expanded, all facets of its life turned for leadership to the 
business canmunit~. 99 
But how successful were these early capitalists and speculators in 
fostering Chicago's economic growth? Statistics unfortunately are rare for 
early Chicago history, but there were a. few reliable indices of economic 
developnent. Chicago's population increased dramatically from 1833 to 1837 
when it tapered off due to the depressio:n.100 The number of vessels arriving 
at Chicago increased fran 4 in 1833 to 456 in 1836.101 Because Chicago had 
a frontier economy, most foodstuffs and manufactured. products were imported.. 
As the years passed, however, Chicago slowly increased its e:xports to the 
East. While imports would exceed exports until the middle 1840's, it was 
evident that Chicago had come a long way by 1837.102 It one wished to 
gauge the retail and commercial growth of Chicago, he need only peruse the 
first issues of the Chicago Democrat in 1833 and 1834 when barely a half page 
was taken up with the advertisements of retail and commercial. establishments. 
In 1835 and 1S36, both the Chicago Democrat and Chicago American devoted three 
to four pages to business advertisements. l03 
By 1S37, therefore, Chicago seemed assured of a continuing economic 
develoµnent.. Retail merchants, lawyers, and general artisans streamed ii:to 
the city with the opening of new canmercial endeavors and the unlimited em-
ployment on various internal improvement projects. CapitalistR snch as 
--
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william Ogden, Gurdon Hubbard, and John Kinzie continued their real estate 
speculations but increasingly contributed their business skill and excess 
capital to encouraging improvement projects and opening subsidiary canmercial 
businesses such as forwarding and commission houses. Their earlier connection 
with eastern capitalists provided them with an extraordinary opportunity to 
draw eastern funds into areas other than land and townsite speculation. By 
18.36-1837, Chicago had its own native city leaders like Ogden, Hubbard, and 
Kinzie, but their connections with Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler indicated 
Chicago's develoµnent was still a partnership of Ea.st and West. 
Unfortunately Chicago developed under boom conditions during the 
nationwide speculative period of the 1830's. The rate of economic expansion 
did not continue indefinitely. By late 1836, there were signs in the East 
that the speculative period was slowly drawing to a close. International, 
national, and local conditions brought on the Panic of 1837 which lasted until 
approximately 1843.104 In the West, the Specie Circular passed in July, 18361 
was the first hint of the curtailment of easy credit which had fostered large 
land sales and city and state improvement projects. The Specie Circular 
required local land officials to accept only gold and silver in payment for 
public land with an exdeption tor actual settlers buying not more than 320 
acres.105 
But the Specie Circular did not cause the depression, for conditions 
had long existed within the national and international economic frameworks 
for financial. contractions. As conditions worsened in the East, their effect 
soon reached the western states. In Chicago, the tightening of credit seemed 
unpreventable. In May, lS.371 the Chicago American mentioned that tight money 
in New York ha.d olowed the volume of Chicago's trade.106 The newspaper called 
for positive govenunent action to ameliorate the financial squeeze.107 Yet 
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the depression in Chicago business circles was not alone the result qf easteni 
financial conditions. Settled in advance of the agricultural frontier, Chicago 
had to wait for the developnent of a surplus-producing hinterland before it 
possessed a balanced economy. The Chicago iimerican realized the defects ot 
Chicago's economic develoµnent as early as May, 1837: 
In the building up of the West, and developing the sources of its 
prosperity, so alluring have been the temptations to the mere 
capitalist and speculator to invest his money, and so splendid, 
and in tact almost incredible has been his success, that the 
regular channels or business and means of subsistence have been 
neglected, and almost every avenue to weal.th, except the •royal 
road' of magic speculatio!!t. has been spumed as unworthy of grave 
and honorable attention.lVti' 
The editor quite correctly recognized the benefits of townsite speculatio 
which brought Chicago from a frontier village to a city in the interval. or 
four yea.rs.109 The fact remained, nevertheless, that Chicago needed the 
agricultural surpluses of the interior to balance its commerce with the 
East and supply the hane market. 
The depression worked great hardships on the canmerce of Chicago, but 
the city's econany did not stagnate during the depression. Population re-
mained fairly steady and trade continued to increase, althotif1 at a reduced 
rate. no In the years from. 18.3.3 to 18.36, there had grown up a number or 
interested eastern investors and a class of westem merchants vitally con-
cerned with the fortunes of Chicago. While many western entrepreneurs suf-
fered financial losses during the depression, they remained in the city to 
wait out the financial storm. At the same time, some large eastem investors, 
notably Arthur Bronson, continued to pour money into the city throughout the 
depression. As in earlier years, Chicago depended on the dedication and 
skill o:t its businessmen and the capital of eastem financiers. 
The depression did not surprise Chicago's capitalists. Arthur Bronson, 
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financial conditions in the East and warned their western agents of the 
approaching storm. As early as June 30, 1836, Arthur Bronson felt that 
Ea.stern financial conditions would eventually precipitate a decline of 
property values in the West. Consequently, Bronson instructed his numerous 
western agents to curtail real estate purchases.111 Charles Butler of the 
American Land Company a.ttanpted to hurry the collection of debts owed to 
the American Land Com.pany.112 In 18.36, l!;dward H.ussell., who had invested in 
Chicago through the agency of Gurdon Hubbard, also limited further invest-
ments and sold a considerable portion of his property before the financial 
depression hit the country.113 Despite warnings fran ea.stern financiers, the 
Chicago business community and especially the real estate promoters were hard 
hit by the depression. In 18.38., a Chicago resident canmented that 11there is 
no telling who are good • • • • The Kinzie's a.re good I should suppose •• 
But it is dangerous to trust anybody now •• ;i.L+ In 1841, William Ogden found 
only gloom among Chicago's land speculators: 
As regards Chicago, everything has changed mightily since you le.f't, 
property has depreciated monstrously, it often happens that property 
which sold for hundreds or even thousands is not now worth even $10. 
Those too who were richest when you left are of the poorest now. 
Jamison, Pearson, G. s. Hubbard, James Kinzie., Kimball and Porter, 
Clybourne, and a host of others for instance & very_few of the old 
stock of 30 are otherwise than deeply embarrassed.ll5 
• • 
Perusing the records and correspondence of William B. Ogden, however, it 
was obvious that land speculators and merchants continued business during the 
depression. Ogden, for example maintained his status as agnet of the American 
Land Canpany in selling property and occasionally supervising real estate 
improvements. At the same time, he handled the town lot investments of 
Various other easteni and westeni capitalists.116 By 1837, Ogden centered his 
real estate interests and those of his customers on the north side of the 
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Chicago River, and consequently he did everything in his power to draw capital 
for improvements to that area. Ogden intended that the north side of the 
Chicago River should become the principal business district of the city. For 
a number of years, he canpeted with capitalists and merchants in other sections 
of the city spurring the general improvement of Chicago.117 In 1839, Ogden 
agreed to build stores and houses for a minimal commission if his eastem 
118 investors supplied the capital. At other t:imes, he employed eastern capital 
in the building of warehouses and fiour mills to accoomodate the increasing 
agricultural produce shiped to Chicago.119 
During the depression, William Ogden played an unparalleled role in 
Chicago's developnent. While other land speculators who resided in the West 
suffered financial failures, Ogden was able to weather the depression and in-
crease his own financial standing. Besides land speculation, Ogden was in-
volved in many other business ventures. While he lost money in certain areas'f 1 
Ogden 1 s innumerable econanic investments enabled h:im to lead Chicago's business 
community during the depression. In 1839, Ogden indicated the diversity of 
his economic interests which aided his financial position fran 1837 to 1842: 
Besides my land, lot, & city matters in Chicago, building renting, 
:improving, & c. I still carry on my Brewery, am concerned with 
Henry Smith in a large canal contract of near $200,000 in amt. & 
have taken into my care since my return more than 50,000 acres of 
land belonging to others, the titles of which in many cases have 121 to be examined, taxes to be paid, examinations to be made & c & c. 
Ogden's land agency was a viable concem even as late as 1839. Various 
eastern capitalists sent money to Ogden which was then loaned to settlers for 
land purchases.122 During the depression years, moreover, many capitalists 
were able to continue their land speculations through Ogden's agency. Be-
ginning in 1837, the Chicago newspapers carried notices of city lots and falm 
lands, which were delinquent in ta.xes.123 If these tax.es rooiained tmpaid, the 
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-;tate and city governments sold the property for the meager price of ~he back 
taxes. The original investor usually had from two to three years to redeem 
his land by paying the back taxes.124 Because of the seriousness of the 
depression, thougti, speculators, like Arthur Bronson and \'/illiam Ogden, figured 
that such lands would never be redeemed and thus purchased land at tax sales.iz 
Because of Ogden's excellent financial standing and his access to eastem 
capital, he was the principal ~ent of many city improvements. In late 1839, 
he organized a campaign to build a bridge across the Chicago River giving 
greater access to the property of his mvestors on the north side of the 
Chica.go River.126 Knowing that Chicago lacked the capital to finance the 
bridge, Ogden wrote to Arthur Bronson in New York hoping to interest him in 
the project: 
The facilities for crossing our River, however, must be great]Jr 
increased or business property on the north side will yet suffer 
great depression. We are now making another effort for a Bridge, 
but we shall find great difficulty in funds to build it even if 
we get the vote of the Council to do so, neither the city nor 
individuals have much money here.l'Z/ 
12$ Bronson agreed to aid in the financing of the bridge. Moreover, Ogden 
succeeded in obtaining backing f ran several of his clients holding property on 
the north side of the Chicago Hiver.129 Ogden himself contributed $10001 and 
he also interested other Chic.a.go merchants in the bridge. DO 
One of Ogden's more important tasks during the depression waa in 
negotiating loans for Chicago's merchants and professional people. Beginning 
:in 183S, he received a fiood of loan applications from Chicago merchants.131 
Ogden himself did not possess the necessary reserve capital to loan money, but 
Arthur Bronson in New York was quite willing to loan money at an appropriate 
rate of interest. Bronson oroinarily required land as security, and it was 
'.iilliam Ogden ts duty to judge the financial responsibility of the loan applicant 
--
and the quality of the land offered as security. In 1838, for example, John 
Caton, a Chicago lawyer, applied to Ogden for a $1000 loan to improve his 
property. Ogden sent the request to Arthur Bronson with the following judg-
ment of Caton: 
Chiefly, Mr. Caton is doing a very good law business and is I 
think responsible, of good habits and character but like the pro-
fession generally not always exact in meeting engagements. Still 
I believe he would meet this & interest probably punctually.132 
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Bronson loaned money to a great number of Chicago merchants. In the late 
1830's Archibald Clybourne borrowed considerable capital to pay the debts 
arising from his meat-packing business.133 In 18401 Walter Newberry used 
capital obtained fran Bronson to erect buildings on the north side of the 
Chicago River.134 Larger amounts of capital were disbursed by Bronson to 
many of his former land speculation partners. In 1838, John Kinzie, who had 
started his career as a land speculator, operated one of Chicago's leading 
forwarding and commission houses. The decline of property values, however, 
found K:inzie in considerable financial difficulty, and he twice turned to 
Arthur Bronson for loans totaling nearly $101 000 based on the security of his 
property. Interest on the loans was 12 per cent yearly.135 By 1841, Kinzie 
was dissatisfied with what he termed Bronson's high-handed business tactics 
and usurious rates of interest.136 The fact remained, however, that Kinzie 
would probably have suffered financial collapse without Bronson's help when 
it was most needed. 
Gurdon Hubbard faced difficulties similar to those of John Kinzie. 
Hubbard also operated a forwarding and commission house as well as a general. 
land agency. In 1837 and 1838, he ignored the deepening financial crisis and 
bought more land and started improvements by borrowing capital. through 
Arthur Bronson. By late 1838, Hubbard was indebted to Bronson for $10,000, 
---
but he insisted that Chicago and its business community (Hubbard, of course, 
included himself) were solvent and good for all outstanding debts.137 The 
bright financial picture painted by Hubbard did not exactly correspond with 
the jud@llents of his contemporaries. In 1839, a Chicago investor warned one 
of ht.a eastern connections that Hubbard was in New York, but 11 I should think 
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it very doubtful whether he will be able to weather the stonn. Do not in-
volve yourself further with him •••• ,,13S Ogden al.so felt that Hubbard was 
facing ruin, and by 1840 Hubbard himself doubted whether he could escape the 
financial morass of the depression.140 
In 1839, Hubbard was desperate because Arthur Bronson demanded payment 
for his loans. To satisfy his debts, Hubbard was forced to sell part of his 
warehouse in Chicago.141 Bronson was then informed by his agent, William 
Ogden, that further collections from Hubbard would cripple all his commercial 
activities. Neither Bronson nor Ogden wished to force financial ruin on 
Hubbard because his warehouses and forwarding and commission business were 
essential. commercial establishments on the north side of the Chicago River.142 
While Hubbard and Kinzie and ma.ny others like them experienced difficult times 
during the depression, both emerged during the decade of the 1S40's to become 
premier businessmen of the city; part of this growth certainly was due to the 
capital and good offices of Arthur Bronson. 
The connections with eastern capital were increasingly more important 
during the lengthening yea.rs of the depression. As financial contractions 
first spread over the East coast in 1837, eastern wholesalers who supplied 
goods to western merchants began investigating the credit position of their 
western custaners. The system was crude and disorganized. Many agents of 
New York business fizms visited the city of Chicago and inquired at bars, 
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hotels, and among the general populace about the stability of various 
merchants. Because of this system, many Chicago merchants found their credit 
in the East l:imited.143 As banks closed both East and West, Chicago merchants 
depended even more heavily on the capital and services of men like Arthur 
Bronson. But Bronson was not alone in this effort. George Smith who had 
0rigina1Jy come fran Scotland as a representative of the Illinois Investment 
Company, an organization designed for land speculation, stayed to invest in 
aJ..1 segments of the town's economy. As banks closed in the West, Smith 
realized that the frontier which most needed a means of exchange to conduct 
business was handicapped. In 1839, therefore, Smith established his own 
banking house, George Smith and Canpany, issuing bills of exchange which 
served as a circulating medium for the debt-ridden camnunity of Chicago.144 
Two of his fonner partners, Patrick Strachan and William Scott, then went to 
New York where they established a brokerage firm which aided the exchange ot 
money between Chicago and the Ea.st.145 Smith provided any number of additional 
services. He was a regualr investor in Chicago improvements especia.J.ly in 
steamboats plying the Great Lakes. Furthermore, farmers and merchants who 
needed assistance in marketing their surpluses received advances from George 
Smith and Canpa.ny.146 As in previous cases, George Smith represented foreign 
capital which helped to bolster Chicago's econanic picture. Alice Smith in 
her study of George Smith viewed his contributions to Chicago during the 
depression in the following light: 
In the struggle of the panic-ridden city to establish a finn 
rooting, George Smith and his money plqed no insignificant 
part. Capital and credit such as he had to offer were needed 
as never before to get agriculture, transportation, and industry 
in motion.147 
With the leadership of western entrepreneurs and the capital of eastern 
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1g36, William Ogden had organized a steamboat line to run between Chicago and 
Michigan City, Indiana. The project was finally underw83' in 1838 because of 
the investments of numerous eastern and western businessmen.148 In 1840, 
ogden obtained a government mail contract to help finance the line.149 
Despite this, several of the stockholders of the Chicago and Michiean City 
steamboat Campany went bankrupt leaving Ogden responsible for the debts ot 
the firm. Ogden then sold a part interest of the canpany to Buffalo merchants 
who were able to maintain the line.150 The canraercial picture looked even 
brighter in 1839 when Chicago and Buffalo merchants established the first 
regular line of steamboats on Lake Michigan.151 Despite the depression, there 
fore, Chicago was slowly recognized as the chief port on Lake Michigan. 
Chicago was far ahead of its rivals along the western shore of Lake Hichigan 
and even was accused of holding a monopoly over the lake shipping by ports on 
the eastern shore.152 
Chicago merchants and capitalists also showed groat interest in railroad 
projects. In 18.36, the Galena and Chicago Union Railw83' Company was chartered, 
but as of 1839 the project had still not advanced beyond the plarming 
stages.153 Chicago newspapers therefore launched a campaign to revive the 
company. The principle impetus was a fear of their rival city to the north, 
Milwaukee. Chicagoans feared that the proposed Mila.ukee and Rock Hiver Canal 
would draw the agricultural surpluses of :northern Illinois southern Wisconsin 
to Hilwaukee instead of Chicago. In 1841, the Chica;so Daily American prodded 
Chicago merchants with the following observation: 
Thus it will be seen, our Milwaukee brethren are moving ahead for 
the Rock River Trade, which now canes to Chicago. \·till not our 
citizens open their eyes to the importance o! constructing a Rail 
Hoad immediately - or will they wait till the growing trade of that 
vast and fertile region is directed to ',.1isconsin Territory?l54 
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Arthur Bronson and various Chicago property holders supported the railro 
project, but the lack or capital caused by the depression prevented real 
progress until the late 1840's.155 Yet even during the depression, Chicago 
continued to talk of and attempt various internal inprovements to ;ldvance 
Chicago's commercial position. 
Of all the internal improvement projects, the Illinois and Michigan Canal 
was the most important. Construction on the canal continued throughout the 
depression until the state of Illi"lois failed in lSU. But during the most 
difficult years of the depression, the Dlinois and Michigan Canal was a a,mbol 
of hope for Chicago merchants and kept the .future of Chicago before the eyes 
of eastern capitalists. In 1839, the state had obtained loans from ea.stern 
156 capitalists to continue work on the canal. Cana1 construction provided 
jobs for la.borers and the general artisan. Furthermore, nerchants :.n Chicago 
were given contra~ta for canal materials which sustained their genera.J.ly de-
clining trade. William B. Oi;den was one of the largest canal contractors and 
was of the opinion if 1839 that 
It our state loans a.re effected, the rapid progress and hea~J 
disbursements upon the canal for 2 or .3 years to come will sus-
tain us and we shall increase with a l~~e growing and thrifty 
business until the canal is canpleted. 
Contracts for the canal were often satisfied with canal scrip, a 
circulating medium which aided the normal commerciaJ. transactions of Chicago. 
In M83', 193 9, the Da.i],y Chica.go American indicated the importance of canal 
money to the city: 
This amount can be circulated to good advantage around the city-
in the pa_yment of debts and necessary purchases; and the greater 
portion of it will, no doubt, be expended among us. Our business 
men should take it, if' for no other reason, than the important one 
of susta.irdng the canal-. and consequently preserving and extending 
the trade of. the city.1,s 
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Along with other citizens of Chicago, 1dlliam Ogden attributed Chicago's 
\'18athering of the depression to the canal.159 Begiru1ing in 1839, however, the 
state showed increasing signs of indebtedness and an inability to continue 
canal construction. l'ihile the Chicago newspapers urged the state to cutback 
all internal improvement projects, the Illinois and 1-lichigan Canal was defend 
as the most vital need of the entire sta.te.160 l'iben it seemed evident that 
the state legislature was about to halt canal construction, William Ogden and 
other Chicagoans lobbied in Springfield, but to no avail.161 In March, 1S4l, 
work on the Illinois and Michigan Canal was finally terminated. During the 
most difficult years of the depression, however, the building of the canal 
had bolstered Chicago's economy. Bessie L. Pierce in her study of Chicago 
thought that 
Canal construction of the period 1837-1S41 was the saving factor 
in an otherwise hopeless situation supplying Chicago with a means 
of life, until the appearance of an agricultural su:rnlus offered 
the first secure foundation for urban developnent.lo2 
For a short time s.f'ter work on the canal was stopped, Chicago was thrown 
into a panic. How were the merchants to survive? rlhere would laborers and 
artisans find employment? But the picture was not that bleak, for other 
sectors of Chicago's economy indicated that the depression was drawing to a 
close by late 1841. In tact, as early as 1839 Chicago appeared to recover 
momentarily as large supplies of goods arrived from the East and new retail 
stores were established.163 Probably the most significant indication of 
Chicago's future was the statement of the Chica.go Daily American in June, 1839, 
proclaiming that 1fide (Chicago) are now becaning a producing and exporting 
country. ul-64 This, of course, was the key to Chicago's growth. Ra.ilroads, 
steamboats, the Illinois and Michigan Canal were all projects kept alive by 
eastern capital a.nd westem businessmen with the hope of converting Chicago 
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into the chief export center of the West. In 18.'.39,, Chicagoans were premature 
in believing that the depression was at an end,, but there was no mistaking 
that all preceding developnents marked Chicago as a major export center. In 
the midst of the depression, the Secretary of War,, after perusing the reports 
of the Topographical Bureau who were at work on harbor construction along the 
western shore of Lake Michigan,, seemed to confirm what Chicago's merchants and 
capitalists had long been struggling for: 
The canmercial interests of all the states that border upon the 
lakes is intimately connected with Chicago aa a place of trans-
shipnent and deposits (sic): and the agricultural prospects of 
Illinois,, Indiana,, Iowa,, and Missouri, are to become greatly 
dependent upon facilities for business upon a large scale at 165 some point on the southwest part of the shore of Lake Michigan. 
In late 1$41,, despite the halt or canal work,, Chicago seemed to be 
emerging from the depression. The newspapers were now more cognizant of the 
city's needs. Land speculation was frowned upon as were fanners and merchants 
who came West hoping to make a f'orttme in a day. No longer were the news-
papers filled with exaggerated statements of Chicago's econanic position. The 
Chicago DajJY American,, for example,, cautioned fa.nners and city merchants that 
1The greatest fortunes have been the moat gradually acquired. 11166 There were 
advertisements,, it is true, still praising Chicago's excellent business 
opporttmities and the possibilities for fanning in the interior,, butthere 
was also a new conservatism,, a. sense of proportion about the needs of Chicago 
and what could be accomplished. 
or even greater importance to Chicago's development was the arrival of 
significant amotmts of wheat,, pork,, and other f'ann. products in 18U.167 After 
several years,, Chicago now possessed an agricultural hinterland to supply the 
city and to provide exports to balance its commerce. In 1841, population 
again began to increase a.."ld Chicago was indeed on the road to recovery. By 
1S4l, Chicago was no longer a frontier town. Perhaps the editor of the 
Chicaeo Daily 1\merican expressod the economic transfonnation which Chicago 
-
had undergone: 
It was scarcely but yesterday that we imported nearly eveey 
necessary of life into the northern part of this State. Not 
only did we obtain our dey goods and groceries fran the east, 
but also our flour, our beef and our pork • • • • Grain and 
beef and pork were articles that received little attention at 
the hands of gentlemen speculators. 
Now however, this tide is about to change. Our own products 
and our own vessels are daily leaving port for the east. We 
are no longer a species of colony miserably dependent upon the 
mother countey • • • .169 
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The end of the depression, therefore, really marked the end of Chicago's 
.f'o:m.ative period of economic growth. Fran 1833 to 18421 Chicago had moved 
from a frontier town to a city with a developed and sustained econany. At 
first the dream of capitalists and entrepreneurs both East and West, merchants 
and artisans slowly drifted to Chicago and supported such dreams. The real. 
test occurred during the depression, but eastern capital and western leader-
ship stayed with the city. After 1841, Chicago possessed sane semblance of 
a balanced economy and each year saw trade increase, farm surpluses rise, 
and new camnunication arteries radiate fran Chicago to the interior of 
Illinois. But Chicago was not the only city to develop on Lake Michigan's 
western shore. To the North, Milwaukee, Green Bay, and a host of smaller 
cities all imagined themselves a.s the chief port on Lake Hichigan. Their 
development was remarkab~ similar to that of Chicago helping to clarify the 
general. course of western town growth and partially explain the significance 
of each city. 
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rABI.E 1 -- Land Sal.es at Chicago. In 1835, there were 3,626,536 acres subject 
to entry 2.t the Chicago Land Office. Land Sold to Individuals from 
1835 to 1843.a 
1835 • • • 370,043 acres 1840 • • • 137,382 acres 
1836 202,364 II 1841 138,583 ll • • • • • • 
1837 15,6'!1 H 1842 • 194,556 11 • • • • • 
1838 87,881 rt 1843 • 229,460 <I • • • • • 
1839 • 160,635 II • • 
aJessie B. Thomas, nstatistics Concerning tie City or Chica.go, II in 
Chica_go River and Harbor Conventicn: 0rl£in. Proceedirurn and Statistics, ed. 
by Robert Fergus (Chicago: Fergus Printing Company, 1822.), p. 186. 
T1\Blli 2 - Population GrCJ<1th of Chicago. a 
1829 • • • 30 1837 • • • 4,170 
1830 • • • 40-50 1838 • • • 4,000 
1831 • • • 60 1839 • • • 4,200 
1832 • • • 150 1B40 • • • 4,470 1833 • • • 350 1841 • • • 5,752 
1834 • • • 1,800 1842 • • • 6,248 
1835 • • • 3,265 1843 • • • 7,580 
1836 • • • 3,820 1844 • • • s,ooo 
~,ierce, History of Chicago, I, p. 44. Pierce compiled these statistlcs 
from all available sources including census reports, travel accounts, and 
newspapers. 
TABLE 3 -- Ship Arrivals at the Port of Chica.go. a 
1833 ••• 4 
1834 ••• 176 
1835 • • • 250 
1836 ••• 456 
168 ,,,.--
~--~---------------------------------------------------------. aAt various times the ChicagJ rewspapers tabulated the number of vessels 
arriving at Chicag:> o These statistics were ccmpiled from the following 
issues: Chica.go American, December 15, 1835; and the Chicago American, 
December 10, 1836. 
TABLE 4 - Imports and l!;xports at the Port of Ghicago. a 
Import 
1836 ••• $325,203.90 
1837 ••• $373,677.12 
1838 ••• $579,174.61. 
1839 ••• $630,980.26 
1840 ••• $562,106.a:> 
1841 ••• $564,347.88 
1842 ••• $664,347.88 
1843 ••• $971,849.75 
1844 .••• $1,686,416.oo 
$1,000.64 
$11,,065.00 
~16,04h.75 
$33,843.00 
$228,635. 74 
$384,862.2.4 
$659,305.20 
$682,2.10.85 
$785,504.23 
aJessie B. Thanas, 1tStatistics Conceming the City of Chicago, 11 p. 184. 
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-CHAPTER VI 
Milwaukee: 'lhe Establishment ot A Town, 1833-18.41 
Next to Chicago, Milwaukee was the most important townsite on Lake 
Michigan's westem shore. In the 18;l)1s, Milwaukee was a smaller fur trade 
post than Chicago, but it al.so was controlled by the American Fur Company 
under the supervision of Solomon Juneau. By 1835, Milwaukee became one ot 
the most popular to'Wllsites on Lake Michigan. The pattem of develoµnent was 
similar to that at Chicago. Land speculation was the first occupation of 
f/dlwaukee•s residents. During the first years of Milwaukee's development, 
eastern financiers and their western agents provided the capital and leadership 
in advancing building construction, internal improvements and camnercial. 
growth. By 1842, Milwaukee was no longer a frontier to'Wll, for the intervening 
years had witnessed the development or commercia.J. and retail businesses and a 
surplus-producing agricultura.J. interior.1 
Attention was first directed towards Milwaukee in 1831 when Major Samuel 
c. Stambaugh was appointed commissioner to obtain the cession of Indian lands 
in southeastern Wisconsin. In 18311 the Menominee Indians ceded the land which 
opened the to'Wl'lsite of Milwaukee to purchase by speculators. Exploring the 
country purchased from the Indians, Stambaugh raved about the agricultura.J. 
possibilities of land from Green Bay to Milwaukee. 2 Despite Stambaugh's 
Report, the area of present-day Illinois and Wisconsin was little 1mown until 
after the Blackhawk War in 1832-1833.3 Then news about the fertile farming 
land and possible to'Wllsites was spread over the East coast. Slowly emigrants 
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headed West, but for obvious geographical reasons Milwaukee was slowe.r to 
attract attention than Chicago. The major routes to the liest were overland 
and ran south aJ.ong Lake Eichigan•s southern shore. Turning northward,, the 
Chicago Hoad first extended only to Chicago. l·filwaukee' s more northerly lo-
cation on the lake shore deprived it of this initial emigration. Until the 
middle 18301 s,, a decent road did not exist between Chicago and .l:iilwaukee.4 
Moreover,, steamboats plying Lake Michigan rarely stopped at Milwaukee in the 
early 1830 1s,, but instead joumeyed to Chicago where al.l passengers disembarked 
In 1835, Solomon Juneau was forced to offer the captain of a vessel a town lot 
to dock his boat at Milwaukee. 5 
There were several conditions which led to the popularization of the 
Milwaukee townsite all of which were interrelated. The developnent of roads 
was dependent upon population pressure and the desire of emigrants to move 
north. 'V'Jestem emigrants also moved to locations where fa.rm land and town 
lots were available. Throughout the 1830' s, Indian lands in V-iisconsin were 
purchased by the government, surveyed, and then readied for public sale. 
h~ile the town of Chicago was plotted in 1829 and town lots offered at a gener-
6 
al. sale in 1833, the site of Milwaukee was not legally registered until 1835. 
Thus the beginning of town lot speculation, i..tiich attracted more and more 
eastern capital, began at a later date in Hil:waukee. At the same time, agri-
cultural land surrounding Milwaukee was not opened for public sale until 1839 
forcing early settlers to squat on the public domain hoping that their claims 
would be validated at the public sale in 1839. Thus the progress of the town-
site at Milwaukee and its agricultural interior was noticeably behind similar 
developnents in Chicago. 
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Milwaukee was separated into three sections, each represented by different 
finB.l'lCial interests. Geographically, Milwaukee was divided into an east side 
and a west side by the Milwaukee lliver. To the south, the Milwaukee River 
was joined by the Menan.inee River dividing the townsite into a third section. 7 
Throughout its early history, Milwaukee was a.ff ected by constant feuding among 
the different sections. 
But who were Milwaukee's town pranoters and land speculators who settled 
each of these sections? Morgan L. Mart.in of Green Bay was the first to en-
vision a town on the Milwaukee River. In 1833, Martin had undertaken a tour 
of the territory of Wisconsin searching for fann and townsite speculations. 
Visiting Milwaukee, Martin immediately decided that its location marked it 
8 
as a future lakeport. At this time, Solomon Juneau resided at Milwaukee in 
order to conduct the declining business of the American Fur Canpany. Martin 
explained to him the possibilities of the Milwaukee townsite, but Juneau was 
apparently incapable of visualizing the country three or four years in the 
future. According to Morgan L. Mart.in, 
His (Juneau) first hint of the prospective value of his location 
at Milwaukee came from me,, and he was so incredulous that it was 
sometimes difficult to prevent his sacri9icing his interest to 
the sharks who soon gathered around him. 
Martin, however,, needed Juneau acquiescence to further the pranotion of 
the east side of the I-:ilwaukee Hiver. Having resided at this location for a 
number of years, Juneau was eligible to claim pre-emption rights to the land. 
Hartin there.fore purchased a hal..f of Juneau's claim for $500 agreeing to do 
all that was necessary to secure the pre-emption rlghts and promote the town-
si te. Martin also purchased other claims of early .fur traders thus monopollz:inti 
the land on the east side of the Milwaukee River.10 To hurry the survey of 
the land, Martin wrote to the Surveyor General of the Michigan Territory.11 
-BY 1835, he bad secured all the necessary legal titles. During this period, 
Solomon Juneau remained uninterested in the whole venture pref erring instead 
to carry on the American Fur Company's !altering trade. Juneau never even 
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entered into a written agreement with Morgan L • .Hartin feeling that Martin's 
project, was visionary.12 In 1835, Juneau expressed his half-hearted interest 
in town.site speculation to Morgan L. Martin: 
I told him that what you would do for our common interest would be 
agreeable to me. Hith the reservation of 4 lots for me and 2 lots 
for my brother you can do what pleases you • • • • I have re-
ferred it entirely to you to do a.a you please but I hope you will 
ask a. good price.l.3 
In later years, Solomon Juneau took a more active interest in Milwaukee's 
future handling the majority of business associated with the buying and 
selling of land while l1a.rtin attended to other financial interests at Green 
Bay. Juneau thus became one of Milwaukee's maj.or business and political 
leaders. Yet this role he assumed only because of the skillful prodding and 
business acumen of Horgan L. Martin.14 
Being a westein businessman residing at a frontier outpost such as Green 
Bay, Morgan L. Martin had little access to large capital resources. Townsite 
promotion, however, was an expensive proposition, requiring the buying of 
land, the construction of buildings, and the paving of streets. Where did 
Martin obtain the capital needed for such large expenditures? He was fortu-
nate in contacting ten ea.stein capitalists and one other western entrepreneur 
who supplied the majority of capital for buying land and making improvements. 
Martin and his eastern partners formed a company known as Morgan L. Martin 
and Company :i • • • for that especial purpose that is to say or making improve-
ments at the mouth of the River Milwaukee •••• ,,15 With an initial capital 
outlay of $20.000, Morgan L. Martin was appointed the company's general agent 
for buying~ selling, and mald.M improvements on the land. Under the terms of 
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-the contract, Martin was also commissioned to purchase additional. lands along 
the lake shore provided they were possible townsite locations or possessed 
lUlllber or mineral. deposits. In no case was Martin authorized to purchase fann 
lands since its speculative value was considerably less than townsite invest-
16 
ments. By 1~1 1835, Morgan L. Martin and Solomon Juneau possessed the 
capital resources to inaugurate improvements on the east side of the Milwaukee 
River. 
While Martin was arranging the financial. backing for the East Side, 
another visionary westezn citizen happened upon the r1ilwaukee site. In 1834, 
Byron Kilbourn had received an appointment as a government surveyor of the 
public lands bringing him to the Wisconsin co'lllltry. Kilbourn was originally 
from Connecticut, but then moved to Ohio with his family. He began his career 
as an engineer on the Ohio canal system in the 18201 s, experience which proved 
a great asset in his later years at Milwaukee. In 1834, Kilbouzn selected 
Milwaukee's west side tor townsite speculation because it would give him 
l"' 
access to the region's agricultural. interior. ' 
Like Morgan L. Martin, Byron Kilbourn did not possess the capital 
resources to engage in townsite speculation. In the person of Micajah T. 
Williams, though, Byron Kilboum al.so had the backing of an eastem capitalist. 
Williams was from Cincinnati, Ohio, where his career exemplified that of a 
westem entrepreneur. He was well-acquainted with the needs of frontier towns 
having served as commissioner to study the feasibility of a canal system for 
Ohio in 1821. In 1823, he was a canal commissioner in Ohio where he conducted 
surveys, supervised construction, and solicited eastem capital for financing 
the canals. By the 18.30 1s 1 Williams was an affluent businessman with finan-
cial. connections in eastern circles and political. influence in Ohio and in 
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Washington. In 1831, he was appointed Surveyor General. of the Michigan 
18 Territory. Then in the early 1830's, he fonned an association with several 
eastern financiers and land speculators including Arthur Bronson and Charles 
Butler. i11th the capital of these eastern f:inanciers and the leadership of 
Williams, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company was organized to conduct 
a general banking business and to invest :in ram lands. Micajah T. Williams 
was the company's first president.19 With his knowledge of internal improve-
ments, western banking, and national politics, Williams became one of Milwaukee'~ 
most important townsite pra::ioters. Although i:illiams invested in townsites 
20 throughout the western states, Milwaukee was his principal interest. At 
one point, Williams delineated what he believed were the ingredients of a 
prosperous city: 
The growth and prosperity of cities comes from several sources. 
Location suited to commerce - a surrounding country well adapted 
to agriculture, and invit:ing to those who may desire new hanes; 
and, last, but by no means the least, men of high character, 
ability, industry and a deep interest in the general welfare 
among the populations.21 
Having decided on the feasibility of townsite speculation at Milwaukee, 
Kilbourn contacted Micajah T. Williams of Cincinnati, under whom he had 
worked on the Ohio canals, about a partnership in the prcmotion of the town-
site. In Mey, 1835, Kilbourn and Williams agreed that each would contribute an 
initial $8000 for the purchase of the land on Milwaukee's west side and share 
2" the cost of improvements. G Thus Milwaukee now had two sections, each with 
its own promoters and each hoping to be the town's principal business dis-
trict. In these early years the West Side came to be known as Kilboumtown 
and the East Side as Juneautown. 
To the south or Juneau town and Kilboumtown was an area called Halker• s 
Point. It was first settled by George H. vJalker and several friends all of 
wtiom were canparatively young men seeking a suitable occupation. l:ialker was 
involved in the Indian trade in northern Illinois before moving to Milwaukee 
in 1834 where, along with his friends, he established a claim to the land in 
Hilwaukee•s southern section. 23 Walker's Point never really threatened to 
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become Milwaukee's major business area because Walker had few initial connec-
tions with eastern financiers. Walker's Point, nevertheless, provided bother-
some competition to the other promoters. 
For several years, Milwaukee's speculators only had claims to the land 
since the government did not conduct a public sale of the Milwaukee lands 
until July and August of 1835. At the government land sale in Green Bay in 
1835 each of the promoters secured legal title to their claims. 24 Before the 
sale, Byron Kilbourn discovered that his original investment was not suffi-
cient to purchase the necessary lands. Thus he requested Micajah Williams to 
obtain loans from several Ohio banks. 25 Kilbourn also drew additional eastern 
capitalists into the Milwaukee project, one of whan was Charles Butler. 26 
By late 1835, Milwaukee's speculators had secured title to the land and then 
proceeded to improve and sell the property. 
The maneuvers of Morgan L. Martin, Solomon Juneau, and Byron Kilbourn in 
securing clains to Milwaukee lands and in arranging the plotting of town lots 
brought the townsite to the attention of western entrepreneurs and eastern 
capitalists. In 18.35, the Green Bay Intelligencer canmented that 
There is already a town laid out at the mouth of the Milwa.uky (sic), 
where they are selling quarter-acre lots at $500 and $600. This 
Fall there will be one hundred buildings up. Pifty people are 
living there, and a gentleman supports a school at his own expense 
• • • • Land speculators are circumambulating the country and 
Milwaukee is all the rage.Zl 
As news of the }Iilwaukee townsite spread across the country, a host ot 
smaller speculators descended upon the town. Some represented their own 
interests while others invested the money of eastern speculators. One 
contemporary described the mania for ~1ilwaukee lots in the following manner: 
Many of the most careful businessmen in the East came here so 
anxious to invest their money that they often bought thousands of 
dollar's worth of land unseen before sleeping~Awith full assurance 
that it would double in value before moming.;;a:s 
The original proprietors of the Milwaukee townsite sold town lots to a 
variety of speculators who improved the lots and then sold to another specu-
).a.tor. This constant exchange of property gave the impression of great 
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prosperity at Milwaukee. But who were some of these speculators? John Haight 
left his home in Vennont in 1835, and arriving at Milwaukee he observed that 
"Milwaukee is a place of considerable importance and bids fair to be in a 
short time as large a town as Chica.go. 1129 Haight and his father invested 
their own capital and that of several eastemers including Daniel Webster, 
Caleb Cushing, and Thomas H. Perkins in farm land and Milwaukee town lots.JO 
Another of Milwaukee 1 s sma.ller speculators was Joshua Hathawa;y who came to 
Milwaukee fran New York State. He acted as agent for several New York finan-
ciers in the purchase of Milwaukee lots and fann lands.31 Later Hathawa;v 
. 32 
established his own agency for buying lands in Wisconsin territory. Arthur 
Bronson also invested at Vdlwaukee through one of his Wisconsin agents from 
Green B2'Y, Albert G. Ellis.33 
But land speculation was not alone the province of eastem capitalists 
and their western agents. Emigrants to Milwaukee and its surrounding hinter-
land usually invested their small capital resources in one or two lots and 
often bought land for relatives in the East. William Gardner, for example, 
came to Milwaukee in 1837 to practice law, but he also handled the investments 
of friends and relatives.34 All of Milwaukee's first citizens whether they 
were doctors, lawyers, or artisans invested in town lots if at all possible. 
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----------------------------------------------------------------. one I:ilwaukee resident claimed that the chief business of the to\\'11 was land 
speculation. He refused to purchase farm land because• 
I can s~ to you with the utmost confidence that I have no doubt 
but what I can clear you 100 per cent every year at the least 
calculation. 'l'his government land speculation is the surest, 35 but there is not so much to be made as there is in town property. 
Small speculators bought and sold Milwaukee town lots for quick cash 
returns, and they rarely improved the property to any significant degree. 
Yet this was not true of the town's principal promoters. Solomon Juneau and 
Horgan L. Martin, for e.Y_ample, spent nearly $1001000 on their Milwaukee 
property in building stores and houses and in grading streets. Furthermore, 
they built a hotel, and in 1836 paid a local contractor $5,000 to erect a 
court house.36 Juneau engaged bricklayers, carpenters, and general artisans 
to handle the construction of buildings.37 Later both Juneau and Martin 
exerted political pressure en territorial representatives in Hashington tc 
obtain the site of the post office, land office, and county offices in their 
section of rfilwaukee.38 All these efforts enabled than to attract more 
buyers for town lots; the profits from sales then being reinvested in addi-
tional improvements for the East Side. 
Byron Kilbourn and Micajah T. Williams developed their section in much 
the same manner as Juneau and Martin. Beginning in September, 1835, Kilboum 
exerted all his energies toward selling town lots to obtain capital for im-
provements. To sell Milwaukee town lots more quickly, Kilbourn went to 
Chica.go because of its greater population.39 ~'hile in Chicago, he sold 
Archibald Clybourne, a Chicago merchant, one-sixteenth of the entire Milwaukee 
plot for $5,000. Because Cl.ybourne was a prosperous merchant, Kilboum 
figured that he could direct capitalists and merchants to Milwaukee.40 At 
Chicago, Kilbourn was anxious to sell as many lots as possible in order to 
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give the impression that Kilbourntown would eventually be the central. business 
section. Purchasers of town lots, however, were usually required to construct 
buildings or to survey streets.41 Sal.es of town lots were brisk throughout 
1S35 and 1836. Reporting to his partner, Hicajah T. Williams, Kilbourn ex-
plained that HI have made some sales at from two to three hundred per-cent 
above f onner prices, and in a few cases four hundred per cent. 1142 
But Kilbourn did not hoard his initial. profits from lot sal.es. In 1837, 
he claimed that all his profits had been used in erecting buildings and 
paving streets. The construction of buildings al.one, Kilbourn explained, had 
cost nearly $13,000.43 Moreover, Kilbourn constantly urged Williams to expend 
capital. in Milwaukee. Stores and warehouses are our most inunediate need, 
Kilbourn explained, and they can be rented at a fair profit.44 Kilbourn and 
Williams, of course., were interested in eventually deriving huge profits from 
their Milwaukee investment., but in the first years their major concern was to 
make certain that the West Side would be the town's principal business area. 
Explaining the abnonnal.ly large expenditures for improvements to Williams., 
Kilbourn explained that 11 • • • it was important in the highest degree that 
the proprietors should do something in the way of improvement and business., 
by way of gaining an impulse, and to counterbalance in some degree the 
efforts on the other side made by the proprietors there.'~5 
At Wal.ker•s Point, the same process of townsite improvement occurred but 
on a substantially reduced scale. George Walker did not have the capital 
resources to launch major improvement projects. Moreover, v~alker• s Point 
was innundated by small capitalists who had little interest in expending large 
sums on further lot improvement. In 1836, James Doty from Green B~ bought 
heavily in land at Wal.ker•s Point in conjunction with eastern financiers, but 
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-he continually advised selling this i8-l1.d for more favorable townsitcs elsewhere 
on the lake. 46 Similarly John H. Tweedy settled at ~;alker' s Point and invested 
the funds of many eastern friends. tweedy soon discovered that Walker's Point 
was handicapped because of the large tiumber of small property owners who 
refused to agree on any specific imprOvements. In desperation, Tweedy in-
structed one of his clients that 
I hope sir you will came in person and put up a store on WaJ.ker's 
Point. I advise you and Beres i£ you wish your purchases to turn 
out well to be here on the spot .and put your own shoulders to the 
wheel. More than half depends 0 tl the personal exertion of the 
proprietors.47 
At various times, Walker's Point seemed to threaten the interests of 
Itilwaukee's more prosperous east and ~est sides. In 1836, for example, 
Solomon Juneau .feared that Walker's point capitalists were lobbying in 
Washington to obtain the transfer of ~he post office to their section of 
town.48 As the years passed, Walker's Point declined as a viable contender 
for the town• s business section. The contest then centered between the East 
Side controlled by Juneau and Martin .and the \·Jest Side of Kilbourn and 
Williams. For nearly a decade, these two sections competed for land sales, 
merchants, and retail businesses. By- spurring the pace of improvements, this 
canpetition was healthy for all of Mi).waukee. At other times, the competition 
was a definite hindrance to the town as each section deliberately slowed the 
progress of its neighbor. Kilbourn, for exanple, located on the west side 
of the 1'1dlwaukee River had acceso to the interior, and it was his intention 
to monopolize the agricultural surpluses. Junoautown had greater access to 
Lake Hichigan and hoped to monopolize trade and commerce. In the original 
political organization of Milwaukee, there were actually two towns. In 1837, 
Solomon Juneau was Hayor of the East Side wmle Kilbourn held the same posi-
~tion on the West Side.49 The quarrel- at times defied all. logical anal7sis for 
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in order to prosper both sections needed access to Lake Michigan shipping and 
the agricultural interioro 
The rivalry between the sections was enlivened in July, 1836, when the 
;1,ilwaukee Advertiser was established. The paper was drawn to the 1- est Side 
by Byron Kilbourn and served as a propaganda organ specializing in slighting 
the interests of Juneau and Ma.rt.in .. 50 Not to be outdone, 3olomon Juneau and 
>Iorgan L .. Martin partially financed the Milwaukee Sentinel which was first 
issued in Jtllle, 1837e51 At times the quarrel between the two settlements 
reached ridiculous proportions. In 1836-1837, Byron Kilbourn constructed a 
bridge across the Hencminee River to the south to divert traffic from Chicago 
to the -,~est Side of the Milwaukee Rivero52 Yet Kilbourn refused to cooperate 
in building a drawbridge linking the East and West Sides fearing the advan-
tage for Jtllleautown. Writing to Williams in 1837, Kilbourn indicated his 
hootility to such a bridge; 
a • q And as to a bridge over the river, I consider it out of 
the question; but if they should succeed contrary to all expec-
tations in erecting it, I wi 11 take good care that they shall 
have no use of it ••• 53 
Kilbourn planned to purchase two small steamboats which he would pass 
under the drawbridge so frequently that it could never be closed. 54 In the 
1830's, Micajah Williams also opposed any bridge connection with the East 
Side. In 1840, he threatened legal action on the grounds that a bridge would 
prevent the free navigation or the Milwaukee River. 55 Yet by 1840 Kilbourn 
had retracted his earlier views and no longer blocked the construction of 
bridges between the sections despite the objections of itiilliams~ 56 
While competition between the sections continued, ~3olomon Jtllleau and 
Byron Kilbourn inaugurated canmercial improvements of their respective town-
sites. In 1837, Jtllleau organized a stock canpany for building a steamboat 
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to run between Milwaukee and Buffalo. The largest shares were held by ¥.artin 
and Juneau, but the project collapsed during the depression.57 In 1837, 
Byron Kilboum built the steamboat, Badger, to ferry people from Lake Michigan 
to the West Side. 58 Accoroing to a resolution of the heat 3ide Council 
Kilbourn' s steamboat was to serve only the :iest Side: 
But not in any case to touch on the east side of the river, nor 
to take load or passenger on f ran the East Side in her upward or 
downward trips ~t any time, or under any circumstances, during 
the year 1839.5"1 
Despite the rivalry between the sections, Milwaukee attracted more and 
more emigrants fran urban areas in the East. The largest group of people 
were from small towns in New York and New Engl.and. 60 Their migration to 
Milwaukee depended to a certain extent on the advertisement of Milwaukee 
through newspapers and travel books. In 1834, Peck's Gazetteer admitted that 
Milwaukee was very sparsely settled but claimed that " • • • a beautiful town 
site is said to exist, American families are settling it, and it is expected 
61 to become soon a place of considerable business. " .Because newspapers 
reached such a wide audience, they were more effective in popularizing the 
Milwaukee townsite. The Green Bat Intelligencer first recognized the townsite 
at Hilwaukee in 1835 and mentioned its possibilities as a commercial center.62 
The establishnent of Milwaukee's two newspapers, the ?Iilwaukee Advertiser and 
the Milwaukee Sentinel, gave the town pranoters means through which Milwaukee's 
advantages for fanning and urban emigrants could be explained.63 Articles 
increasingly appeared in eastern papers a.bout Hilwaukee in 18.37 and 18.38. 
Typical of these articles was the statement of the New York Canmercial 
Advertiser in February, 1837: 
The main point in Wisconsin upon the lake, I have no hesitation 
in saying, is this place. It is now not two years old, and yet 
it presents quite the appearance, in the number of its stores, 
warehouses, and mechanics shops, and in its population and trade, 
of an eastern lake port sane fifteen years standing.64 
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Personal correspondence also pl~ed a major role in drawing mechanics and 
and professional people to Milwaukee. Increase A. Lapham, for example, came 
to Milwaukee at the request of Byron Kilboum to serve as his assistant in 
handling land transactions. Lapham had previously worked under Kilbourn when 
he was an engineer on the Ohio canal system.65 John Tweedy, who came to 
vialker's Point in 1836, attracted many of his young friends fran Connecticut 
to the new town. 66 There were al.WS\YS jobs for the emigrants on the various 
construction projects. Labor was so scarce that Juneau was forced to recruit 
carpenters ani masons with promises of high wages and perhaps an interest in 
one or two town lots. 67 
The transition of eastern emigrants into town life at Milwaukee was 
facilitated by the speculator's efforts in building stores and warehouses, in 
paving streets, and in providing job opportunities. Moreover, Milwaukee's 
town promoters played a conspicious role in aiding the settlement of the 
interior. One of the major reasons for Milwaukee's slower development com-
pared to Chicago was that the public lands immediately adjacent to Milwaukee 
were not opened for public sale until 1839.68 Although many farmers squatted 
on the public lands and established claims, they alw~s feared that their 
claims would not be validated at the public sale. Realizing that Milwaukee's 
developnent depended on the settlement of the interior, Kilbourn and Juneau 
assisted the farm population before the public sale. In 183?, Byron Kilbourn 
was the principal organizer of the Milwaukee County Agricultural Society for 
inf o:rming new emigrants about the most fertile land and the most appropriate 
products for cultivation. Kilbourn served as the society's first president 
with Solomon Juneau as vice-president.69 Backed by the capital of Kilbourn 
and Juneau, the society issued an agricultural Journal and took steps toward 
establishing experimental. rarms.70 
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The farmers of the Hilwaukee area. also organized the Milwaukee Claimants 
Union. The Union registered the claims of farmers in the Milwaukee region in 
order to prevent confJ.icting claims and land speculation. 71 Milwaukee's town 
promoters supported the Claimants Union wishing to see the interior• s orderly 
settlement. 72 When the government finally held a public land sale in 1839, 
the farmers and settlers secured their claims without competition from land 
speculators. The Claimants Union regulated the sale so that its members ob-
ta:ined their clairJS at the minimum government price. A few speculators tried 
to bid up the land's price, but '",hey were forcefully ejected from the sale. 7J 
Both Hilwaukee newspapers agreed that the settlers received their ,just 
claims.74 Horeover, the Hilwaukee land sale occurred during the height of 
the depression. Many of the farmers were without sufficient capital to pur-
chase their claims even at the government price, but they were able to borrow 
money, admittedly at high rates o.f interest, from town promoters. Because 
town prcxnoters and speculators were often the only source of capital for 
fanncrs, they were needed and welcomed by the agricultural population sur-
rounding Hilwaukee in 1839. 75 
Unlike Chicago, Hilwaukee was hit by the depression just as the promoters 
enbarked on a major scheme of town improvements in 1837. Milwaukee, however, 
did not stagnate during the depression because population and trade continued 
to increaso, although at a slower rate than preceding years. Capitalists and 
speculators were naturally affected by the depression. In :,!a.y, 1837, Kilboum 
calculated that he was owed $37,000 fran lots purchased during the speculative 
period. 76 Kilbourn realized that these outstanding debts would probably 
196 
never be satisfied, yet he assured Micajah T. Williams that 11 1 ••• shall do 
all in my power for our best interests, but at present I can affect but little; 
I cannot change the times, but wait their results with hope for the future. ir"fl 
Kilbourn, though, prevented Williams fran disposing of his Milwaukee property 
advising him that commarce and agriculture would eventually return to nonnal.7 
Increase Lapham, Kilbourn•s assistant, expressed the same attitude toward 
Milwaukee during the depression: 
We begin to feel the pressure of the times here in the woods, 
money is scarce, provisions scarce and dear, very little doing 
in the way of making improvements, in fact Milwaukee begins to 
be a dull place and will now jog along at the rate of other 
towns. There is no doubt however that it is a valuable loca-
tion and will sustain itself through these hard times. It is 
the natural port of entry for a large portion o:f Wisconsin, em-
bracing some of her most valuable lands.79 
Despite the hardships which the depression caused, 1".il:waukee1s promoters 
and many of their eastern backers contributed to the establishment of retail 
businesses and intemal improvement projects. Sol0t1on Juneau, who directed 
the expenditure of capital on the ::ast Side, was in considerable financial 
difficulty, but he turned to Morgan L. Hartin for capital to sustain his 
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operation. Kilbourn also tried to conduct business in a no:rmal pattern. 
He operated a general land agency handling investm~..nts all over the territory. 
At great personal risk, Kilbourn also supported various merchants in establish 
ing or maintaining businesses. Describing his financial operations at 
Eilwaukee, Kilbourn indicated his :importance to the town's business section: 
In my operations here, with an eye out to the improvement of the 
place, and relying on payment being made to meet my engagements, 
I incurred some liabilities contrary to all my fixed rules of 
business - For instance in order to aid (Leland) in canpleting 
his tavern, which is a large and expensive house, and to aid him 
in furnishing supplies when he wanted a backer, I became respon-
sible with him for about $3500 - To aid (Hinman) in erecting a 
house, I endorsed for him at the Green Bay bank to the amt. of 
$3s~OO - To get into operacion th3 ste;;un boat to keep up our inter-
d which OU 
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$2, 500 remains tmpaid • • • 82 • 
Because of such large expenditures, Kilbourn soon found himself in 
financial difficulty. Through his partner, Micajah W:iJliams, and his eastern 
banking connections, Kilbourn was able to borrow $10,000 to continue his 
projects at Nilwaukee.83 Williams al.so donated several town lots for signifi-
cant cultural. improvements. In 18421 for example, he provided a town lot :for 
the building of a scientific l.yceum.84 
During the depression, foreign capital played a significant role in 
Milwaukee's banking establishments. In 1836, the Wisconsin territorial. legis-
lature had authorized the organization of the Bank of Milwaukee with Sola:non 
Juneau as one of its first directors. Because of its involvement in land 
speculation, the Bank of Milwaukee failed during the depression forcing the 
legislature to repeal its charter. Now, at the very height of the depression, 
Milwaukee was without a. financial institution to exchange money and to loan 
capital to tanners and merchants.85 As in Chicago, however, George Smith 
fran ~)cotland used his capital resources and profits fran. land speculation 
to provide banking facilities for Milwaukee's residents. 
In 1839, George Smith received a charter from the Wisconsin territorial 
legislature to establish the .Jisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company. 
George Smith held the majority of stock in the canpany with smaller portions 
controlled by citizens of Milwaukee and Smith's backers in Aberdeen, Scotland. 
Because of Smith's involvement with a similar institution at Chicago, Alexander 
Y.dtchell, Smith's assistant, supervised the ~iisconsin Marine and Fire 
Insurance Campany. The company provided many services, otherwise unobtainable, 
for Hilwaukee residents during the depression. Businessmen unable to pay 
debts and f anners lacking the capital to purchase land were able to obtain 
loans. The company also made advances to merchants and .tanners involved in 
trade with the East. 86 
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With the assistance of men like George ~>mith, Byron Kilbourn, and Morgan 
L. Martin, Milwaukee businesses did not collapse during the depression. More-
over, many of these seme IL.en attempted to secure large-scale internal improve-
ments. Unlike Chicago, Milwaukee did not have any significant projects, such 
as roads and can.a.ls, underway before 1837. Milwaukee thus embarked on a. scheme 
of internal. improvements just as financial conditions deteriorated across the 
nation. The course of improvements was affected not only by the depression 
but also by a growing rivalry between Chica.go and Milwaukee. Because many of 
the speculators had invested in all or many of the lakeport towns and their 
interest was in seeing all such towns advance, this rivalry was not at first 
of great porportions. Furthermore, Milwaukee and Chicago each had a well-
defined backcountry which ultimately would ship its agricultural. surpluses to 
the closest port. In 1836, Kilbourn recslenized this fact: 
There are no conflicting interests between Green Bay, Milwaukee, 
and Chicago, each ha.s its own appropriate country; and that natu-
raJ.ly united to Milwaukee by common interest is at least equal in 
extent and fertility, and I hesitate not to add, will sustain a 
!!21:2 dense population than either or the others.87 
There were certain areas, nevertheless, lfilich seemed capable of 
exploitation by both ~lilwaukee and G'hica.go. One was the Rock River region 
which included south-central Wisconsin l:1Xi northern Illinois. The competition 
for the surpluses of this area was clearly indicated by the chief engineer of 
the Milwaukee and Rock River Canal: 
It is true that Illinois is ma.king great strides with her internal. 
improvements, and will be able in a few years to give access to 
Lake Michigan upon her public works for our produce. But will 
Wisconsin remain inactive and suffer the ha.rd earned products of 
her citizens to be carried away by Illinois to fill the coffers of 
that state? It is a self-evident fact, that unless she makes use 
r--
---------------------------------------------------------------o:f the advantages given her by the General Government, all the 
important trade of the country will be diverted into the state 
o:f Illinois by her canals and rail roads.SS 
Fearing that Chicago might tap the agricultural resources of the Rock 
River country 1 Milwaukee citizens were anxious to build a canal. While com-
petition between Chicago and Milwaukee stimulated improvements in Milwaukee, 
other town rivalries actually hindered the success of these ventures. In the 
first place, the Wisconsin Territory was divided among different sections a.11 
contesting for political. power and control of appropriations for improvements. 
Southwestem Wisconsin was the most powerful section in the 1830's primarily 
representing the lead mining interests. In the North, Green B~ contested fol' 
power while in the southeast Milwaukee was first coming to prominence. 89 On 
the westem shore of Lake Michigan, at the same time, Wisconsin possessed 
numerous towns compet:ing for appropriations for harbor and canal projects. 
Finally 1 Milwaukee itself faced the competition of the east and west sides 
for canmercial daninance. All of these rivalries affected Milwaukee's devel~ 
ment. Like Chicago 1 however, most major projects were sponsored and led by 
town promoters and eastem capitalists. The Milwaukee and Rock River canal 
and the quest for an adequate harbor at Milwaukee provided clear examples of 
the workings of these .forces. 
Fran the beginning, Byron Kilboum led the fight for intemal. improvements 
at Milwaukee. When the town was still little more than a fur trade post, 
Kilboum wrote to Senator Louis Linn of Missouri at Washington soliciting his 
aid in obtaining government appropriations for Milwaukee. 90 At a public 
meeting in 1836, Kilboum urged Milwaukee's citizens to support either a canal. 
or railroad to the Mississippi River. 91 According to Kilboum, a railroad or 
canal would enable Milwaukee to capture the lead trade of southwestem Wiscon-
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River to New Orleans and then to eastern markets. Kilbourn believed that lead 
could be shipped overland to Milwaukee arrl then eastward by the Great Lakes. 
But Milwaukee faced the canpetition of Green Ba.v over an improved Fox-
Wisconsin waterwq. 92 In late 1837, the territorial legislature issued a 
charter of incorporation for a company to build a canal from Milwaukee to the 
Rock River. In January, 1838, the Milwaukee and Rock River Canal Canpa.ny was 
organized, stock sold, and a board of directors appointed with Byron Kilboum 
as president. 93 
The canal advocates were always faced with one major problem--money. In 
February, 1838, the Wisconsin territorial legislature drafted a petition to 
Congress requesting a land grant to aid in the canal's construction. The 
legislature then appointed Byron Kilbourn to carry the petition to Washington 
and lobby there for the grant. 94 Before his departure for Washington, 
Kilbourn asked Micajah Williams, his eastern partner, to exert his influence 
among the politicians in Congress. 95 Kilbourn remained in Washington for 
several months carrying on conversations with influential politicians who 
might hurry congressional action on the land grant. 96 The efforts of Kilbourn 
and Williams were rewarded for in June, 1838, Congress granted alternate sec-
tions of land along the proposed route of the Milwaukee and Rock River canai.97 
The congressional lam grant solved only part of the canal's financial 
problems. Because of the depression, subscribers to canal stock were small 
in number, and Kilbourn discovered that he needed additional eastern capital 
in the form of stock subscriptions and loans. He first contacted eastern 
capitalists who held an interest in Milwaukee town lots. Because he had few 
connections with other bankers and financiers in the East, Kilbourn again 
requested Williams' assistance: 
To this end, (that is to get money) and to gi. ve me some small 
credit as I am properly entitled to with capitalists in N.Y. 
I would request of you to furnish me with some letters to such 
of the money men there as lQU may th ink proper and with whom you 
are intimately acquainted.98 
201 
Because of the depressed state of the economy, Kilbourn was unsuccessful 
in arousing significant interest in the canal among eastern capitalists. 99 As 
he sojourned in the East seeking money, the canal project became involved in 
state an:l town politics. As the political feud worsened in Milwaukee and 
throughout the territory, Kilbourn tenninated his eastern tour and returned to 
Milwaukee in July, 1838.100 The quarrel centered on the congressional land 
grant which stated that the land was to be sold at $2.50 per acre with no 
exemptions for actual settlers along the canal route.101 Kilbourn soon dis-
covered that he was charged with obtaining the land grant knowing that settlers 
would suffer.102 At this time, Kilbourn was a candidate for a position on the 
council of the Wisconsin state legislature. He was opposed by Alanson Sweet 
from the East Side, who along with the Milwaukee Sentinel, propagated the 
charge that Kilbourn deliberately acted against the interests of the snall 
.fanners. The Milwaukee Sentinel and Sweet were joined in the fight against the 
canal by Jmres Doty fran. Green Bay who favored internal improvement projects 
elsewhere in the state. In the summer of 1838, Alanson Sweet and Kilbourn 
aired their quarrel in the pages of Milwaukee 1 s two newspapers 0 l03 The end 
result was that Kilbourn. failed in his bid for election to the territorial 
council. Even more important was the fact that progress on the canal was 
slowed by the opposition of residents of Milwaukee's East Side as well as the 
resistance of town promoters in other areas especially James Doty of Green Bay. 
S:ince Kilbourn 1 s efforts to finance the canal failed, the territorial 
legislature established a new canal organization with additional powers of 
borrowing money for construction in 1839. John H. Tweedy fran Milwaukee was 
authorized to negotiate a loan in the East.104 Yet Tweedy also ran headlong 
into the conservatism of eastern financiers beset by a financial depression. 
202 
According to Tweedy, it was virtually impossible for western states to borrow 
money in the East because 
• • • The opinion was prevalent that the states generally, and 
especially the new states, were attempting to do too much and 
that ma.iv of their schanes of internal. improvements were extrava-
gant and visionary. The opinion was frequently expressed by same 
of the most eminent financiers, that the stocks of many of the 
states might not find a ready sale for many years, and that they 
would be compelled to partially suspend if not entirely arrest the 
progress of their public works.105 
When the state failed to obtain loans for canal constructions, opposition 
to the canal grew more vocal. Kilboum fought to protect the canal project 
fran collapsing because of the opposition of the East Side of Milwaukee and 
the Green Bq interests. In 1840, Kilboum claimed that the East Side " • • • 
most certainly entertain so violent a hostility to the west side, that many, 
if not most of them, would rather see the whole place sacrificed and sink out 
of existence than that the west side of the river should prosper. 11106 In a 
last desperate effort to save the canal project, Kilbourn again joumeyed to 
the Fast and pleaded with eastern financiers to loan money for construction. 
As Kilboum prepared to depart for New York, Micajah Williams instructed him 
that loans would be virtually impossible to obtain but assured Kilbourn that 
he had 11 ••• opened an active correspondence on this subject, and am pushing 
it in New York, and on this side of the mountains • ..,107 
Kilboum and Williams, however, had little success in 1840 in negotiating 
any further loans for the canal project. After the national elections in 1840, 
James Doty was appointed governor of the Wisconsin Territory. He inmediately 
repealed Kilbouzn's commission to negotiate loans. Exerting pressure on the 
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territorial. legislature, Doty succeeded by 1841 in ending the Milwaukee and 
Rock River Canal project.108 The history of the Milwaukee and Rock River canal 
clearly illustrated the leadership of town promoters and their extensive 
dependence on the capital resources of the East. When eastern capital failed 
to materialize in support of the canal project, its fate was virtually sealed. 
Yet the project also faced the constant workings of state and town politics 
which combined with financial conditions wrecked any hopes for success. 
The efforts to construct a harbor at Milwaukee faced problems similar to 
those which plagued the canal project. While Chicago had received appropria-
tions for harbor construction from the federal government in 1833, Milwaukee 
did not begin agitation for such improvements until 1835. The site of a har-
bor at Milwaukee was surveyed in 1836, but with the onset of the depression 
Congress refused appropriations for construction.109 Yet Milwaukee leaders 
did not become quiescent with the govenmi.ent 1s failure to act. In late 1836, 
Byron Kilbourn attempted to raise money among the citizens to start harbor 
construction.110 Throughout the next several years, the Milwaukee newspapers 
constantly editorialized on the need for a harbor. In July, 1837, the 
Milwaukee Sentinel mirrored the general attitude of the town: 
Our bay is the safest refuge for shelter in a gale to be found 
on the lake. In this particular, nature has favored Milwaukee 
above her sister towns, and with the assistance of the government 
we could soon have the best harbor in the West. The great and 
rapidly increasing business of our town requires a speedy appro-
priation by Congress for its improvement.lll 
In January, 1838, a meeting of Milwaukee citizens organized by Solomon 
Juneau and others drafted a petition to Congress.ll2 At the same time, 
Juneau maintained contact with local politicians in Washington lobbying for 
a harbor.113 But why did Milwaukee face such difficulties in obtaining harbor 
appropriations? Part of the reason undoubtedly was the depression and the 
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reduced amount of goverrnnent funds available for such projects. Furthe:nnore, 
Milwaukee was in competition with other Wisconsin towns on the lake shore for 
harbor funds. By 1839, Milwaukee citizens realized that with the depression 
onlY one or possibly two towns could possibly hope for an appropriation, but 
Milwaukeeans were convinced that 11Milwaukee is the greatest commercial town 
on Lake Michigan, save Chicago; her importance is generally acknowledged, and 
her claims upon the attention of the general government are unquestioned.',114 
In 1840, the citizens of Milwaukee presented a lengthy memorial to Edward 
Curtis, Chainnan of the Committee on Canmerce of the House of Representatives. 
In this memorial, Milwaukee residents admitted that Congress faced a difficult 
task in deciding ltlich Wisconsin towns should receive harbor funds. Yet the 
memorialists then listed commercial statistics to prove Milwaukee's leadership 
in population and trade over the other towns.115 
While rivalry among Wisconsin harbor areas certainly made Congress's 
task more difficult, Milwaukee's interests were also hindered by an intra-
town squabble. When harbor construction was first discussed, two different 
sites were suggested. One was at the natural mouth ot the Milwaukee River as 
it entered Lake Michigan. Proponents of this location claimed that this would 
be the least expensive location. Yet Kilbourn and Juneau opposed this southeni 
location, for it was a half mile from where the East and West sides had es-
tablished the central business sections of the city.116 For many yea.rs, the 
controversy excited Milwaukee citizens with charges of political corruption 
hurled back and forth.117 In 1843, the government finally appropriated money 
for the construction of a harbor at the natural outlet of the Milwaukee River. 
Kilbourn and his forces screamed political bribery, but they never identified 
the source of this corruption. Faced with this useless harbor location, 
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Kilbourn then united the capitalists of the east and west sides plus interested 
eastern investors and began construction of another harbor a half mile further 
north where the business sections of the town were located.118 Until the 
1850 1s, Milwaukee was hindered by this competition between harbor locations, 
but then government funds were redirected toward Kilbourn and Juneau 1 s sec-
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tions of the town. 
All the efforts of the town promoters in the area of internal improvements 
were intended to increase the town's economic position. Each year population, 
the munber of ship arrivals, and the anount of exports fran the Milwaukee 
120 harbor increased. The depression, of course, slowed the rate of economic 
develoµnent, but by 1841 the town seemed to have recovered. Milwaukee now 
had reached the s.tage where its economy was practically self-sustaining. The 
interior was sufficiently developed to supply surpluses for the town and for 
shi~nt to the East. In 1839 and 1840, for example, wheat first arrived 
at Milwaukee for shipnent to eastern markets •121 In 1839, Milwaukee registered 
exports valued at $43,568, in 1840, $53,828, and in 1841, $286,777.122 The 
people also recognized the importance of a developed agricultural interior. 
As early as September, 1837, the Milwaukee Sentinel commented that 
People generally have turned their attention to the tilling of 
the land during the present season, and spend their capital in 
improving their fam.s instead of buying lots in paper Cities and 
Villages; - all this has a tendency to increase the growth of our 
tolffi materially, and as the back country increases in population, 
so must the town increase - as the rich farming sections lying 
West and Southwest fills up, and the prairies and openings becane 
converted into rich and productive farms, it will .tom. the only 
sure basis on ltl.ich a city can safely be built up, and will be the 
surest evidence of future success and prosperity • • • .123 
With the semblance of a balanced econany, Milwaukee thus had bridged the 
gap between a frontier village and a town. Its developnent was ver-y similar 
to that of Chicago. Both towns were originally established by town speculators 
... 
or promoters with the financial aid of eastern capitalists. As the years 
passed, the Milwaukee promoters like Morgan L. Martin, Solomon Juneau, Byron 
Kilboo.rn, and Micajah T. Williams supplied the capital am the leadership for 
the majority of Milwaukee's improvements. Again this emphasis on town specu-
la.tors and eastern capitalists does not diminish the equally important role 
of smaller merchants, yet it becomes increasingly clear that the pranoters 
led the way in the most significant areas of Milwaukee's development. 
In 1841, however, Milwaukee was in no sense the equal of Chicago. A 
comparison of the basic commercial statistics of the two towns indicated that 
Chicago surpassed Milwaukee by a considerable margin in population, in ship 
arrivals, and in the value of exports.124 Chicago had an advantage over 
Milwaukee merely because of geography and its consequent earlier settlement. 
Located further north on the lake shore, Milwaukee waited on the natural 
movenent of people to settle its agricultural interior. Chicag0, moreover, 
had embarked on needed improvements, such as a canal and a harbor, several 
years before Milwaukee. Thus Chicago earlier attracted merchants, camnerce, 
and eastern capitalists. WhEl'l. Milwaukee did enter the stage of town develop-
ment, it was confronted with state sectionalism, intra-town rivalry, and com-
petition from other Wisconsin towns on the lake shore. While Chicago also 
faced state and intra-town competition, it was of little significance canpared 
to that at Milwaukee. Through a canbination of geography, state sectionalism, 
and town rivalry, Milwaukee in 1841, while reaching the status of a town, 
found itself considerably behind the colossus of the lakes--Chicago. 
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MILWAUKEE'S OOMMERCIAL GROWTH 
TABLE 1 -- Land Sales at Milwaukee. The majority of faming land surrounding 
Milwaukee was not opened for public sale until 1839. The figures 
represent the amount of money received at the Milwaukee Land 
Office.a 
1836 • • • $88,432.10 
1837 • • • $90,131.81 
1838 ••• $69,350.24 
1839 ••• $785,950.57 
1840 • • • $138,661.02 
1841 ••• $103,547.48 
1842 ••• $149,816.75 
1843 ••• $192,401.11 
a 
"Address by Increase Lapham, 11 cited in the Western Historical Can.pany, 
History of Milwaukee, p. 192. 
TABLE 2 - Population Growth of Milwaukeea 
1836 • • • 700 
1840 ••• 1,712 
B..rhere are no adequate figures for Milwaukee's population during the 
early period. The above figures were the most reliable estimates from Still, 
Milwaukee, p. 570, and Jam.es s. Buck, Pioneer History of Milwaukee (Milwaukee: 
Milwaukee News Company, 1866), I, p. 49. 
TABIE 3 - Ship Arri val.s at the Port of Milwaukee. a 
1835 • • • 2 
1836 ••• 19 
1837 ••• 97 
1838 ••• 126 
1839 ••• 18.2 
1840 ••• 174 
a 11Address by Increase Lapham, 11 cited in Western Histcri..cal Company, 
History of Milwaukee, p. 192. Also see the Milwaukee Sentinel, March 10, 1840. 
TABLE 3 -- Imports and Exports at the Port of Milwaukee. a 
Import 
1835-1836 ••• $588,950 
1837 ••• $641,2.35 
1838 ••• $783,458 
1839 ••• $866,740 
1840 ••• $1,147,803 
1841 ••• $1,805,277 
E:xport 
$26,145 
$47,745 
$47,690 
$43,568 
$53,828 
$286,777 
aAddress by Increase Lapham, 11 cited in Western Historical Company, Histo"M 
of Milwaukee, p. 1920 
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CHAP1'EH VII 
The Secondary Towns: Townsite '.Jeveloµnent at 
Green Bay, Hanitowoc, Kewaunee, Sheboygan, Racine, and Kenosha 
While Chicago and Hilwaukee were the two most important commercial 
centers in the 18J0 1s, townsites were plotted at almost every juncture of 
rivers and Lake Michigan. Except for Green Bay, most of these townsites in 
the 1820 1s were little more than occasional meeting places of the fur traders 
and Indians. During the speculative period of the 18301s, some locations, 
such as Green Bay, Racine, and Kenosha, attracted considerable attention, 
while others such a.s Kewaunee, 1'ianitowoc, and Sheboygan were speculative. 
dreams which did not actually develop until the lS4C 1s and 1850 1s. Despite 
the varying degrees of success encountered by these townsites, the patterns 
and methods of develoµnent were remarkably similar to those observed at 
Chicago and Milwaukee. After the decline of the 1'ur trade and the cession of 
Indian lands, capitalists and land speculators plotted the towns before the 
arri. val of urban and fanning emigrants f ran the 1ast. At each townsite, the 
speculators const:nicted stores, paved streets, and attempted to establish 
communications with the interior and the East. The leadership for these 
projects was, as before, a combination of eastern and western capitalists. 
Green Bay was the largest of the fur trade villages on the western shore 
of Lake Nichiean.1 During the 18aJ' a, Green Bay had attracted a small number 
of merchants and professional people desiring to make a new start in the West. 
f lie. 
Arriving iW-820 1 s, were persons to be significant during the period or town 
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growth. Horgan L. Martin, Daniel Whitney, James Doty, and Albert G. Ellis. 2 
Until the 1830 1s, however, these people were forced to engage in occupations 
related to the fur trade. Daniel 1..hitney, for example, employed his own 
traders to compete with the .American fur Company while Jaines Doty served as 
agent and lawyer for the American Fur Company. Actual town growth did not 
begin until the 1830's when the fur trade declined, Indian lands were ceded, 
and the tide of white settlement moved viest.3 
Defore town development could begin, Indian title to the land around 
Green Ba;y had to be secured by the national government. This process actually 
began in 1825 at Prairie du Chien when tho Indians a.greed to the military 
occupation of Fort Howard at Green B~v as well as white settlement there. 4 
In 1831, the Menominee Treaty secured most of the land in the Green BaJ' area 
for settlement.5 After government surveys, the land was opened for public 
sale in 1835 at the Green Bay Land Office. At this sale, hordes of speculators 
descended upon Green Bay as did farmers anxious to secure squatter claims.6 
Famers am speculators who came to Green Bay in 1835 were probably 
somewhat surprised to discover that three separate towns were rapidly rising 
in the region and contesting for business and commercial hegemony. Actually 
the designation, Green Bey, in this period, referred to a cor.iplex of towns 
around the juncture or the Fox River and the bay leading to Lake Michigan.7 
Geographically the most prominent townaite was plotted by the officials of 
the American Fur Cornpaey and appropriately named Astor. A short distance 
away was the village of Navarino laid out by Daniel Whitney, and then further 
south was De Pere. In point of time, Navarino was the first town plotted. Its 
proprietor, Daniel Whitney, had first come to the Green Bq area during the 
heyday or the fur trade. He certainly did not conform to the pa.ttems of 
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the normal. frontier trader, for \.;hitney was involved in a number of econcmic 
enterprises. Yet his principal occupation was in supplying goods to matlY' 
residents of Green Bay not connected with the American Fur Company.8 Through-
out the early 18201s, vJhitney extended easy credit to many Green Bay traders, 
and by 1826 he was receiving their land claims in p~ent for outstanding 
debts. In 1829, he laid out the town of Navarino. Because settlers and 
capitalists had not as yet reached the area of Green Bay, the sale of lots a.t 
Navarino was extremely slow until 1834. Whitney, nevertheless, made necessary 
:improvements, such as building stores, and houses, in anticipation of the 
territory's eventual settlement. Navarino first attracted wisespread atten-
tion in 1833 1..tien •ihitney assisted in the establishment of a newspaper, the 
Green Bf.LY Intelligencer.9 
The Green Ba.y Intelligencer provided Navarino as well as other townsites 
in the Green Bay area with advantageous publicity, in its first issue, the 
Intelligencer claimed that one of its principal goals was 11 • • • the advance-
ment of the countr;y west of Lake Michigan. In this we have a direct and 
intense interest, 'Which we shall be very unlikely to .f'orget. 1,lO The Navarino 
townsite was recamnended to emigrants because of the camnunications network 
of the Fax and Wisconsin Rivers and the availability o:t government lands.11 
As more and more settlers approached the Green Bq area in 1835, the sa.le of 
Navarino lots increased. Whitney himself' purchased land throughout the 
territory and established a forwarding and camnission house at Navarino. But 
Navarino did not attract heavy eastem investment confining it to the cl.ass 
of a secondary townsite.12 
Five miles south of Navarino, several Green Bay capitalists including 
James Doty, Morgan L. Martin, and George Lawe organized the Fox H:iver Hydraulic 
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Com~ny in 1836 to construct a dam on the Fox River. The men then extended 
their investment to plot a townsite near the dam called De Pere. De Pere 
advertised extensively for laborers and made a few efforts to attract capital-
ists, professional people, and political institutions to its location.13 The 
town, however, never succeeded in gaining the interest of eastern capitalists 
or even the whole-hearted attention of western entrepreneurs. riorgan L. 
Hartin, for example, was primarily promoter of the Astor townsite and invested 
at De Pere mere).y to increase the general develoµnent of the territory. He 
never considered it a threat to the Astor location a short distance away.15 
In the Green Bay region, the most viable townsite was at Astor. It was 
plotted as an indirect result or the American Fur Canpacy1s control of the 
fur trader. As the fur trade dwindled :in volume and profitability, the French-
Canadian traders surrounding Green Bay gradually deeded their land claims 
and land titles to John Astor's American Fur Compa.ny.16 Observ:ing the success 
of townsites at Chica.go and Daniel .ihitney•s project at Navarino, Astor de-
cided to lay out a town on the land obtained fran the fur traders. John 
Astor was not a novice at land speculation since he already had extensive 
investments in New York state and in Ganada.17 To supervise the building and 
management of the townsite, Astor required a western agent, and James Duane 
Doty was the most logical choice. Doty had arrived at Detroit in 1818, and, 
at the age of n:inett?en he was admitted to the bar. In 1823, he was appointed 
a Michigan territorial judge. At the same time, Doty worked for the American 
Fur Company in securing land titles fran the old fur traders. Moreover, he 
was well-acquainted with the agricultural and commercial possibilities of the 
entire territory having participated in several exploring expeditions.18 Thus 
on March 5, 18351 John Astor, Rams~ Crooks, Robert Stuart, and James Doty , 
united in partnership to plot the town of Astor. The property was originally 
valued at $2500 with Astor controlling 75 per-cent; H.amsq Crooks, 20 per-cent; 
Robert Stuart 5 per-cent; and James Doty 25 per-cent. Doty was to earn his 
share of the property by acting as the townsite•s general agent in selling 
lots and inaugurating improvements.19 
Doty 1 s first problem was the hostility of the old fur traders toward the 
Astor townsi te which was located on land they earlier had owned. Many of the 
traders felt that John Astor had treated them harshly in appropriating their 
land claims for past debts. Since John Lawe was the acknowledged leader of 
the old community, he was allowed to retain part of his land claims. A 
lenient policy toward John Lawe, Doty explained, would temper the hostility 
of local inhabitants who otherwise might jeopardize the developnent of Astor. 20 
Doty next turned his attention toward plotting the physical dimensions of the 
town. He arranged streets and avenues, measured lot sizes, and established 
lot prices. The town's main streets were to run parallel to the Fox River 
giving Astor the greatest possible number of lots fronting on the river. 
Various lots in the town were then reserved for future public buildings such 
as the post office, the land office, and the county seat; all of which Doty 
ultimately hoped to attract to the town. 21 
Once the physical layout of Astor had been surveyed, the proprietors were 
prepared to sell lots to speculators and town emigrants. John Astor, H.amsay 
Crooks and Robert Stuart held very definite views on the proper method of lot 
sales. To attract business interests to the town, Doty was instructed to 
sell at low prices to merchants and artisans. 22 James Doty was in full accord 
with this view, and he concentrated his sales on merchants often requiring 
them to build stores and warehouses. Observing the methods of town promotion 
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elsewhere in the West, Doty hoped that after a year the remaining lots could 
be sold at competitive prices since Astor, by then, would naturally attract 
capitalists and merchants23 In August, 1838, Doty delineated his methods for 
building an :image of Astor's prosperity: 
I agreed to sell about 30 lotf'I at naninal prices, in order to 
establish canmercial and mercantile business there, that it might 
immediately compete with the adjoining town. This is the principal 
reason of its rapid increase in value, as it placed it on a foot-
ing with other Western Towns. I also made a similar arrangement 
with some of the officers and several mechanics. Having now enough 
of these, I should canmence selling lots at their market value, as 
this will be the surest method of increasing the value of the whole. 
The sale of one lot, either by the Proprietor of a Town or by one 
to whan he has sold, increases the value of those he retains. The 
price of lots in the Town of Chicago was created in this manner. 
There is much speculation now in this country, I therefore think it 
is best21;o sell largely at prices which I have no doubt can be ob-
tained. 
For the first two years of Astor's developnent, Doty sold lots at minimal 
prices to any interest which might possibly increase the townsite•s potential. 
In this manner, he attracted the government land office, various county 
offices, and professional people to Astor. In 1837, for example, Doty enticed 
the postmaster, then at Navarino, to Astor promising him several town lots at 
reasonable prices and a new office building. 25 while Doty o~inally intended 
to increase lot prices after a year, he soon found that merchants and pro-
fessional people could only be drawn to Astor through reduced lot prices. 
John Astor grew impatient with this scheme, but Doty explained that it was 
necessary in order 
To obtain improvements ••• to sell at very low rates, because 
this appears to be the custom of Proprietors in other towns. I 
have lately been at Milwaukee where I find this is the case; and 
where the proprietors are expending abot1_t $20,000 in grading 
streets.26 
Doty thus followed his own inclinations and continued to attract 
merchants and artisans to the town by very low lot prices. Many times, he 
')7 loaned money to merchants preparing to build a store or warehouse."" 
Yet Doty and John Astor not only sold lots at Astor to merchants and 
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artisans, but they early recognized the need of drawing more and more capital-
ists into involvement with the townsite. In 1835, Doty suggested that sane 
lots at Astor should be sold in New York at a general auction sale where higher 
prices could be obtained. 28 John Astor, however, sold shares of Astor to a 
mun.bar of selected eastern capitalists including Samuel Stocldng, Chester 
Jennings, and Charles Butler29 Thus the town of Astor had interested eastern 
financiers whose money could be employed for further improvements. Canmenting 
on the sale of shares to Samuel Stocking, John Astor indicated the reasons for 
attracting such people: 
This disposition we deemed the more valuable and important, as 
Hr. Stocldng is wealthy, is considered one of the most prudent 
men in the state, and is possessed of much practical knowledge 
connected with the building up of country towns, and land opera-
tions generally.JO 
In Mq, 1836, James Doty undertook a journey to the East in order to 
confer with Astor and solicit the interest of additional. eastern capitalists.31 
Having little success in New York City, Doty then traveled to Buffalo in 
order " • • • to interest those in this city who have control of the greatest 
number of vessels on the Lakes - and this is the most favorable point to 
secure this object. 11 At Buffalo Doty encountered Jacob Barker, of the large 
forwarding finn of Barker and Holt. Learning that Barker was departing for 
the West, Doty decided to take passage on the same steamboat with hopes of 
using the voyage to interest Barker in the Astor project. Jacob Barker, 
however, refused to invest at Astor since he was al.ready involved at Racine, 
Wisconsin.32 
In addition to eastern capitalists, Doty al.so sold lots to town residents 
and western speculators. In July, 1836, he conducted a general auction sale 
of the real estate at Astor.33 At other times, Doty sold lots to speculators 
who traveled throughout the territory reselling property as they journeyed 
from town to town. In 1836, for example, Doty sold fifty-eight lots to a 
Mr. Van Dom. Van Dom then stopped at St. Louis, New Orleans, and Philadel-
phia where he sold the lots. Doty, of course, hoped such sales would publicize 
the townsite at Astor and attract new investors.34 
When John Astor, Ramsay Crooks, and Robert Stuart originally established 
the Astor townsite, there was never any general agreement as to how long they 
would remain connected with the project. Periodically, John Astor received 
offers fran entrepreneurs interested in purchasing the entire townsite. 
Worried over the threat to his investment at Navarino, Daniel Whitney offered 
$251 000 for Astor in May, 1835.35 While John Astor was often tempted to 
liquidate his interest, Ramsay Crooks and James Doty prevented such action by 
assuring John Astor that the property would double in vc:.lue. In August, 1835, 
James Doty optimistic~ reported to Astor that 
I.f money continues to flow t'ran the "::a.stern cities to the West 
for the next years as it has for the last six months, this 
property should not be sold for leas than $1001000. Whether it 
will so cont~ge you are of all men the moat competent to 
judge • • • • 
John Astor, however, was never satisfied with the townsite 1s progress. 
Often he criticized Doty 1s handling or the concern because of excessive sales 
at low prices to merchants and artisans. At other times he objected to Doty•s 
prolonged absences fran Astor to attend legislative sessions of the territory. 
Moreover, John Astor continuall.y fretted over the competition of other town.-
sites in the Green Bay area.37 Doty did his best to reassure John Astor that 
their townsite possessed the greatest potential for future growth. According 
to Doty, both Navarino and De Pere were secondary locations incapable of 
serious can.petition unless capital.ists turned their attention in that direc-
tion. In February, 1836, Doty explained to Jolm Astor the relative position 
of their townsite: 
This town, like all others, must have its rival.a; and whether it 
will be able to compete successfully with all, time al.one can 
determine. I see none from which any fears ought to be enter-
tained at present. But there certainly are points near us, where, 
if a large amount or capital should be invested in improvements 
and in trade, it would greatly lessen the val.ue of real. estate 
here.38 
James Doty actually had left the chal.lenge clearly up to J olm Astor and 
his eastern associates warning them that town promotion required continued 
lot sal.es and significant investments of capital for improvements. Like 
western entrepreneurs in other towns, James Doty tapped the resources of 
eastern capitalists to inaugurate improvements at Astor. To expedite the flow 
of capital from East to West, John Astor obtained the general consent or the 
major eastern investors to expend their capital for improvements at Astor.39 
Doty, or course, had to continually request John Astor to release these funds. 
In 1836, for example, John Astor balked at donating several lots for the 
Presbyterian Church, but James Doty insisted that thi~ edifice was essential 
to the town. I<.ventually Jolm Astor donated the required lots and even con-
tributed $300 to the church's construction.40 In 1837, James Doty subscribed 
$21 000 to erect public buildings for housing county offices and professional. 
people and requested additional. capital. fran John Astor for "it is usual for 
Proprietors of \-Vestern towns to contribute something towards works of a public 
nature, and where there are rival to~s this seems to be indispensably neces-
sary. ,,41 
Doty early recognized that one of the to~site•s principal requirements 
was a oublic house or hotel. According to DotY .. manv stranJ?ers visited Astor 
but rarely stayed to investigate its potential because of the absence of 
public accommodations. Thus Doty set aside four lots for a hotel, but its 
actual construction required considerable capital. J,Xplaining the need for 
a hotel to John Astor, James Doty calculated that the project would cost 
$10,000; funds which were just not available in the West.42 Thus Doty threw 
the burden on John Astor who turned to the other eastern investors for capi-
tai. 43 When sufficient .fimds had not been procured by 18.37, Doty reminded 
John Astor that Navarino now possessed a hotel providing serious canpetition 
for their townsite.44 Eventually, Astor possessed a hotel reputed to be one 
of the finest in the West. 
Doty inaugurated a number of other improvements to increase Astor's 
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attractiveness. With the aid of John Astor and the other eastern financiers, 
Doty supervised the grading of streets. In 1836, he constructed a dam across 
the Manitoo River to bring fresh water into the town.45 Later Doty built a 
bridge across the Manitoo H.iver enabling Astor to receive the majority ot 
emigrants travelling overland to the Green Bq region. To increase the town-
site's connections with the interior, Doty proposed a network of roads costing 
$10,000. \·i'hile many of these projects were rejected by John Astor, Doty1s 
persistence succeeded in garnering many improvements for the town.46 
During the 18301s, James Doty also plqed an important role in all of 
Wisconsin's internal improvement schemes. He did not believe the region could 
develop without a general system of roads and canals throughout the terri-
tory. 47 Yet Doty had his pet projects dependent on where his economic invest-
ments were concentrated. Besides his interests at Astor, Doty was also the 
principal proprietor of Madison, a town which was later designated as the 
territorial capital.48 Moreover, he was involved at Manitowoc along with 
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various eastern capital.ists.49 For the first year of their association, John 
Astor criticized Doty•s projects throughout the territory feeling that it 
affected his care of the Astor property. 50 By late 1836) however, John Astor 
changed his view and gave Doty additional capital to invest in townsites and 
canal projects throughout the territory. 51 Doty, nevertheless, pushed for 
improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers to increase the commercial possi-
bilities of Astor. As early as 1832, he wrote to a New York financier request-
ing funds for a canal. company becaURe 
It must be obvious to all who look with an intelligent eye to 
that portion of the western country, that the great northern 
thoroughfare between the Great Lake and the Mississippi River, 
is, and for an indefinite period must continue to be, by the 
Fox and Wiskonsin (sic) rivers • • .52 
Doty, however, was certainly not unique among town promoters, for all the 
Green Bay capitalists and speculators considered internal improvements, in the 
fonn of canals and railroads, an important step to camnercial developnent. 
Capitalists in the Green Bay region unfortunately faced the problems of in-
adequate financing brought on by the depression in 1S37. Similar to the 
situation at Milwaukee, Green Bay never launched significant projects until 
the depression period when their efforts were seriously handicapped. Moreover, 
the Green Bay region faced the econanic and political competition of other 
towns on the lake shore as well as the sectional rivalry of southwestern 
Wisconsin's lead mining region. Those projects which were inaugurated, never-
theless, derived capital from the East and leadership from western entrepre-
neurs. 
The first plan to attract the interests of Green Bay residents was the 
improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. This route had been employed for 
generations to transport furs from the interior to Green Bay, but by the late 
1820•s western entrepreneurs~ such as Daniel Whitney and Morgan L. Martin, 
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saw that the lead mined in Routhwestern Wiscons1n could be shipped to Green 
Bay rather than its normal route down the Mississippi River to New Orleans 
and then to eastern markets. 5.3 At the first public meeting held at Green Bay 
in 1829, Morgan L. Hart1n and others petitioned Congress for funds to improve 
the Pox and Wisconsin Rivers. 54 In 1$29, a canal COCJ.pany was organized under 
the direction of liartin but little was ever accomplished. 55 Daniel Whitney 
opened a shot-tower on the lower Wisconsin River at Helena in 1830 hoping 
eventua.]J.y to transport lead shot to Green ~.56 Yet capital was always 
insufficient to construct such a carmunications network. 
As the region became more settled in the mid 18,30 1s, Morgan L. Martin, 
James Doty, and Daniel \'i'hi tney renewed their ef .forts to launch a cannl company. 
Improvement projects were recommended by newspaper editorials and public 
meetings. In 1836, thv Green Ba.y Intelligencer contained an editorial entitled 
''Everything As Individuals - Nothing As a Comm.unity 11 in which citizens were 
asked to support a canal between the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. The editorial 
pointed out that 
1:.1hile we are 1nacti ve, the people of Milwaukee and Chicago are 
alive and doins; the one are starting a railroad and the other 
a canal to communicate with the Mississippi - all over new 
routes, while we in possession of the old long travelled route, 
are asleep, and letting them take away the commerce fran us.57 
The Gre~n Ba,y Intelligencer further recognized that the smaller cities 
on the western shore of Lake Hichigan, such as Manitowoc and Ra.cine, were al-
ready discussing canal schemes to link them with the interior. To a certain 
extent, these smaller towns represented a threat to Green Bay's hopes for 
commercial hegemony, 
Another start was made in an effort to improve the Fox and Wisconsin 
Rivers 1n 1834 with the establishment of the Portage Canal Canpany headed by 
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Daniel 1>hitney. Yet again the project was stymied by insufficient capitai. 58 
As the years passed, Wisconsin politicians and capitalists petitioned Congress 
for ap1Jropriations. In 1837, a bill for granting an appropriation for the 
development of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers was before Congress, and Doty 
urged John Astor to exert his influence among various members of Congress. 
Yet the Milwaukee and Rock River Canal received the only major appropriation 
for territorial improvements. 59 Green Ba,,y promoters now turned to other 
devices. In 1838, Doty, with other area capitalists, formed the Fox rdver 
Transportation Company to move merchandise fran southwestern \;isconsin to 
60 Green Bay. Doty personally journeyed to the lead mine area to obtain con-
tracts for shipping lead via the Fox River Transportation Company to Green Bay. 
Doty, of course, hoped Jolm Astor would invest capital in the finn. Noting 
the establishment of the Fox River Transportation Campany, Doty explained to 
Astor that 11 • • • there is not sufficient capital in this countr-J to prosecute 
this business as extensively as it ought to be. 1161 
Despite numerous attempts, Green Ba,,y never succeeded in capturing the 
lead trade of southwestern Wisconsin or tapping the agricultural interior 
along the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers. While in 1839 and 1840 the 1:lisconsin 
Democrat bragged that more and more lead was f:inding its way to Green Bay,62 
:in actual fact Milwaukee and Racine were rerouting the lead trade overland to 
their ports on Lake ftlchigan. 63 
In their attempts to secure an ad.equate harbor and steamboat connections 
with the East, the promoters in the Green Bay area encountered many of the 
same difficulties as in their drive for improvement of the Fox and Wisconsin 
Rivers. These capitalists suc~eedad in obtaining a few improvements, but 
nowhere near the achievements at Chicago and Hilwaukee. The principal de.fi-
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Navarino and James Doty at Astor were not able to can.'lland the financial 
resources that were available to Chicago and Milwaukee speculators. Harbor 
facilities were early rec4gnized by the speculators as a necessa.Ij' ingredient 
of future commercial growth. In 1835, there was not a harbor of any conse-
quence at Green Bay, and thus it was very difficult for ships to approach the 
mouth of the Fox River to deposit goods and passengers. Fearing the possi-
bility of rwming aground, many ship captains avoided Green Bay. In 1835, 
the Green Bay Intelligencer called on the people to improve their own harbor 
warning them that 
• • • Unless the people of Green Bay will incur the paltey 
expense, (and that right soon) of a few dollars or a few hundred 
dollars in improving their harbor, they must be content to see 6 the commerce of the Lakes find another channel to the Mississippi. 4 
Few Green Bay citizens, however, had the necessar.r capital reserve to 
contribute to harbor construction. Thus Daniel 1.;hitney undertook the required 
improvements on his own.65 In 1836, James Doty pressured Congress into sur-
veying the Fox River for a pennanent harbor. Because of the depression, Green 
Bay, like Milwaukee, never received government appropriations until the 
1840's.66 
Commercial developnent at Green Bay was also hindered because of its 
inability to establish steamboat or water communications with the East. Fran 
their inception, Astor and Navarino were avoided by captains of lake vessels. 
According to contemporaries, captains of lake vessles considered the time and 
expense of stopping at Green Bay excessive when the majority of passengers 
and cargo were destined for Chicago.67 James Doty attested to this fact and 
indicated its effect on the Astor townsite: 
I was greatly delayed in my return in consequence of the refusal 
of steam-boats to touch at this place on their way to the head 
of the Lake; and for the same reason I saw more than a hundred 
emigrants go from Detroi~ to other places, when they were extremely 
desirous of coming here. 8 
Doty warned John Astor that the townsite would never attract widespread 
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attention until steamboats regularly plied between Astor, Detroit and Buffalo. 
Unless Green Bay citizens used their own capital to finance a steamboat cam-
pany, the Green Bay Intelligencer predicted that Green Bay would continue to 
fall behind other towns on the lake shore.69 
Jam.es Doty again took the lead in encouraging Green Bay capitalists to 
build or charter steamboats. In 1836, Doty requested John Astor to subscribe 
capital for a steamboat to run between Green Bay and Detroit. According to 
Doty, the proprietors of Astor must assume a large portion of this stock even 
though "• • • it should only return their simple interest, for it is c~rtain 
that without a regular communication of this kind the public can never be made 
to realize the value of this point. 11 John Astor agreed to the proposition, and 
Green Bay soon had at least one regular steamboat.70 
But one steamboat was hardly sufficient when other lakeports, such as 
Chicago, had regular packet service with eastern ports.71 At other times, 
Doty suggested additional steamboat investments, but John Astor steadily re-
fused. 72 Throughout its early history, lack of proper camnunications with the 
East remained a glaring inadequacy of Green Day. As late as 1847, John 
Astor's agent at Green Bay claimed that it was the most inaccessible spot on 
the lake shore. Merchants who ordered goods from the East often had them 
shipped to Chicago, then transferred to smaller vessels plying the trade along 
the lake shore.73 Green Bay, therefore, despite the efforts of Doty and 
occasional subscriptions of capital by John Astor failed to develop a cormnuni-
cations network. 
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As in all .frontier communities one of the most important and needed 
institutions at Green Bay was a bank. In this project also, James Doty and 
:forgan L. Martin led the way with the assistance of eastern capital. The 
history of banking at Green Bay again showed the conflicts among the dif .f erent 
sections of the territory for commercial and political leadership. 
In 1835, Horgan L. Martin was chiefly responsible for obtaining a bank 
charter .from the Michigan Territorial Legislature. Assistance in framing the 
charter and securing capital was provided by Martin's two brothers, John and 
1:iilliam, who lived in New York State. The bank was capitalized at $1001 000 
and governed by a board of elected directors which included :'1organ L. and John 
Martin and James Doty.74 
While Horgan L. Martin and John Martin were primarily responsible for 
obtaining the charter, it was never certain who would control the bank's stock 
or where it would be located. According to the charter's provisions, the 
major stockholders reserved the right to locate in either Brown or Iowa coun-
ties. There were several different factions contesting for the bank's control. 
Primarily they were divided between Doty, Martin, and Whitney representing the 
North and Green Ba.v and Lucius Lyon and Frederic and Arthur Bronson represent-
ing the South. In 18.34, Lucius Lyon had a.greed to invest in farm land and 
townsites for Arthur Bronson of New York. 75 Iqon himself was a delegate to 
Congress fran the Michigan Territory in 183.3, when Wisconsin was still part 
of Michigan Territory.76 When Arthur Bronson first learned of a proposed bank, 
he wrote to Horgan L. Martin offering his capital resources and financial 
leadership: 
From my knowledge of the country it strikes me that this institution 
if confined to the management of discreet skillful a.gents, with 
advantageous connexions (ili) fonned in this city , and elsewhere 1 
and well organized, may be made one of the most productive stocks in 
the countrv. and at the same time of p;:reat public benefit.77 
I 
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Bronson, however, seemed to have ulterior motives. It was his intention 
to secure control of the Bank of Wisconsin and then move the bank to Cassville, 
a townsite development on the Hississippi Iliver in the southwestern part of 
the territory.78 Bronson's plans were defeated because Green Bay speculators 
were able to gain control of the bank. John Astor subscribed $101 000 in bank 
stock and Morgan L. Martin, through his brother John in New York, managed to 
interest other eastern capitalists thus garnering the majority of the bank's 
stock. 79 
But where was the bank to be located within the Green Bay region-Astor 
or Navarino? Doty immediately requested John Astor and the other eastern 
proprietors to donate lots and supply capital for building a bank building 
because 
It is the only institution of the kind chartered in this country, 
and wherever it is located it is likely to detennine the business 
to that point. We are contending with a Town which has its busi-
ness established. (Navarino) Mr. Whitney paid I am infonned 
about $21 000 premium upon shares of stock purchased by him, to 
obtain a majority of the votes in order to secure its location in 
Navarino, which shows that he regards it as a measure of consider-
able importance.SO 
Because Doty succeeded in donating lots for a bank building, it located 
at Astor in 1837.81 
After def eating the southern interests for control of the Bank of 
Wisconsin, William and John Martin in New York advised their brother, Horgan 
L. Martin,to sell their controlling shares of stock because of the country's 
deteriorating financial condition. Morgan L. Martin always resisted the 
82 idea. By 1838 1 however, the Bank of Wisconsin was in financial trouble and 
the Martins were held responsible.83 Anxious to preserve the bank's financial 
standing, Morgan L. Martin approached George Smith who was involved in both 
the Wisconsin Marine and Fire Insurance Company at Milwaukee and George Smith 
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and t.;ompany of Chicago. 4 Smith considered taking controlling interest or 
the bank, but before he could act, the territorial legislature investigated 
the bank's financial position and then revoked its charter in 1839.85 The 
Bank of Wisconsin failed during the depression, but its establishment through 
the leadership of Horgan L. Martin and the capital. of ea.stern financiers 
mirrored the basic course of town development. 
The financial depression had eff ecta on all segments or Astor and 
Navarino's econany; internal improvement appropriations were just not available 
from the national govenunent, eastern money was more difficult to obtain, and 
banking credits were restricted. Beginning in 1837, Doty•s letters to John 
Astor became extremely pessimistic as capital was more difficult to procure. 
To attract merchants and artisans, Doty sold lots on credit knowing that pay-
ment might be delayed for years.86 By 1838, the Wisconsin Democrat filled 
each issue with notices of lots at Astor and Navarino available for public 
sale because of failure to pay taxes.87 While John Astor reraained involved 
with the Astor townsite, many eastern investors were overextended and forced 
to sell-lrheir property at Astor or stop payment on their original shares.88 
Expressing the general condition of the townsite in Jtm.e of 1839, James Doty 
claimed that 11the times are no better here, but rather worse. There is no 
money in this comtry and we are living by barter. 1189 
By 1840, Jam.es Doty himself was in financial difficulty. As a member of 
the territorial camnission for erecting public buildings, Doty had used part 
of the money for his improvement schemes. Panic-stricken by a possible 
territorial investigation of his financial affairs, Doty requested John Astor 
to loan him $12,000 to cover the missing ftm.ds. 90 Robert Stuarl comselled 
John Astor to grant Doty•s request because Doty•s "• •• inability not to do 
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so (that is pay back the money), would at once destroy his credit and political. 
:influence, and this would be a greater loss to the Astor propertz alone, than 
twice ;~12,000. 1191 Doty thus was supported by John Astor during the depression; 
his reputation was preserved leading eventually to his appointment as governor 
of the Wisconsin Territory in 1841. 92 
Both Astor and Navarino suffered during t.he depression, but as in other 
lake towns, the easing of the financial contraction began in late 1839 and 
1840. The most encouraging sign for the Green Bay region was basically a 
change of attitude, a realization that further town developnent required a 
surplus-producing agricultural. interior. In an editorial in the Wisconsin 
Democrat in 1839, this change of economic orientation was apparent: 
If but one-half of the money which has been expended on useless 
buildings had been applied to the improvement and cultivation or 
f a.rms instead of now being can.palled to expend our thousands for 
the benefit of foreign markets, we might have a surplus of agri-
cultural products for exportation. 
Unoccupied stores, the high price of provisions, and the general 
complaint of hard times, should admonish business men, men of 
capital, that if they wish to invest funds in a manner that will 
ultimately tend to their own advantage as well as to the sub-
stantial good of the comm.unity, they must turn their attention to 
the cultivation of the soil • • • • 93 
But f a.rm.ing did not develop as quickly in the :1.nunediate hinterland of 
Green Bay, and in this lay one of the chief reasons for Green Bay's slower 
growth ca:n.pared to Chicago and Milwaukee. 94 Geography again plB\fed a large 
role in western develoi:ment. The overland routes to the West ran along the 
southern shore of Lake Michigan, then turned north to Milwaukee and Green Bay. 
Thus Green B~ waited on the natural movement of population to the North. 
But geography was not the sole reason for Green Bay's slower cteveloi:ment, for 
transportation connections with the East were never established. Despite the 
efforts of James Doty 1 Green B~ never established a regular line of steamboats 
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with the principal port of Buffalo. Moreover, the town.sites at Astor and 
Navarino did not have access to the large number of capitalists as did Chicago 
and Milwaukee. 95 
South of Green Bay, the majority of secondary towns were located within 
the present-day boundaries of Wisconsin. The United States government pur-
chased Indian title to the lands along the westem shore of Lake Michigan at 
two treaties. The Menaninee Treaty of 1831 purchased the land on which 
Kewaunee, Manitowoc, and Sheboygan were later plotted while the Indian Treaty 
of 1833, negotiated at Chicago, cleared title to the land where Kenosha, 
Racine, and Milwaukee were located.96 Between 1833 and 1835, the majority of 
this land was surveyed and then sold at the government land sale at Green Bay 
in 1835. While townsites were already underway at Green Bay, Chicago, and 
Milwaukee, speculators and capitalists utilized every available location. In 
1836, the Green Bay Intelligencer mentioned six separate settlements with:in 
Wisconsin which voiced pretensions of town status.97 Later that same year, 
the Green Bay Intelligencer described the mania of townsite speculation: 
In a few days after the close of navigation the excitement attendant 
on the Land Sales seemed to die away, and little was expected till 
the opening of the season. But the speculators cannot rest. With-
in the last three days many thousand dollars have been paid in the 
entry of lands at the Green Bay Land Office: Agents are sent on for 
companies - monies remitted to the Clerk of the Office, citizens or 
this place employed to make the entry, and in one way or another the 
business of entering Public lands is going on at a brisk rate. The 
principal points now sought are Manitowoc and Rock Rivers •••• 
A year ago Milwaukee was suspected of having sane pretensions to a 
townsite. But now we have done speaking of that place; the specu-
lators are aJ.l past there - it is an old place; Lots have reached 
the maximum - say 1000 to 5000 - The attention is now directed fur-
ther down the Lake. Sac Creek, Sheboygan, Sleeping River, and 
Manitowoc are at this manent the rage. Within a week the lands 
have risen .fran $10 to $250 per acre at Manitowoc - they talk or a 
communication direct fran thence to Fort Winnebago! At the Sheboygan, 
the most bea.utifulA and we doubt not thanost important town site on 
the Lake • • • • 9 
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Next to Green Bay, the first townsite on the northwest shore of Lake 
Michigan was Kewal.lllee. It was first brought to the attention of western 
capitalists in September, 18.36, when the Wisconsin Democrat advertised its 
location in an article most likely written by the town's promoters. According 
to this article, Kewaunee's two most notable attractions were the Kewal.lllee 
River which was navigable five miles into the interior and even shoreline 
which would permit harbor construction. 99 The Kewal.lllee townsite was under the 
direction of Joshua Hathaway who had previously invested at Milwaukee.100 
Hathaway advertised extensively throughout the Wisconsin Territory and in 
Chicago for merchants and artisans. Lot purchasers were pranised a reduction 
101 
of 40 per-cent if a dwelling or store were erected. Hathaway also had 
financial backers, chief of wham was Levi Beardsley, a New York banker.102 
Shortly after the Kewaunee site was established, the depression of 1837 
forced many of its supporters to withdraw. One Chicago lawyer infonned 
Hathaway that he could not meet his p~ents on lot purchases. Kewal.lllee, 
then, faded from the list of viable townsites until the late 1840 1s.103 
South of Kewaunee, the next most popular site was Manitowoc. This 
location was at first the creation of western entrepreneurs led by James 
Duane Doty of Green Bay. After establishjng Manitowoc, Doty planned to con-
nect the Manitowoc River by canal with a small stream running into Lake 
Winnebago. According to Doty 1s scheme, this canal would tap the resources of 
the agricultural interior as well as increase Manitowoc's potential as a port 
city.104 
In 18.35, Doty began directing eastern capital to the townsite. He 
interested two New York capitalists, Benjamin Clapp and John c. Halsey. Doty 
had met both men through his earlier association with John Astor's American 
Fur Canpany. Clapp was an executive in the New York offices of the American 
Fur Company while John Halsey operated an eastern retail firm which, for many 
years, had supplied the American Fur Company with goods.l05 In 1SJ6, Doty 
persuaded the two men to sell their land at Milwaukee and then reinvest the 
money at Hanitowoc.106 Associated with James Doty in plotting the Manitowoc 
site was Albert G. Ellis of Green Bay. Ellis was part-owner of the Green Bay 
Intelligencer and also operated as a 1&1d agent for eastern financiers.107 
His principal eastern connection wa.s James B. Murra\}T, a brother-in-law of 
Arthur Bronson. Murray was attracted to the Manitowoc site because Ellis and 
Doty claimed it had excellent harbor facilities and would soon be linked by 
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canal with Lake Winnebago. 
Various attempts were ma.de by the chief speculators at ;.1anitowoc to 
obtain the necessary internal improvements. In January, 1837, Ellis, Doty, 
and James Murray urged Wisconsin's territorial delegate, George Jones, to 
petition Congress for harbor appropriations at Manitowoc.109 George Jones 
requested congressional aid, but the depression had brought the curtailment 
of govelTl!llent spending ending Manitowoc's hope for harbor construction.110 
Located south or Manitowoc, Sheboygan experienced a sjmilar develoµnent. 
In 1835, a government surveyor judged that Sheboygan was a better harbor 
location than Milwaukee since .forested land in the interior provided ample 
building materials.lll The obvious availability of the Sheboygan site did 
not escape the eyes of western capitalists. At the Green BS¥ land sale in 
1835, Daniel Whitney, Joshua Hathaway, and George Smith purchased most of the 
land surrounding Sheboygan. These entrepreneurs then formed a company, 
plotted the village of Sheboygan, and commenced selling lots to interested 
ea.stem capitalists.112 The proprietors built stores and a hotel in 1836. 
They al.so felt confident that the Troy and Erie Steamboat Line from ~uffalo 
would make regular trips there.113 Initial publicity through the Green Bay 
Intelligencer was excellent since the newspaper claimed that 
The site is unquestionably the most beautitul one upon the western 
shore of Lake Michigan, and the land in its vicinity and fran 
thence to Lake Winnebago surpassed by none in the Territory.114 
In 1835 and 1836, many of the most important western speculators purchased 
land at Sheboygan. James Doty, Morgan L. Martin, William B. Ogden, and Gurdon 
Hubbard directed eastern capitalists to the site.115 Moreover, Sheboygan 
attracted a number of merchants and lawyers all believing that it would 
eventually dominate Lake Michigan's western shore. With the onset of the 
depression in 1837, however, many speculators found themselves overextended, 
harbor construction faltered, and the backcountry failed to attract f'a:nners. 
Slowly the town's merchants and artisans moved awa;y, perhaps to Milwaukee and 
Chica.go. A contemporary resident described the failure of the tCJrlnsite: 
A number of' framed dwelling-houses and stores were erected during 
the fall and village lots rose rapidly in value. A lot which two 
years afterwards could not have been sold for as many shillings, 
was considered a bargain at five or six hundred dollars. At the 
same time there was not a farm in the country; not twenty acres of 
cul ti va.ted land within forty miles. But this was no obstacle to 
building a western city in 1836. No one stopped to consider that 
in order to establish camnerce, to sell merchandise, to ply the 
various mechanic arts, there was a necessity for a productive class 
in the vicinity. Everybody wcs expecting sudden affluence fran the 
rise in the prices of wild lands. There was a t.emporary show ot 
prosperity, while they were patronizing one another which continued 
during the time they were fitting up their houses, and getting 
settled in them. This was very encouraging while it lasted. But 
all of a sudden, it was discovered that eve:rybody was out of money 
and that nobody had anything to do •••• ll6 
While the settlements between Green Bay and Milwaukee experienced great 
difficulty, two other townsites south of Milwaukee, Racine and Kenosha, 
achieved limited success. On numerous voyages along the western shore of 
Lake Michigan, Gilbert Y..napp, an ex-naval officer, was the first to consider 
a townsite at Racine. Once the Indian title to the land was cleared. by the 
Treaty of 1833, Knapp interested Gurdon Hubbard, one of Chicago's major specu-
lators, in plotting a town.site there.117 But neither Hubbard nor Knapp had 
the necessary capital resources. r'ortunatel.y, Benjamin Barker, an eastern 
emigrant, visited the Ra.cine area in 1835, Barker had been supported in his 
western migration by his brother Jacob Barker, a partner in a large Buffalo 
forwarding business. On the advice of his brother, Jacob BA.rker then f omed 
a partnership with Hubbard and Knapp to share in the expense and profits of 
the Racine project.118 Since Gurdon Hubbard lived at Chicago and Jacob Barker 
at Buffalo, the majority of promotional -work fell to Gilbert Knapp and Benjamin 
Darker, acting as his brother's agent.119 
To attract more capitalists and merchants to the Racine area, Jacob 
Barker sold many of his town lots •120 In 18.37, he sold a halt interest in his 
property to Stephen Ives and Marshall Strong. Marshall Strong was from New 
York, and, although a lawyer by profession, he operated a dry goods store in 
partnership ld.th Stephen Ives at Ra't:ine.121 The town's principal landholders 
also led the way in establishing Ha.cine's business potential. Benjamin Barker, 
with the financial support of his brother Jacob at Buffalo, built a warehouse 
and a general store.122 Gilbert Knapp sold lots at reduced prices to mer-
chants who agreed to construct stores and houses.123 Later Knapp and Hubbard 
erected a public building to acconunodate a court house and county offices. 
To improve Ra.cine's connections with the interior, Benjanin Barker and Marshall 
Strong constructed a bridge across the Root River running through Racine.124 
One of the inmediate needs of any frontier town was adequate publicity 
which usually depended upon the establishment of a newspaper. As early as 
18.36, Gilbert Knapp expressed his desire for a newspaper, but at first he 
lacked the necessary capital. '1;ritiruz to Jacob Barker. Knaoo emphasized the 
great need of a newspaper for 11 • • • one man can do much to praise his 
country,, but when the newspaper talks it is with a thousand tungs (sic) 11125 
Thus Knapp asked Jacob Barker for .financial support and aid in lining up 
eastern subscribers.126 Because of the depression, however, Knapp was not 
able to establish a newspaper until February, 1838,, and then it was only in 
circulation until October, 1838. Yet the newspaper was a joint undertaking 
of the major town pranoters including Knapp, Stephen Ives,, and harshall 
Strong.l'Zl 
During its short existence, the jE1cine Areu:s advertised the town's 
advantages to merchants and famers. In one issue, the Ra.cine Argus claimed 
that the town's merchants were incapable of handling the large retail trade.1 2$ 
In l!arch, 1838, the newspaper camnented that 
••• It (Racine) was first settled about three years ago. Its 
growth since that time, although not as rapid as some others, has 
been gradual and pemanent. While many places that, during the 
rage of speculation for the last two years,, have outstripped us, 
now retrograde, or at least have to stand still for the country 
which sustains them to settle and improve, our march, not having 
been in advance of the surrounding country, which is now rapidly 
settling, will continue onward.. There is not, in our estimation, 
any place in the Territory that promises a more rapid and penna-
nent growth, nor any place where the enterprising capitalist could 
use his money to better advantage than this.129 
Despite such promotional efforts,, Racine grew slowly. The depression 
handicapped commercial and retail businesses and slowed the pace of improve-
ments. At one point,, Gilbert Y!.llapp and other capitalists tried to establish a 
bank and later a mutual .fire insurance company, but both projects .failed to 
attract sufficient stock subscriptions.130 Internal improvements,, such as a 
harbor and a railroad to the interior, were also stymied by the lack ot capi-
tal. As in all lakeport towns,, the proprietors immediately realized the need 
for harbor improvement. In 1836, ships were forced to unload passengers and 
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cargo into smaller vessels which could navigate the shallow waters ciose to 
the shore. Both Benjanin Barker and Gilbert Knapp :improved this mode of trans-
portation by building small vessels to carry passengers and goods from the 
larger sailing ships.l3l Knapp also purchased a full-sized schooner in 
1836.l32 Of course, Hacine possessed a decided advantage because Jacob Barker 
owned steam.boats and a forwarding house in Buffalo. Yet Barker's camnercial 
connections were of little value without an adequate harbor. While government 
surveys were made at Racine for a harbor, no government action followed. 
Gilbert Knapp twic'9 journeyed to Washington to lobby in Congress.133 Jacob 
Barker signed petition after petition and encouraged praninent eastern busi-
nessmen to support harbor improvement at Racine.l34 The lack of harbor appro-
priations at Racine was again due to the .financial depression; Congress did 
not have the necessary funds for harbor improvement anywhere on the western 
shore of Lake Hichigan i.mtil the mid 1840's.135 Through capital subscriptions 
by Racine citizens, a minimal program of harbor improvements was undertaken in 
1840.136 In order to tap the agricultural resources of the interior, the 
Racine promoters chartered two railroad lines in 183S known as the Root River 
Railroad and the Racine and Rock River Railroad Company. Both charters, how-
ever, were soon forfeited when the promoters failed to obtain the required 
stockholders.137 
The depression also affected the economic position of many of the town's 
proprietors. In late 1837, Banjamin Barker left Racine to return to Joliet, 
Illinois, because of financial failure. His share of the Racine property wa.s 
claimed by creditors throughout the territory. b'ventually, Jacob Barker was 
forced to satisfy his brother's debts. l38 Harhhall Strong in 1839 considered 
leaving Racine because " • • • the growth of Racine has been too slow for me. 
I find myself embarrassed with debt, with no means or prospects, if I stayed, 
of extricating myself. 111.39 It wa.s not until the early 1840 1s with the in-
creasing agricultural production of the interior that Racine became a viable 
townsite. 
The original settlement of Kenosha. was unique for its primary purpose was 
settlement and not speculation.140 The origins of Kenosha or Southport as it 
was called in the 1840's actually began at Hannibal, Oswego County, New York, 
where in 1834 a number of £armers and businessmen talked increasingly about 
moving to the weatem states. John Bullen, Jr., who was then post-master at 
Hannibal, took the lead and invited the most respected camnunity members to a 
dinner at his home where the principal topic of conversation was westem mi-
gration.141 To render the move as cheap and quick as possible,, the Western 
Emigration Canpany was established. In Article I of the company's constitu-
tion, its aims were clearly stated: 
For the purpose of aiding those disposed to emigrate to the Westem 
States or Territories, in the purchase of land and the pursuit of 
agriculture, manufactures,, mechanics and other branches of industry, 
and the fonnation of a desirable community • • • .142 
In the spr:ing or 1835, the lilestem I!lnigration Compa.rzy- dispatched several 
members to explore the westem shore of Lake Hichiga.n for a possible townsite 
and fertile :fa.ming lands. The exploring party stopped at Hilwaukee,, but 
found that land prices there were too high. Racine offered little inducement 
since Gilbert Knapp and Gurdon Hubbard had already claimed the majority of 
land. Finally, the W13stem .&nigra.tion Company decided on Pike Creek, a sm.aJ.l 
stream flowing into Lake Michigan about ten miles south of Racine. Once the 
news reached Hannibal,, New York, a small party of eight families came West to 
settle at Pike Creek.143 
It was only a short time until the settlement at Pike Creek attracted 
the interest of speculators all over the territory. In late 1835, a Chicago 
land dealer, Augustus Garrett, offered to purchase the whole tract.144 In 
1836, Charles ll. Turner, a member of the i:estern Emigration Company, became 
dissatisfied and staked out a claim to lands along the Pike !liver, a mile 
north of Pike Creek. Then other investors came to the two settlements from 
F..a.cine, Milwaukee, and Chicago.11+.5 By 1836, however, the Western 11nigra.tion 
Company disbanded by the mutual consent of its members.146 
Little information remains about the early history of the settlements at 
Pike Creek and Pike River, but occasional bits of infonnation indicated that 
the progress of the towns was similar to that at other points on the lake shore 
For example, the original members of the Western rl:nigration Company had claimed 
farm land as well as plotted a town, but as in the Hilwaukee area they were 
forced to wait until the government land sale in 1839 to secure legal title 
to the land. Thus the leaders of the comnnmity fonn.ed the Pike River 
Claimant's Union in 1838 to protect the settler's land until the public 
sale.11+.7 Harbor improvement was also an early demand of residents of both 
bommunities. In 1837, the settlement of Pike Creek sent Charles Durkee to 
1i~·ashington to lobby for harbor appropriations. But he also ran into the 
probltms created by the depression, and government funds were refused.148 Yet 
Pike River and Pike Creek also contested for a possible harbor site, a quarrel 
which prohibited developnent at either point. William Ogden of Chicago was 
the largest investor at Pike River, and he, of course, desired the harbor to 
be located contiguous to his property. When Ogden learned that Charles Durkee 
of Pike Creek had been sent to Washington, Ogden also considered journeying 
to that city to prevent Durkee fran gaining an advantage.149 By 1839,, the two 
settlements were united in the village of Southport and both now worked for a 
harbor appropriation. O A local citizen indicated the .importance of harbor 
construction to the struggling town: 
Building lots are wurth here frcm 75 to 200. If the Govt. would 
make an appropriation for a harbor here we should shortly have a 
right smart place. vie have one of the finest and most healthy 
backcountries you can imagine • • • • Ifo man can .form anything 
like a correct idea of the country without seeing it - Govt. ought 
to make an appropriation soon - for in less than five years there 
will be a large surplus of butter, cheese, Pork Lard, wheft & beef 
dependent on eastern and southern markets for sale •••• 51 
Despite the absence of government aid, the t.itizens undertook many 
.improvements such as roads and bridges. Construction wa.s begun on a harbor, 
but it never proved userui.152 Similar to other lake shore towns, Kenosha 
waited until the 1840's and government funds for an adequate harbor.153 
Not all townsitcs on the western shore of Lake Hichigan could emerge as 
major camnercial centers, even though ea.ch promoter envisioned that result. 
There were various reasons for the slow developnent of these secondary to1-m-
sites. Kewaunee, Manitowoc, and Sheboygan faced the same problem as Green 
Bay; agriculture did not develop in the north until later decades. Thus trade 
was stymied. South of Hilwaukee, Racine and Kenosha had more settled interiors 
but they faced the canpetition of the already thriving commercial ports of 
Chicago and Milwaukee. lforeover, all the secondary townsites confronted the 
financial difficulties caused by the depression. Harbor .improvement, canal 
connections with the interior, and the general construction of stores and 
houses were all slowed by the scarcity of capital. Yet the origj_nal settle-
ment and pranotion of the secondary townsites exemplified many aspects or 
western town growth. In the first years, speculation played a major role in 
the econo."Ilic life of the towns. The speculators plotted the towns, attracted 
emigrants, and provided jobs in constructing stores and houses. Initially 
western entrepreneurs located the secondary townsites, but they eventually 
turned to the resources of eastern financiers. Gilbert Knapp and Gurdon 
Hubba.rd depended on Jacob Barker at Buffalo. James Doty worked closely with 
John Astor and solicited the funds of additional easterners such as Benjamin 
Clapp and John Halsey. Horgan L. Hartin financed his interests in the Bank 
of Wisccnsin and in land in the Green Bay region through his brothers, John 
and ;':illiam, frcm New York. As in Chicago and :·ulwaukee, the pattern was 
clear; town growth was a cooperative venture of eastern capita.lists and west-
ern entrepreneurs. 
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FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER VII 
1 The Green Ba.y area has not attracted the attentions of either the 
amateur or professional historian during the period of town growth. There 
are, however, two early histories of Green Bay which are encyclopedic in 
character and provide a f'und of useful info:nnation: l.:J.la Hoes Neville, 
Sharah Greene Martin, and Deborah Martin, Historic Green Bay, 1634-1840 (Green 
Bay: Published by the authors, 1893); Deborah Martin, History of Brown Countz, 
Wisconsin (2 vols.; Chicago: The s.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1913); and 
William A. Titus, Histo of the Fox lliver Valle Lake W:inneba o and the 
Green Bay Region (3 vols.; Chicago: The S.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1930 • 
The most authoritative information on Green Ba.y is found in the more 
recent w:>rks of Alice Smith especially her biography of James Doty: Alice E. 
Smith, James Duane Doty, Frontier Promoter (Madison: The State Historical 
Society of r:isconsin, 1954). 
4rhe arrival of numerous white settlers at Green Ba.v has been described 
by two contemporaries: Ebenezer Childs, "Recollections of Wisconsin Since 
1820, 11 !ill£,, IV,, pp. 153-195; Albert G. fil.lis, "Fifty-Four Years' Recollections 
of Men and ..!.'Vents in Wisconsin," lli!Q, VII, PP• 2fJ7-268. 
3For a brief period, John La.we, the fur trader employed by the American 
Fur Company, purchased land in the Green ~ area between 1824 and 1829, and 
laid out the small town of Menomineeville. During this period, however, white 
settlers were not moving to Green Ba.y nor was IA.we able to maintain his town 
due to losses in the fur trade. Infonna.tion on Lawe• s early townsite can be 
found in Alice Smith, 11Daniel Whitney, Pioneer Wisconsin Businessman,," 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXIV (1940-1941), 289-292. 
4charles Kappler (ed.) 1 Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1904),, II, pp. ?50-255. This Treaty is also dis-
cussed in Smith,, James Doty, p. 79. 
5Kappler (ed..) I Indian Affairs' n, pp. 319-325. A detailed discussion 
of treaties affecting Wisconsin lands is contained in William F. Raney, 
Wisconsin, A Story of Progress (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940) 1 PP• 78-
79. Cession of Indian land was often a confused situation in early Wisconsin 
because New York tribes had been moved to hisconsin in the 1820's. For a 
discussion of the New York Indians see Smith, James Doty, PP• 109-115. 
6 Green Ba;y Intelligencer, September 121 1835. The newspaper advertised 
extensively that a public sale was to take place. An actual description of 
the sale has been provided by Elizabeth T. Baird, rrReminiscences of Lite In 
Territorial .Jisconsin, 11 !lli.Q, IV, p. 242. 
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GeneralJ.y, the region was referred to as Green Bay which encompassed the 
townsites of Navarino, Astor, and DePere. In 1S38, Astor and Navarino were 
united in the town of Green Ba.y, but each site retained its identity as a 
ward of the town. See Neville, Sarah Martin, and Deborah Martin, Historic 
Green Bay, Po 260. 
8Daniel Whitney's early career was described in Alice Smith, "Daniel 
Whitney, Pioneer Wisconsin Businessman, 11 Wisconsin Magazine of History, XX.IV 
(1940-1941), 283-285. 
9Ibid., pp. 290-291; Smith, Janes Doty, p. 106. 
10 Green Bay Intelligencer, 1Jecember ll, 1833. 
11 ~., February 19, 1834. 
12 Alice Smith, "Daniel Whitney, 11 p. 291; Green 3ay Intelligencer, 
January 8, 1834. 
l3Green Bay Intelligencer, April 12, 1836; June 1, 1836. 
14see Chapter VI for a description of Martin's involvement at ~.ilwaukee. 
15 James Doty to John Astor, August 20, 18.36, John Astor Papers, Vol. 22, 
Baker Library, Harvard University. The John Astor Papers a.re on microfilm and 
held by Cudahy Library, Loyola University. Hereafter this collection will be 
cited as Astor Papers, Vol. No. 
16ror a discussion of the process of acquirlng land which was followed 
by John Astor and the American Fur Company see Chapter III. 
l7Smith, James Doty, p. 160; Kemeth Porter, John Jacob Astor: Business 
lli!!!, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1931), II, p. 855. 
18James Doty• s early career is discussed in the early chapters of Smith, 
Jame a Doty, pp. 1-157. 
19
statement of Shares held by the Proprietors of Astor, April 16, 1836, 
Astor Papers, 22. Also see Smith, James Doty, p. 161. 
20 Janes Doty to John Astor, Rams~ Crooks, and Robert Stuart, June 16, 
1835; James Doty to John Astor, November 14, 1835, .Astor Papers, 22. 
21John Astor, Robert Stuart, and Ransey Crooks to James Doty, March 5, 
1835, Astor Papers, 22; James Doty to John Astor, Novanber 8, 1835, Astor 
Papers, 22. Also see Smith, James Doty. 
22 John Astor, Ramsey Crooks, and Robert Stuart to Janes Doty, March 5, 
1835, Astor Papers, 22. 
23James Doty to Robert Stuart, July 28, 1835, and Robert Stuart to James 
Doty, August 4, 1835, Astor Papers, 22. 
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24Ja:nes Doty to John Astor, August 19, 1835, ~. 
25James Doty to John Astor, September 14, 1835, ~.; James Doty to John 
Astor, April 21.+, 1837, ~. 
26 James Doty to John Astor, October 18, 1836, ~. 
27~.; James Doty to John Astor, April 21.+, 1837, Astor Papers, 22. 
23 James Doty to John Astor, November 8, 1835, Astor Papers, 22. 
29
needs of Sale to New York Speculators, 1836, Astor Papers., 22. For a 
discussion of the sales to New York investors see Porter, John Astor, II, 
PP• 863-864. 
30John Astor to Jam.es Doty., March 4, 1836, Astor Papers, 16. 
31James Doty to John Astor, ~ 10., 18.36., Astor Papers., 22. 
3 2James Doty to John Astor, ~ 17., 1836, ~· 
33Jam.es Doty to John Astor., June 28, 18.36., ~· 
34James Doty to John Astor., October 1., 1836, !!:!!!!• 
35John Astor to James Doty., July 15., 1835, Astor Papers, 16; James Doty 
to John Astor., :,fey 19, 1835, Astor Papers., 22. 
36James Doty to John Astor, August 19, 1835, Astor Papers, 22. 
37John Astor to James Doty, September 8_, 1835; John Astor to Robert 
Stuart, October 15., 1835; &..'1.d John Astor to James Doty, March 4, 1836, Astor 
Papers., 16. 
38James Doty to John Astor., February 14., 1B36, Astor Papers., 22. Also 
see James Doty to John Astor., December 21+, 1835; January 1., 18.36., Astor Papers., 
22. 
39chaster Jerm.ings, Ramsay Crooks, Charles Butler', James ·,/ebb, T. Roberts., 
Horatio Seymour, 3amuel Stocking, c. Griswold., Wright and Winston to John 
Astor, November 16, 1836, Astor Papers, 2,4. 
40James Doty to John Astor., June 18, 1836, Astor Papers., 22. Also see 
Smith, James Doty, p. 163; Hary Mitchell, "Reminiscences of the Early North-
west.," Wisconsin State Historical Society Proceedings, 1902, P• 182. 
4l.James Doty to John Astor, February 6, 1837, and April 21+, 18.37, Astor 
Papers., 22. 
42Jam.es Doty to John Astor., November 8., 1835; July 25., 1836; and October 
18, 1836, Astor Papers., 22. 
---
John Astor to Norris Woodruff, March 17, 1837; John Astor, Samuel 
Stocking, November 2.3, 1836; and John Astor to Robert Stuart, Noveci.ber 2.3, 
1836, Astor Papers, 16. 
44James Doty to John Astor, January ll, 1837, and June 16, 18371 Astor Papers, 2.2. 
45James Doty to John Astor, June 28, 1836, ~. 
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46James Doty to John Astor, April 5, 1837; James Doty to John Astor, 
February 3, 1838; James Doty to John Astor, April 1, 1838; James Doty to John 
Astor, Mq 28, 1838, Astor Papers, .22. 
47Doty•s plans for Astor and the territory are discussed. in a letter of 
Doty to Astor, September 14, 1835, Astor Papers, 2.2. An excellent discussion 
of Doty•s involvement in internal improvements is contained. in Smith, James 
Doty, PP• 174-191. 
48Smith, Janes Doty, pp. 198-202. 
49James Doty to John c. Halsey, January 21 1836, James Doty Pa.pers, 
Vol. I, Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif'ornia. This collection is small 
and has been microfilmed. The designation of I, refers to microfilm reel 
No. 1. Hereafter cited as Doty Papers, Huntington Library. 
50James Doty to John Astor, October 1, 1836; James Doty to Jolm Astor, 
February 6, 1837, Astor Papers, 2.2. Also see Smith, James Doty, p, 168. 
51rn 1836, Doty received an additional $5,000 to invest all O'rer the 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
In the mid 1840's, the formative period of town developnent on the 
western shore of Lake Michigan had drawn to a close. Future years would bring 
railroads to tap the agrirultural interior, shipping lines to utilize the Great 
Lakes system, and a new immigration of fanners, merchants, and capitalists. 
Chicago and Milwaukee solidified their positions as the most important cam-
mercial centers, but at the same time each of the secondary townsites developed 
their own balanced economies. The establishment of such viable townsites has 
been the focus of this study. 
The developnent of the western shore of Lake Michigan went through two 
distinguishable stages. In the first stage the government, the .American Fur 
Company, and individual traders were of special importance while in the second 
stage land speculation, eastern capitalists, and western entrepreneurs were of 
primary consideration. 
After the 'viar of 1812, the American government sought to pacify the 
Indians and dispel British influence in the lucrative fur trade operating 
from centers at Chicago and Green Bay. The first step was to establish a 
military post at Fort Howard at Green Bay and rebuilt Fort Dearborn at 
Chic ago. Then Indian agents were sent to this frontier area to regulate the 
conduct of the Indian trade by licensing fur traders an:i assuring that British 
influence over the Indian tribes was curtailed. Finally the factory system 
was an ployed to buy Indian furs and sell goods at fair prices. 
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But the government's policies were poorly conceived and implemented, for 
contra.dictions abounded within the system. Indian agents licensed traders who 
then competed with the factory system. Frontier traders resented. the intru-
sions of all government institutions. The military was to protect the traders 
from the Indians when they had maintained friendly relations for generations. 
The Indian agent enforced government laws, such as the license law of 1816 1 
which required the traders to subnit to regulations in a previously indepen-
dent frontier business. The factory was resented because it was a business 
enterprise competing for the Indian's furs. By 18221 the government closed 
its factories and assumed a purely regulato:cy role over the frontier and the 
fur trade. 
While the national government searched for a suitable frontier policy 
fran 1815 to 18221 a new institution had entered the picture - the American 
Fur Company. Established by John Jacob Astor and managed by Hamsay Crooks and 
Robert Stuart, the American Fur Campany was a major business corporation de-
signed to exploit the Indian trade. In its initial years of operation, the 
American Fur Company utilized the confusion surrounding government policy to 
entice the fur traders to join the canpany. The license law of 1816, for 
example, changed so often that the fur traders never knew fran one year to the 
next whether they could participate in the trade. Yet the American Fur Com-
pany through influence on national and local officials provided. assurances 
that licenses would be available. The American Fur Company contributed to 
the failure of the factory system by aiding local traders in competing with 
the government business. The western shore or Lake Michigan was hardly a 
placid and remote wilderness, for the national government and the American Fur 
Company competed for control of the Indians and the fur trade. 
--
Fron l.S22 to l.S33, the American Fur Company was the principal agent of 
frontier society. Trading headquarters were established at the bro centers of 
civilization, Chica.go and Green Da.v. The company exercised canplete control of 
the traders assigning each one to a specific region and regulating the profits 
of any selected trader. 'I'he Green Bay and Chicago traders found themselves 
unable to garner sufficient profits under this system, and they slowly accumu-
lated huge debts to the American Fur Company. ~·,'hen the fur trade declined in 
the 18301s because of increasing white settlanent and the sale of Indian lands, 
the fur traders and the .American Fur Company withdrew leaving few positive 
econanic or social contributions to the next stage of frontier society. The 
fur traders la.eked land and capital both having been lost to the American Fur 
Canpany for debts <tompiled in the trade. While they had occupied and solidi-
fied the geographic sites of future towns, such as Green Ba.v and Chicago, and 
indicated the usefulness of waterways, such as the Illinois and Hichigan Canal 
and the Fox and i·fisconsin Rivers, the fur traders and the American Fur Cozapa.ny 
never developed the land or comnercial facilities of the towns because the 
fur trade economy required the most primitive conditions. In sun, the fur 
trade era was a "stage 11 of frontier history designed to exploit the country for 
the manent. Thus the towns on the western shore of Lake m.chigan did not 
develop in the period from 1815 to 1833. The real period of 11westwa.rd 
expansion" occurred within a decade from 1833 to 1843 when emigrants .fran the 
F..a.st arrived with the necessary capital and technical. skill to build towns 
from the primitive fur trade villages. 
Leading the westward march to the towns were eastern land speculators. 
From Green Ba.¥ to Chicago, these men poured capital into the frontier villages 
dreaming of future western metropolises on the lake. In Chicago, Arthur 
Bronson, Charles Butler, and 1'tiward Russell were the major eastern financial 
investors who were represented by western agents like h'illiam Ogden an:i Gurdon 
Hubbard. In Hilwaukee, Hicajah ·~.rilliams of Cincinnati formed a partnership 
with Byron Kilbourn while Solomon Juneau turned to Morgan L. Martin of Green 
Bay who invested the capital of a group of New York financiers. At Green ~ 1 
James Doty plotted the town of Astor through the capital resources of John 
Astor. At smller towns, the storJ was the same. Manitowoc, Kewaunee, and 
Racine were all established through the resources of eastern capitalists with 
their interests being managed by western entrepreneurs like Gilbert Knapp at 
Racine. 
Townsites along the western shore of Lake Michigan quickly attracted 
the attention of financiers, merchmts, and farmers across the nation. In the 
first. few years, the exchange of town lots represented the principal economic 
activity of town residents, for fanners and merchants reached the towns at a 
later date. But the speculators were preparing the WS\Y' by improving streets 
and constructing Rtores and houses. These improvements, of course, brought 
higher prices when a particular lot was sold. Yet the major speculators owned 
innumerable lots and profits from sales were often reinvested in other areas 
of the to'Wtl. The eastern financier employed many western agents 'l'tlo E.lll.erged 
as leaders of the community in canmerce and politics. Gurdon Hubbard and 
~lilliam Ogden in Chicago 1 Byron Kilbourn and Solomon Juneau in Milwaukee, 
James Doty in Astor, and Gilbert Knapp in Racine owed their economic and 
political success partly to their association with eastern speculators in 
western towns. 
As the towns developed, new areas of corrmerce and retail business opened 
up. The speculators, such as Arthur Bronson and Micajah T. Williams, provided 
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the capital to build stores and warehouses which were then rented to merchants 
as yet unable to finance the construction of their own establishnwnts. Her-
chants, for example, were able to borrow capital through William Ogden and 
Gurdon Hubbard in Chicago who obtained the funds .from their eastern partners. 
Emigrants arriving in these rustling western villages discovered that jobs were 
plentiful because of the manpower requirements for constructing stores and 
houses. Gradually a generation of western entrepreneurs directed their inter-
ests to new businesses. Gurdon Hubbard, for example, opened a commission and 
.forwarding b.tsiness while William Ogden and Byron Kilbourn operated land 
agencies. 
But the continued developnent of the town required a balanced economy. 
In their first years, Chicago, Z..filwaukee, and Green Bay purchased all manu-
factured products and .food supplies fran the 1·~ast or marby settled regions. 
As the backcountry was settled, farmers were able to ship surpluses to the 
towns. To a lesser extent, tho speculators also played a significant role in 
developing the agricultural frontier. .fi'armers were able to obtain loans for 
the purchase of land fran Byron Kilbourn and William Oeden. These same men 
assured the proper functioning of the land system by establishing organiza-
tions of fanners to protect their land claims. 
Throughout these years, town promoters sought to increase communications 
with the interior and the ba.st. In Chicago, Arthur Bronson and Charles Butler 
constantly pushed the Illinois and Michigan Canal, at one point they even 
considered financing the canal through a private company. When construction 
was undertaken by the state, Arthur Bronson was one of the heaviest sub-
scribers to canal bonds. William Ogden and Gurdon Hubbard, the principal 
agents of eastern capital at Chica.go, supervised the financing and building 
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